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Syposium: The Trial of The uGang of Four" 
and Its Implications in China 
INTRODUCTION 
By James C. Hsiumg 
The recent trial in Peking of the so-called ""Gang of Four," 
including Mao Zedong's widow, Jiang Qing, is probably the most 
significant political development in China since Mao's death in 1976, 
and is likely to have far-reaching effects on China's internal politics 
and foreign policy. The trial, held from November 20 to December 29, 
1980, is important for a number of reasons. It symbolized, first of all, 
the formal reversal of the course into which the People's Republic had 
been launched since Mao's Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976. Second, 
if during the Maoist purges in the late 1960s we had heard only the 
accusers' version against the purged "revisionists," now for the first 
time we were able to hear the former victims - since then 
rehabilitated - speak out against their Cultural Revolutionary 
persecutors, who, in an ironic reversal of history, were on trial in late 
1980. 
Third, from the revelations by Peking's current leaders and the 
"confessions" of the former radicals during the trial process, the 
outside world was able to gain new insights into the nature and 
workings of politics in the Chinese Communist system. In addition, 
the specific ways in which the trial was conceived and conducted, 
some of which were highly contrived and improvised, are also worth 
studying, as they serve to enhance our understanding of Chinese 
politics as a whole. 
Although the trial of the "Gang of Four" has been viewed in and 
outside of China as having been prompted by the revengeful and 
self-serving motives of Peking's present leaders, which is probably 
very true, the trial can be studied for its larger meanings. In the first 
place, the trial process was certainly educational in that it was staged 
to redirect China's official ideology by expunging the discredited 
ideology identified with the former ultra-Maoist radicals. The 
seriousness with which the campaign was launched bespeaks the 
continuing primacy of ideology as an unwritten code to be internal-
(1) 
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ized and practiced by all Chinese. The "correct" ideological line being 
promoted now is best summed up in Deng Xiaoping's dictum that 
"truth is to be tested through practice," which is to replace the 
ultra-Maoist romanticism of the "Gang of Four." (Equally discredited 
was the "whateverism" laid to another group of Maoists not 
associated with the "Gang ·of -Four': who briefly had in 1976-1978 
claimed that "whatever Chairman Mao had said or done was correct.") 
To discredit the radicals was, therefore, also to discredit the 
particular ideology and policy line that they had stood for when they 
were in power from 1966 to 1976. In this sense, the trial was more 
than a power struggle; it was simultaneously an ideological struggle. 
Second, the purge of the radicals and their brand of socialism was 
a campaign almost exclusively engineered at the top, with the 
Chinese masses being called upon merely to ratify what the present 
leadership in Peking had done and to endorse the latter's wishes. If 
this is indicative of anything, Chinese politics remains elite-
dominated, no matter what others may claim. The flow of political 
information and action starts from the top, constituting "input" into 
the political system, while the participation (qua endorsement and 
implementation) by the Chinese public is the "output," reversing the 
input-output process postulated by Western political scientists for a 
political system. 
Third, the much-publicized debates surrounding the trial were 
meant to arouse public attention regarding the ideological shift noted 
above. These, however, were elite-sponsored debates, the purpose of 
which was not to involve the public in working out a solution or 
policy through debating the issues, as is often done in the West, but 
rather to drum up mass support to stamp out all residues of the Reign 
of the Radicals. 
Fourth, 'the political significance intended (such as re-educating 
the Chinese nation on the right ideological course and policy line to 
pursue) was more important than the legal significance of the trial 
proceedings (such as bringing the criminals to justice). Here one finds 
confirmation of the motto "Politics must take command", which Mao 
himself had made famous, although it is officially played down now. 
Fifth, in view of the results of the trial, which apparently fell 
short of the original expectations of the Deng group, Peking is today 
- perhaps as before - ruled by a coalition, albeit one with the Deng 
group anchored in the center. The many twists and turns accompany-
ing the course of the trial are probably symptomatic of the leadership 
disarray or the instability characterizing the leadership coalition in 
Peking today. The monolithic model- that one strongman such as 
THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FouR 3 
Deng Xiaoping is in absolute control - probably cannot explain the 
much more complex and fluid political reality in China. 
Finally, there was much "ad hoc-ishness" or improvisation in the 
way the Peking trial was conducted, which is also quite typical of 
Chinese politics and to some extent remotely reminiscent of the 
typical Maoist despise for routinization and standardization. One 
example was the combination in the trial of the "Gang of Four" and 
six former military associates of the disgraced Lin Biao, possibly to 
use the latter group's alleged assassination plot against Mao as a thin 
shield to protect Mao from being implicated in the sinister charges 
leveled at his widow and her three top aides. Another example of 
improvisation was the deliberate omission of Premier Zhou Enlai's 
role in the bloody purge of Liu Shaoqi, the former chief of state 
accused of being China's No. 1 "revisionist" during the Cultural 
Revolution. Equally, the ommission of Hua Guofeng's role in the 
Tienanmen Square Incident of April 5, 1976, now exclusively 
attributed to the "Gang of Four," was also a necessary contrivance to 
save Hua's skin, at least in that one incident, although the effects of 
the trial as a whole were detrimental to Hua's career. The special 
tribunal set up to hear and conduct the trial proceedings was also an 
ad hoc contrivance. Composed of previous victims of the "Gang of 
Four" purges of the 1960s and established by order of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, the special tribunal 
actually had no legal basis in the Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China. 
Although the trial of the "Gang of Four" is technically over, the 
campaign to discredit their particular brand of Chinese Communism 
and their remnant supporters - many of them probably now hiding 
in the closet - will most certainly continue for a long time to come. 
The three articl~s assembled in this symposium are meant to review 
the various aspects of the trial and to assess their implications for 
China beyond the end of ultra-Maoist radicalism. The one by Dr. 
Lyman Miller deals with the political aspects of the campaign against 
the radicals. Following that is an inquiry by Professor Hungdah Chiu 
into the legal aspects and implications of the trial. Dr. Lillian Craig 
Harris in her study approaches the purge of Jiang Qing and her 
associates from the human-rights angle. Together, they provide a 
good expose of the lessons that one can learn from the trial as the 
culmination of the purge of radicalism in post-Mao China. The 
selected primary documents, appended at the end of the collection, 
will provide additional details of the accusers' version of that purge. 
When read against the literature turned out during the Cultural 
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Revolution by the radicals, these should round out the picture of a 
prolonged struggle between the radicals and the "revisionists," in 
which this time the "revisionists" won. 
Postscript: Subsequent to the above writing, the long-awaited 
sixth plenum of the Central Committee CCC) of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) was convened on June 27-29, 1981. The 
results from the session brought the momentum built up during the 
"Gang of Four" trial to its logical extension. Hua Guofeng, Mao's 
hand-picked sucessor, was officially removed and demoted to the 
position of one of the Party's Vice Chairmen. More important, Mao's 
historical place was finally relegated to that of a brilliant revolution-
ary leader but ignominious ruler. A CC resolution adopted at the 
plenum credited Mao for his "indelible meritorious service" in 
bringing the CCP to power, but severely criticized him for having 
committed "theoretical and practical mistakes" as China's leader 
between 1949 and 1976. The greatest errors were made, it declared, 
during the Cultural Revolution, causing China "the most severe 
setbacks and heaviest losses." 
In the four years since he came back to power in 1977, Deng 
Xiaoping, who had been purged twice by Mao for ideological 
deviations, has carefully built a sufficiently wide-based coalition to 
push through his modernization programs and to remove Hua from 
the Party's chairmanship. Although Hu Yaobang, a protege, was 
made to replace Hua as the new Chairman, Deng will most probably 
remain as the country's de facto ruler. The more pragmatic brand of 
socialism fashioned by Deng is most likely to dominate in the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) for the immediate future. 
Although the retention of Hua Guofeng as a lowest-ranking Vice 
Chairman and a junior Politburo member and the less-than-total 
denunciation of Mao were compromises between the Deng group and 
the others among top Party leaders, Deng and his associates have 
emerged from the sixth plenum much stronger than before. Their 
latest victory was the crowning event for a prolonged and carefully 
calculated campaign to eliminate diehard Maoists from state, Party, 
and military bureaucracies. The trial and conviction of the "Gang of 
Four" was the culmination of that campaign. The significance of the 
trial, as Deng's reversal of Mao's Cultural Revolution, has thus been 
further illuminated by the latest developments in the PRC. 
All the essays in this symposium were written before the 
landmark sixth plenum, but the developments were mostly antici-
pated by the authors. We have decided to let the essays stand as 
originally written. 
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THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE DOCK: THE 
TRIALS IN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
By H. Lyman Miller* 
5 
The opening of criminal trials of the Cultural Revolution's 
surviving leftist elite in Beijing on November 20, 1980 was by any 
account a political spectacle, even judging by the standards of a 
country whose political history over the previous two decades has 
routinely provided the makings of high political drama. For the first 
time in PRC history disgraced members of the CCP's highest 
leadership were now on public trial for a long list of sensational 
crimes, including attempts to assassinate Mao Zedong and to foment 
armed rebellion in China's largest city. For several weeks the trials' 
almost daily proceedings dominated China's media, as the press 
frontpaged accounts of each day's events and Chinese radio and 
television carried long taped excerpts of each day's testimony. For the 
first time in four years, pictures of Mao's widow Jiang Qing returned 
to the pages of People's Daily. Virtually the last time her picture had 
appeared in the party's daily newspaper had been in September 1976, 
when she was portrayed as the deceased chairman's grieving widow 
and loyal student; now she appeared on the People's Daily's front page 
as the condemned "principal conspirator" of a vicious counterrevolu-
tionary clique. 
The opening of the public trials of the "gang of four" and the 
surviving associates of Lin Biao, nevertheless, was only the latest 
spectacular political event in a year which had already witnessed 
several other dramatic political happenings. The trials' opening was 
thus preceded in the same year by the posthumous rehabilitation and 
political exoneration of Mao's most important antagonist and the 
Cultural Revolution's highest victim, Liu Shaoqi, in the spring. Hua 
Guofeng was replaced by Zhao Ziyang as State Council premier amid 
a surge of reformist political rhetoric at the Fifth National People's 
Congress (NPC) third session the following September. Shortly after 
the trials opened, moreover, indications in the Beijing press lent 
credence to rumors alive in the Chinese capital that Mao's heir Hua 
* The views expressed here are those of the author's. 
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Guofeng had been forced to resign as party chairman, pending formal 
approval at an upcoming sixth plenum of the party Central 
Committee.1 Clearly, in the context of the sweeping political changes 
already in motion as they opened, the trials' undeniably sensational 
character must be placed in the perspective of the equally remarkable 
political events of that year. 
As most observers of the Chinese scene have concluded, all of 
these political events of 1980 appear to have been the successful 
culmination of efforts by party Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping. The 
trials of the Cultural Revolution Leftist elite, together with the 
posthumous rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi and the apparent political 
demise of Hua Guofing, have thus been seen as part of Deng's 
relentless efforts to transform both the style of politics in the PRC 
and the substantive direction of the regime policies. This paper 
attempts to assess the broad political significance of Deng's efforts to 
open public trials of the "gang of four" and Lin Biao's associates from 
the broader perspective of his overall reformist political program as it 
has emerged in the last three or four years, and to evalutate the 
extent to which the results of the trials has advanced his goals. 
Specifically, Deng Xiaoping appears to have had two interrelated 
aims in pressing for the opening of public trials of the Cultural 
Revolution left. First, the public trials contributed to his drive to 
transform the CCP into a more suitable instrument for guiding the 
rapid, all-out modernization of China, both by furthering his efforts 
. to repudiate the ideology and politics of the Cultural Revolution 
decade and by opening the way for a more thorough purge of the 
party's ranks swollen by leftist members recruited in that period. 
Second, in providing a vivid, concrete example of the application of 
socialist law to persons who were once among the CCP's highest 
leadership, the trials were intended to be a dram tic symbol of Deng's 
efforts to establish the regime's permanent commitment to the 
supremacy of law and institutional procedure as the arbiter of 
political conflict in the future, a reliable guarantee that political and 
social conflict born out of the process of modernization would not 
again escalate into a new Cultural Revolution. 
Deng Xiaoping's success in achieving these twin goals as the 
trials closed in early 1981, however, seems in doubt. Political 
controversies generated by the trials themselves, erupting in the 
midst of a major shift in the political climate in Beijing away from 
1. (Editor's note) Hua's resignation was accepted by the Party's Central 
Committee and announced on June 29, 1981. 
THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FouR 7 
Deng because of other, unrelated issues, seemed to prevent conclusion 
of the trials in a manner unambiguously favorable to Deng Xiaop-
ing's goals. As the trials progressed, Deng's two interrelated aims in 
opening them seemed increasingly to contradict rather than comple-
ment each other, as his short-run aim of using the trials to discredit 
the Cultural Revolution seemed to poison the legalistic atmosphere so 
essential to his long-term goal of establishing law, and not political 
expedience, as the final criterion for judging acceptable political 
action. Accordingly it seems doubtful, at this early writing, that the 
trials will be remembered in China as a triumph of law over political 
criminality and as a watershed submission of the party and its 
politics to higher, state defined standards of permissible political 
conduct, than simply as Deng's personal political vendetta against his 
most vicious political antagonists. 
Deng Xiaoping's Goals 
Deng Xiaoping's efforts to transform the style and substance of 
politics in China since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 have 
repeatedly placed him at the center of political controversy in Beijing. 
Finding support among a broad coalition of veteran leaders in the 
Chinese hierarchy, Deng has relentlessly maintained the political 
initiative in attempting to bring about fundamental changes in 
Chinese politics, despite evident setbacks periodically in the past four 
years. Convinced of the need for rapid Chinese modernization in a 
tense international environment, Deng has been in the forefront of 
China's leadership in stressing the corresponding necessity of drastic 
political reform, both in Chinese society and most particularly in the 
CCP itself, to accompany modernization in other areas. 
Deng Xiaoping's political reform program has been extensive in 
scope and radical in nature. With respect to political life in the CCP, 
its main features include the following: 
(1) A more flexible interpretation of the principles of Marxism-
Leninism as they apply to the concrete realities of Chinese mod-
ernization in the current stage, leading in particular to an overall 
depoliticization of economic, social and cultural activity in Chinese 
society; 
(2) The firm reassertion of the party's organizational rules and 
institutions as the ultimate arbiter of authority in party politics, 
rather than an appeal to the will and wisdom of an infallible 
charismatic leader above a party organization whose legitimacy is 
subject to routine challenge; and 
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(3) The cultivation of a party membership competent to admi-
nister and guide an increasingly complex and technologically adv-
anced society, recruited and evaluated according to managerial and 
technical criteria rather than standards of rigorous ideological purity 
or political expertise in areas such as "waging class struggle." 
In pressing these interrelated concerns, Deng Xiaoping has led 
the way among the current leadership in attacking the political style 
and ideological foundations of politics prevailing during the Cultural 
Revolutionary years of 1966-1976, the last decade of Mao Zedong's 
life. Deng's challenge to the "Maoist" politics of the Cultural 
Revolution decade has come in four broad areas. First, Deng has 
attempted to abrogate the supreme status of Mao Zedong Thought as 
the sole doctrine conferring legitimacy on political behavior and 
policy. Where Mao Zedong Thought during the Cultural Revolution 
years had been enshrined as the unique wisdom of Marxism-
Lenisnism's greatest modem inheritor and innovator, Mao Zedong 
Thougth now is portrayed only as Mao's "crystallization" of the 
"collective wisdom" of the party's veteran leadership through the 
· CCP's revolutionary period, a doctrine which corresponded brilliantly 
to the demands of the Chinese revolutionary situation of the time but 
not necessarily to the present. 
Deng's vanguard effort to bring about this ideological trans-
formation, of course, was the campaign to "take practice as the sole 
criterion of truth."1a Taking Mao's Y anan slogan of "seeking truth 
from facts" as its keynote, this study movement implicitly challenged 
the supreme legitimizing authority of Mao's doctrines by arguing 
that an ideology's truth must be assessed solely by the extent to 
which it provides correct interpretations of current political and 
social realities and leads to the formulation of correct policy. The 
principles of Mao Zedong Thought, the "practice" campaign implied, 
should be retained where they correctly correspond to current 
Chinese realities; they should be discarded where they do not. Since 
Deng finally achieved an authoritative leadership consensus endors-
ing the "practice" campaign and its implications in the summer of 
1979, Chinese political commentary has become increasingly explicit 
1a. For the inauguration of the "practice" campaign, see the contributing 
commentator article, "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth," Guangming ribao, May 
11, 1978, pp. 1-2, and the speech by Deng Xiaoping to the PLA conference on political 
work, Renmin ribao, June 6, 1978, pp. 1-2; an English translation of Deng's speech 
appears in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report-PRC (hereafter cited as 
FBIS-PRCl, June 6, 1978. 
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about the relative merits and limitations of Mao's thought. One 
important commentary in the party's theoretical journal Red Flag 
very recently observed, for example, that Mao Zedong Thought 
represents the crystallized body of correct ideas of the party 
leadership up until 1957, which must be distinguished from Mao's 
erroneous ideas after that year, when the chairman became in-
creasingly divorced from the realities and demands of China's 
development. 2 
This delineation between Mao's correct guidance of the CCP 
during the earlier parts of his career from his erroneous ideas in the 
later years of his life points to a second major area in which Deng has 
challenged the politics of the Cultural Revolution years - the 
reinterpretation and rewriting of authoritative party history. In this 
regard Deng Xiaoping has pressed hard for a formal, authoritative 
resolution by the party critically evaluating Mao's leadership of the 
party in the last years of his life and repudiating the politics and 
policies of the Cultural Revolution decade. As commentary in the 
press arguing the necessity for such a formal statement on party 
history has suggested, authoriative judgment on such historical 
questions would parallel a similar authoritative reckoning on 
questions of party history at the party's 1945 7th Congress and is 
crucial for defending the longterm legitimacy of the current regime's 
policies and line.3 Just as the 7th CCP Congress' historical resolution 
had authoritatively interpreted the history of Mao Zedong's triumph 
over Wang Ming for leadership of the party over the preceding fifteen 
years, the new party history resolution would sum up authoritatively 
the deviations and errors in Mao's leadership after 1957. While the 
specific judgments to be incorporated into such a formal party 
resolution have undoubtedly been the object of persistent leadership 
contention, the communique of the February 1980 Fifth Plenum 
suggested that the party's Twelfth Congress would be convened 
ahead of schedule to resolve the "important ideological and theoretic-
al problems" involved in such a historical resolution.4 
Clearly connected to Deng's effort to bring about a formal party 
condemnation of leftist deviations in the party's work after 1957, and 
2. Editorial department article, "Correctly Understand the Situation and Policy, 
Firmly Uphold the Four Basic Principles," Hongqi 1981 No. 5, pp. 2-11; FBIS-PRC, 
March 25, 1981. 
3. See e.g., the contributing commentator article, "Unite and Look Ahead," 
Renmin ribao, January 18, 1979, p. 1. 
4. "Communique of the 11th CCP 5th Plenum," Renmin ribao, March 1, 1981, pp. 
1-2. 
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particularly of the Cultural Revolution itself, has been the piecemeal 
"reversal of verdicts" on the entire range of events, policies, and 
personalities repudiated over the same period under Mao Zedong's 
leadership. This effort has proceeded steadily over the past three 
years, including the landmark exoneration of Mao's outspoken 
antagonist from the Great Leap years, Peng Dehuai, at the 1978 
Third Plenum and culminating in the politically spectacular return 
to political honor of Liu Shaoqi last year.5 
Deng's efforts to dilute the authority of Maoist dogma and to 
establish an authoritative party repudiation of the Cultural Revolu-
tion years relate in concrete application to his efforts to undertake a 
more thorough purge of the party apparatus of cadres who were 
recruited into the party during those years, the third broad area in 
which Deng has attempted to reverse the politics of the Cultural 
Revolution. The CCP's membership doubled over the decade from 
1966 to 1976, increasing from around 18 million members to over 38 
million. Most of those admitted to the party during that period were 
recruited according to the highly politicized criteria of the Cultural 
Revolution and presumably they remain committed to the ideological 
principles pre-eminent during those years. As press commentary 
associated with Deng has pointed out, such cadres constitute a hidden 
threat to the long term implementation of the leadership's current 
policies and must be removed for the sake of future political 
stability.6 Just as commentary stressing the importance of a formal 
party judgment on the Cultural Revolution years looks back to the 
7th CCP Congress' resolution on the history of Mao's Yanan triumph 
over Wang Ming, commentary pressing a wider purge of leftists from 
the party apparatus similarly cites the precedent of Mao's Y anan 
rectification drive to purge the CCP's ranks of followers recruited into 
the party under Wang Ming's leadership- a model which ironically 
would now be used to remove party members still loyal to Mao and 
his political legacy itself. 
5. For Peng Dehuai's rehabilitation, see Renmin ribaa, December 25, 1978, pp. 
1-3; on Liu Shaoqi's rehabilitation, see Renmin ribaa, May 18, 1980, pp. 1-2. 
6. Deng Xiaoping's earliest efforts to expand the purge against leftist cadres were 
reflected in Jiefangjun baa articles in early 1978 which were thereafter reprinted in 
Renmin ribaa. See Dao Nin, "A First Analysis of the Masks of'Wind Faction' Figures," 
Renmin ribao, January 6, 1978, p. 2, Jin Ge, "Painting A Picture of"Slipaway" Faction 
People," Renmin ribaa, January 10, 1978, p. 2, and Shang Gong, "Advice to Persons of 
the 'Earthquake' Faction- Give Up Your Bad Ways and Do Right," Jiefangjun baa, 
January 15, 1978, as transmitted by Xinhua Chinese service on January 17, 1978 and 
translated in FBIS-PRC, January 18, 1978. 
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Finally, the last aspect in which Deng has challenged the politics 
of the Cultural Revolution decade has been his assertion of the 
ultimate authority of the party's organizational rules and institution-
al procedures. Where during the Cultural Revolution Maoist doc-
trines permitted the masses and party activists to "kick aside" party 
committees and institutions whenever such party organs inhibited 
the spontaneous and progressive will of the popular masses, party 
members must now advance the demands of the masses through 
prescribed party channels and mechanisms. Deng's efforts to regula-
rize party activity are embodied in the "Guiding Principles for 
Inner-Party Political Life," promulgated by the February 1980 Fifth 
Plenum and, together with the revised party constitution draft 
approved at the same party meeting, circulated throughout the party 
ranks thereafter as the focus of party study and rectification. 7 
Reinforcing the authority of party rules and organizational discipline 
in party political life has been the re-establishment of party 
discipline inspection committees at various levels of the party 
apparatus, as prescribed by the party's Third Plenum in December 
1978.8 
Complementing these efforts to reassert the final authority of the 
party organization itself, Deng has attempted to make compensating 
modifications in the party's workstyle. Deng has thus led the way in 
stressing the "democratic" aspects of democratic centralism in party 
life. Deng in this regard has called for a more collective leadership 
style and an end to more dictatorial styles of leadership and the 
"system of lifetime tenure" in leadership positions. 
Deng Xiaoping's broad efforts to reform political life within the 
CCP have been complemented by attempts to bring about similar 
reforms in Chinese society as well. Paralleling his efforts to induce 
greater intraparty democracy and to assert the ultimate authority of 
the party's organizational rules and procedures, Deng has similarly 
pressed for greater "democracy" within Chinese society at large, for a 
strengthened socialist legal system, and for a greater separation of 
party and state activities. The most outstanding examples of Deng's 
efforts to promote greater democracy within Chinese society have 
been the "Beijing Spring" movement at "Democracy Wall" in the 
capital, which blossomed from an otherwise typical wallposter 
. . . . . 
7. "Communique of the 11th CCP 5th Plenum," supra note 4. 
8. "Communique of the 11th CCP 3rd Plenum," Renmin ribcro, December 24, 
1978, pp. 1-2. 
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campaign preceding the party's Third Plenum and which Deng 
defended in its early stages, and the third session of the Fifth NPC in 
September 1980, which the Beijing press went to great lengths to 
portray as a model of genuinely democratic deliberation and 
consultation.9 Similarly, Deng Xiaoping appears to be the foremost 
supporter among the leadership of efforts to democratize election 
procedures in lower-level government and ·mass organization bodies, 
including calls for secret ballots on slates naming more than single 
candidates for any one office. 
At the same time calls for strengthening China's legal system 
and for the rigorous, universal application of law to all criminal 
behavior, regardless of political intent, have been staples of Dengist 
political rhetoric. The Fifth NPC's second session in June 1979 
revived a 20-year old effort to set down a body of legal codes which 
had been stalled by political contention among the leadership 
through the Cultural Revolution years, and subsequent meetings of 
the NPC and its Standing Committee have continued the process. 10 
Political commentary in the Beijing press has in the meantime 
illustrated the theme that "everyone is equal before the law" with 
examples of legal action taken against instances of corruption and 
bureaucratic malfeasance among party and state cadres at various 
levels.U 
And finally, Deng has pressed for a greater separation of party 
and state powers, together with an overall depoliticization of normal 
government activity in the PRC. Arguing that the experience of the 
Cultural Revolution has demostrated conclusively that the party's 
"usurpation" of virtually all of the state's normal functions has both 
overburdened the party and hampered the orderly administration of 
social and economic life under China's socialist system, commentary 
expressing Deng's point of view has accordingly stressed that the 
CCP should confine itself simply to "exercising political leadership 
over the state." The party, such commentary explains, thus should 
9. For Deng Xiaoping's comments defending the early stages of the Beijing 
wallposter campaign that blossomed into the "democracy Wall" movement, see his 
c:omments to the visiting Japanese Democratic Socialist leader Sasaki as reported by 
Xinhua, Renmin ribao, November 28, 1978, p. 1. On characterizations of the 5th NPC's 
3rd session, see the editorial "A Congress of Democracy, A Congress of Reform," 
Renmin ribao, September 12, 1980, p. 1; FBIS-PRC, September 12, 1980. · 
10. The new criminal codes, for example, appear in Renmin ribao, July 7, 1979, 
pp. 1, 3 & 4, and July 8, 1979, pp. 1-3. 
11. See e.g. the commentator article, "This Type of Bad Trend Must Be Stopped," 
Renmin ribao, October 30, 1980, p. 1. 
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provide leadership in overall "line, principles and policies" rather 
than leadership in "administration, technology, business and man-
agement" which are areas in which the state properly exercises 
authority. 12 The Fifth NPC's third session is in that regard praised as 
a state meeting which followed the CCP's general lead in initiating 
major changes in a "spirit of democracy and reform" and which thus 
"embodied the functions of the NPC as the highest organ of state 
power in a highly significant way."13 
Taken as a whole, the thrust of Deng Xiaoping's efforts to 
transform both the style and substance of political life in China is 
toward a political atmosphere which encourages the expression and 
resolution of conflicting political views and interests beneficial to the 
primary goal of rapid Chinese modernization, but within a context 
which structures such debate and conflict according to firmly-
established organizational rules and bodies of socialist law. In that 
regard, of course, Deng inherits a political tradition within Chinese 
Communism which had come to the fore at the 8th CCP Congress in 
1956 but which was subsequently repudiated thoroughly during the 
Cultural Revolution. The keynote of that approach had been sounded 
at the 8th CCP Congress by Liu Shaoqi in words as meaningful for 
Deng's political reform program in post-Mao China as they were for 
political events in 1956. "The question of who will win in the struggle 
between socialism and capitalism in our country has now been 
decided," Liu stated. The victory of socialism in China, Liu concluded, 
means that "the period of revolutionary storm and stress is past, new 
relations of production have been set up and the aim of our struggle 
is changed into one of safeguarding the successful development of the 
productive forces of society, so that a corresponding change in the 
methods of struggle will have to follow and a complete legal system 
becomes an absolute necessity."14 
In thus upholding what might be termed the "8th CCP Congress 
line" on the political requirements of Chinese modernization in the 
socialist stage, Deng Xiaoping is simultaneously overthrowing the 
12. Contributing commentator article, "On the Separation of the Work of the 
Party and the Government," Renmin ribao, December 18, 1980, p. 5; FBIS-PRC, 
December 19, 1980. 
13. Renmin ribao editorial, September 12, 1980, supra note 9, 
14. Liu Shaoqi, "Political Report of the Central Committee of the CCP to the 8th 
National Congress of the Party," delivered September 15, 1956, in Eight Natioool 
Congress of the Communist Party of Chioo, vol. 1 "Documents," !Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1956), p. 37 and p. 82. 
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line developed by Mao Zedong in the years of leadership strife after 
1956. That approach, which found its most vivid expression in the 
Cultural Revolution itself, was built on Mao's thesis of "continuing 
the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." According to 
that approach, class struggle in socialist society, far from receding as 
Liu Shaoqi had suggested, may actually intensify as disenfranchised 
reactionary elements from the abolished expoiting classes make 
last-ditch efforts to regain power and as the continuing corrosion of 
residual reactionary ideologies compromises the revolutionary in-
tegrity of the leadership of the party itself. Social progress in socialist 
society therefore demands the ever-sharper drawing of class lines in 
society and may ultimately require the overthrow of once revolution-
ary leaders of the party now corrupted by the "sugar-coated bullets" 
of reactionary ideologies and the abandonment of formal party and 
state institutions, laws and procedures which ultimately may res-
train rather than safeguard or advance the progressive desires of the 
masses and their activist leaders.15 
The Maoist approach to China's development in the socialist 
stage was reaffirmed as the basis of politics early after Mao's death in 
1976 but has been the focus of strong ideological attacks by Deng and 
·his political allies since then. Chairman Hua Guofeng authoritatively 
endorsed the thesis of "continuing the revolution under the dicta-
torship of the proletariat" as Mao's greatest contribution to the body 
of Marxist-Leninist theory, and the 11th CCP Congress in 1977 called 
on the party to "persist in continuing the revolution" as part of its 
basic task. Class struggle remains the CCP's primary task in the 
current stage as long as the threat of overthrow and subversion of the 
revolutionary regime persists, the party's 1977 Constitution declared, 
warning that political revolutions such as the Cultural Revolution 
"will be carried out many times in the future." 16 Thereafter, at the 
December 1978 Third Plenum - a major watershed in post-Mao 
Chinese politics - the party implicitly reaffirmed the 8th CCP 
Congress line in declaring that "the large-scale turbulent class 
15. A seminal essay delineating these traditions within Chinese communism is 
Tang Tsou, ·"The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," China 
Quarterly, No. 38 (April-June 1969), pp. 63-91. 
16. Hua Guofeng, "Carry the Continuing Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the 
Proletariat Through to the End- Studying Volume Five of The Selected Works of Mao 
Zedong," Renmin ribao, May 1, 1977, pp. 1-4; "Constitution of the CCP, "Renmin 
ribao, August 24, 1977 and FBIS-PRC, September 1, 1977, supplement, "Material on 
the 11th National Congress of the CCP." 
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struggles of a mass character has in the main come to an end" and 
that what class struggle remains must be handled "in accordance 
with the procedures prescribed by the (state) constitution and the 
law" as the party "shifts the focus of its work" to speeding China's 
modernization. 17 
Within this broad framework of Deng Xiaoping's efforts to bring 
about a fundamental transformation in post-Mao Chinese politics, the 
Beijing trials of the "gang of four" and the surviving members of Lin 
Biao's clique played an important symbolic part. By bringing the 
Cultural Revolution's most prominent leftist leaders - save Mao 
himself - to trial, Deng was in effect putting the Cultural 
Revolution itself on trial in perhaps the most dramatic example of the 
restored 8th CCP Congress line in practice. The Beijing trials were 
thus intended to complement Deng's drive to win final, authoritative 
condemnation of the Cultural Revolution years in party history, to 
provide a vivid demonstration of the current regime's permanent 
commitment to modernization within a framework of authoritative 
laws and institutions, and to further efforts to root out those still 
committed to the Cultural Revolution's politics and principles from 
the party and state apparatus. 
The massive attention given the trials in the PRC media 
repeatedly stressed the importance of the trials for these various 
complementary political goals. To further explicit condemnation of 
the Cultural Revolution decade, for example, the Beijing prosecutors 
tried the leaders of the Cultural Revolution's two most important 
leftist cliques together - albeit in separate courts - and tried them 
only for crimes during the Cultural Revolution. The Lin Biao and 
"gang of four" cliques, PRC Chief Procurator Huang Huoqing 
explained in reporting preparations for the trials, had "common 
counterrevolutionary goals and common counterrevolutionary ac-
tions" and were thus "entangled and inseparable from each other." 
Huang's report provided a new benchmark itself in overall condemna-
tion of the Cultural Revolution by repeatedly enclosing the term 
"Cultural Revolution" in quotation marks, a derogation of the period 
that has become conventional in the Beijing press thereafter. 18 While 
Huang explained that deceased participants in the Lin and "gang" 
cliques would not be tried posthumously, the criminal activities of 
17. "Communique of the 11th CCP 3rd Plenum," supra note 8. 
18. Huang Huoqing report to the NPC Standing Committee's sixteenth session, 
September 27, 1980, Renmin ribao, September 28, 1980, p. 1; FBIS-PRC, September 29, 
1980. 
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such dead leftist leaders were recounted in detail in the press during 
the trials, including those of Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi. 19 As the 
trials proceeded, moreover, the Chinese media carried long accounts 
of the Cultural Revolution's most notorious events - most notably of 
the death of Liu Shaoqi, the attempted coup of Lin Biao in 1971, and 
the attempted radical insurrection in Shanghai in 1976 - easily the 
most informative reports on these affairs by Beijing's own telling.20 
The long indictment of the trials' defendants itself advanced author-
itative interpretation of the Cultural Revolution decade by providing 
details of several incidents only alluded to previously and for the first 
time mentioning several leaders of the period who since 1976 had 
disappeared from public view without explanation.21 
Underscoring Deng's hope that the trials would lend impetus to 
efforts to remove or discredit leftists from various levels of the party 
and state leadership, Huang Huoqing in his report on preparations 
for the trials observed that other defendants would be tried at 
appropriate levels of the court system.22 The People's Daily, in a 
January 26, 1981 editorial on the close of the trials, predicted 
triumphantly in that regard that the trials' verdicts "will help us to 
pass correct judgment on other defendants in the case of the Lin Biao 
and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques and to strike at as well 
as disintegrate the remaining forces of these two counterrevolution-
ary cliques, and encourage more people to admit their guilt."23 
That the trials were intended to demonstrate the regime's 
permanent commitment to law as the ultimate arbiter of political 
19. Chen Qizhang and Jin Shi, "Ripping Off the Mask of Kang Sheng," Renmin 
ribao, December 22, 1980, p. 4, and FBIS-PRC, December 24, 1980; Chen Jiayong, "Xie 
Fuzhi Cannot Escape the Judgment of History," Renmin ribao, December 23, 1980, and 
FBIS-PRC, December 29, 1980. Both Kang and Xie were posthumously expelled from 
the party on the eve of the trials' opening, according to Renmin ribao, November 1, 
1980, p. 1. 
20. Liu Pingping, Liu Yuan and Liu Tingting, "Offering the Fresh Flowers of 
Victory to You - Commemorating Our Father Liu Shaoqi," Gongren ribao, December 
5, 1980, pp. 2-3, December 6, 1980, p. 2, and December 8, 1980, p. 2, and in FBIS-PRC, 
December 31, 1980; "An Account of the Bankrupting of Lin Biao's Counterrevolution-
ary Coup," Renmin ribao, November 24, 1980, pp. 3-4; and Gao Ji, "The Frenzy of the 
Final Days - The Details of the Efforts of the 'Gang of Four' and Their Adherents to 
Provoke Counterrevolutionary Armed Rebellion in Shanghai," Renmin ribao, Decem-
ber 14, 1980, p. 2. 
21. "Indictment of the Special Procuratorate of the PRC Supreme People's 
Procuratorate," Renmin ribao, November 21, 1980, pp. 1-3; FBIS-PRC, November 20, 
1980. 
22. Huang Huoqing report, September 27, 1980, supra note 18. 
23. "A Just Verdict," Renmin ribao, January 26, 1981, pp. 1-4. 
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behavior under Chinese socialism was stressed repeatedly throughout 
the trials. A People's Daily's September 30, 1980, editorial on 
preparations for the trials thus observed that the proceedings would 
provide China's masses with "an intensive education in the socialist 
legal system" and would "declare to the whole country and the whole 
world that our country will become still more stable and united and 
that our socialist cause will surely advance soundly along the path of 
democracy and legality."24 The Guangming Daily on September 30th 
recalled that Lin Biao and the "gang of four" had "totally disregarded 
party discipline and state law and created a situation of chaos and 
absolute lawlessness," so that "the state did not function as a state 
and the party could not function as a party." "This bitter historical 
lesson," the Guangming Daily continued, "clearly demonstrates to us 
the truth that the law of the People's Republic is a magic weapon in 
the hands of the people to rule the country and to protect 
themselves."25 The People's Daily similarly noted in an editorial as 
the trials opened that "the era of lawlessness when the Lin Biao and 
Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques were running wild is gone 
forever" and that China "has now entered a new period of promoting 
socialist democracy and strengthening the socialist legal system."26 
The Verdicts: Triumph or Setback? 
The Beijing trials closed on January 25, 1981, with the same 
triumphant fanfare that had greeted their opening. The People's 
Daily on the following day declared that the trials' verdicts against 
the Cultural Revolution cliques are "verdicts of history" which have 
"realized the people's wishes." The condemned leftist leaders "have 
forever been condemned to disgrace in history as the people's public 
enemies, arch-usurpers of state power and national criminals, and 
they will go down in history as a byword for infamy," the party paper 
predicted.27 China's domestic and foreign media thereafter poured out 
a flood of commentary patterned after the same themes laid out by 
24. "A Solemn Decision," Renmin ribao, September 30, 1980, p. 1; FBIS-PRC, 
September 30, 1980. 
25. "That Which Damages the State and Harms the People Will Not Be Tolerated 
by the Law of the State," Guangming ribao, September 30, 1980, p. 1; FBIS-PRC, 
October 14, 1980. 
26. "Trial by the Nine Hundred Million People," Renmin ribao, November 22, 
1980, p. 1; FBIS-PRC, November 24, 1980. 
27. "A Just Verdict," supra note 23. 
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the People's Daily, claiming to express the deep satisfaction of people 
at all levels of the country. 
Despite the predictably triumphant note sounded in the public 
media at the trials' close, however, a number of indications through-
out the trials suggested that they may not have completely fulfilled 
the aims that Deng and his associates entertained in opening them. 
While it is certainly too early to determine whether in the long run 
the results of the trials contributed to the advance of his overall 
reform program, the trials in the short run may have contributed to 
clear political setbacks to his reform enterprise since the trials 
opened, however short-lived those setbacks may turn out to be. 
Since his political rehabilitation in 1977 Deng's efforts to bring 
about a fundamental transformation in Chinese political life have 
been resisted by a variety of groups in the central party leadership. 
The most important group opposing Deng's drastic political reforms 
has been a coalition of moderate or centrist leaders led by party 
Chairman Hua Guofeng and Vice Chairmen Ye Jianying and Li 
Xiannian. Proceeding from. diverse. political interests and loyalties 
and from differing perspectives on China's domestic and foreign 
situation, these leaders have appeared to find common ground in 
opposing the scope and speed of Deng Xiaoping's efforts to transform 
China's political and economic systems. From time to time, moreover, 
the politically independent party Vice Ch~irman Chen Yun has 
appeared to align himself both with Deng Xiaoping on one hand and 
with political moderates like Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying on the 
other, depending on the particular issue at hand. Leaders like Hua, 
Ye and Li Xiannian have thus stressed the necessity of political 
"stability and unity" for the sake of modernization and apparently 
perceive Deng's drastic political and economic reforms to be too 
divisive to party unity and social stability. Where Deng Xiaoping 
evidently believes that a more critical assessment of the party's 
leadership under Mao Zedong, a more thorough purge of the party's 
membership and a liberalization of party control to be the key to 
solving both the "crisis of confidence" in the CCP's leadership and the 
success of the "four modernizations," the moderate leadership sus-
pects that these reforms will only exacerbate China's problems. 
Further criti~ism of Mao and the 9ultura} Revolution can only 
further damage the party's already dimmed prestige, efforts to extend 
the party purge will only sharpen already acute antagonisms in 
lower-level party organizations, and efforts at liberalization will only 
weaken party authority and control at a time when such attributes 
are needed most as China's modernization accelerates, such leaders 
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appear to argue. The main threat to China's socialist modernization, 
leaders like Hua Guofeng have suggested, is not the "left erroneous 
trend" within the party which remains committed to the politics and 
principles of the Cultural Revolution years but rather the "right 
erroneous trend" in Chinese society at large which doubts the 
capacity of the CCP to lead Chinese modernization - a diverse body 
of opinion which may in fact grow stronger as a side-effect of 
modernization itself.28 This moderate coalition has from time to time 
dealt Deng Xiaoping unmistakable setbacks politically, sometimes on 
single political issues but at other times on a broad range of fronts. 
Despite such setbacks, however, Deng has in the past three years won 
a series of important political victories against his moderate opposi-
tion, particularly in 1980. 
The ability to win consistent political victories over his opposi-
tion has been crucial to the long-run success of Deng's overall reform 
program. The reason for this need concerns the balance of political 
sentiment at lower levels of the party apparatus. Provincial political 
commentary thus describes three main types of cadres at local levels 
in China. Some cadres, according to such comment, strongly endorse 
Deng Xiaoping's reformist political goals and policies and vigorously 
support them at their levels. Another group of cadres - most of 
whom were recruited and advanced during the Cultural Revolution 
years - actively oppose Deng's policies, either out of the political 
conviction that they are "revisionist" or out of personal political 
interest. Both of these two groups, provincial commentary has 
suggested, comprise minorities among the body of local cadres. The 
overwhelming majority lies between the two leftist and reformist 
wings. Accordingly, they sympathize with the overall direction of 
Deng Xiaoping's policies and reforms but choose not to implement 
them because they are not convinced that Deng has gained the upper 
hand in the central party leadership permanently and that therefore 
one day they may again be attacked for implementing "rightist" or 
"revisionist" policies as cadres were during the Cultural Revolution 
years. Such persisting concern for a potential leftist return to power 
has commonly been referred to as the "lingering fear" in the party's 
ranks and frequently cited as the major obstacle to the implementa-
tion of Deng's reforms since the Third Plenum.29 
28. Contrast, for example, the speeches by Hua Guofeng on May 3, 1979, in 
Renmin ribao, May 4, 1979, p. 1, and by Zhou Yang, in Renmin ribao, May 7, pp. 2, 4. 
29. See e.g. the speech by Zhao Ziyang on May 22, 1979, as reported by Xinhua's 
Chinese service and translated in FBIS-PRC, May 23, 1979. 
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Regular reassurances that Deng's political reforms are advancing 
without impediment at the central level have thus been crucial to 
Deng's efforts to dispel the "lingering fear" of the left at lower levels 
and thereby to ensure implementation of his policies there. Despite 
apparent setbacks in the wake of the Third Plenum in the spring of 
1979, Deng has since then won important political victories on a 
number of fronts at the central level, particularly in 1980. The 
results of the Fifth Plenum in February 1980 - leading to the purge 
of the "little gang of four" from the Politburo, the restoration of the 
Secretariat, the exoneration of Liu Shaoqi, and the inauguration of a 
more concerted party rectification drive - and of the 5th NPC's third 
session in the following September, highlighted by the replacement of 
Hua Guofeng as premier by Deng's reformist ally Zhao Ziyang and 
the acceleration of reforms in the economic and state administrative 
structures, provided clearcut evidence that Deng was moving force-
fully toward his goals. 
The opening of the Beijing trials in November 1980 in the 
context of these other events of that year reinforced the impression of 
Deng's relentless advance against his opposition, particularly in 
anticipation of major party meetings expected to be convene by the 
end of the year. The emergence of persistent rumors that Hua 
Guofeng had been forced to resign his positon as party chairman as 
the trials got underway also appeared to confirm that Deng's political 
reform program was proceeding according to schedule.30 A central 
work conference was expected to resolve questions of Hua's status 
and to offer a draft party resolution on historical questions from the 
Cultural Revolution years, all for formal approval by a sixth Central 
Committee plenum in late December 1980 or early January 198V0a 
The sixth party plenum has not come off, as of this writing at 
least, apparently because the underlying political compromises 
within the leadership over the various issues to be endorsed have 
come undone. The impetus for these political shifts seems to have 
come primarily from a new assessment of China's economic situation 
and its implications emerging in early December 1980, but the 
proceedings of the trials themselves appear to have themselves 
30. See e.g. the Agence France Presse report of December 14, 1980, in FBIS-PRC, 
December 15, 1980. 
30a. <Editor's note) The Sixth Central Committee plenum met for three days 
ending on June 29, 1981, during which Hua was replaced as Party Chairman by Hu 
Yaobang, a protege of Deng. 
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exacerbated antagonisms among the leadership, instead of playing 
out smoothly within a context of leadership consensus. 
Certainly there must have been a carefully wrought leadership 
consensus behind the trials as they opened on November 20, 
reflecting a delicate balance of various political sensitivities and 
concerns among the leadership. The indictment of the leftists to be 
tried, released by NCNA in full as the trials opened, was a clear 
indication of this consensus underlying the trials.31 Mao Zedong is 
scarcely mentioned in the long, detailed list of 48 criminal charges 
against the defendants - the few references to him coming mostly in 
connection with Lin Biao's attempt to assassinate him in 1971 and 
the "gang of four's" efforts to sway his judgment against Zhou Enlai 
in 1974 on the eve of the 4th NPC. Hua Guofeng similarly was 
mentioned only rarely. He was not named among those suffering 
persecution at the hands of the left in the Cultural Revolution's early 
years, evidently because he did not rank high enough at that time as 
a provincial party leader to be placed among the leadership so named. 
The 1976 Tiananmen incident was mentioned only briefly as an 
example of the "gang's" slander of the masses, but the details of its 
suppression - evidently a political albatross for Hua Guofeng 
because of his alleged part in it - were not elaborated. 
Despite the evident effort by the leadership to confine con-
troversy over the conduct of the trials, the proceedings nevertheless 
were obviously expected to stir high political emotions on both sides 
of the Chinese political spectrum. At least one provincial leadership 
warned on the eve of the trials' opening of the possibility of leftist 
political violence in reaction to the proceedings in Beijing.32 Jiang 
Qing's vocal ridicule of the proceedings against her and Zhang 
Chunqiao's equally effective silent contempt for the trials seemed 
completely in keeping with the fierce defiance that had made both 
notorious in the past and may actually have won some measure of 
respect- if not outright sympathy- from China's population.33 On 
the right end of the political spectrum, Beijing's own media seemed, 
31. "Indictment of the Special Procuratorate of the PRC Supreme Peoples' 
Procuratorate," supra note 21. 
32. Hefei Radio report on the November 13 Anhui CCP and People's Government 
meeting, November 14, 1980, as translated in FBIS-PRC, November 17, 1980. 
33. David Bonavia, China-watcher for the Hong Kong magazine Far Eastern 
Economic Review, observed after the trials' close that "surprisingly, many ordinary 
Chinese felt the sentences (given the defendants) . . . were too severe. "See David 
Bonavia, "Will the Gang Rise Again?" in Far Eastern Economic Review, February 20, 
1981, pp. 36-37. 
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consciously or not, to enflame passions as some commentary's 
vituperation of the radical leftists in the dock savored sentiments of 
revenge seemingly beyond the bounds demanded of impartial justice. 
Jiang Qing in particular seemed to be the focus of special animus, 
and media reporting noted with particular favor the satisfaction of 
Wang Guangmei and Pu Anxiu- the widows ofLiu Shaoqi and Peng 
Dehuai, respectively- at the progress of the trials.34 
That new leadership controversy may have broken out in the 
midst of the trials, particularly as Jiang Qing was forcibly ejected 
from the court on the eve of the anticipated party central work 
conference, moreover, seems clear from the unexplained four-day 
break in the trials proceedings from December 15th to 18th, and the 
ten-day break in proceedings against Jiang Qiang following her 
ejection on December 12th. The spectacle of Mao's widow being 
dragged from the courtroom, having evidently implicated both Mao 
and Hua Guofeng in her alleged crimes, on the eve of a major party 
conference may thus have finally cracked the fa~ade of leadership 
consensus over the trials.35 Jiang was returned to the courtroom on 
December 23rd, but only after a remarkably defensive "contributing 
commentator" article in the People's Daily the day before insisted 
that the leftists were being tried for "crimes" and not errors or 
deviations in political line. While in his later years Mao Zedong had 
"made mistakes, especially in initiating and leading the Cultural 
Revolution," these mistakes were "entirely different" in nature from 
the criminal actions of the Lin Biao and "gang of four" cliques, the 
article stated.36 As the courts moved thereafter into the final stages of 
the trials, moreover, court prosecutor Jiang Wen summarily rebutted 
Jiang Qing's alleged efforts to "shift the responsibility" for her crimes 
onto Mao Zedong, even though Chinese media before December 23rd 
had given no explicit indication that she had done so.37 
All of these new difficulties in the trials emerged against a 
political background that began to move strongly against Deng 
Xiaoping. The harbinger of these political reverses was an editorial 
in the People's Daily on December 2nd, conveying a much more 
34. See e.g. the report by Hu Sisheng, "The Day the Trials Opened," Renmin ribao, 
November 21, 1980, p. 4; FBIS-PRC, November 24, 1980. 
35. Renmin ribao, December 13, 1980, p. 4; see also FBIS-PRC, December 15, 
1980. 
36. "A Milestone in Socialist Democracy and Legal System - Commenting on the 
Trials of the Lin Biao and Jing Qing Counterrevolutionary Cliques," Renmin ribao, 
December 22, 1980, pp. 1, 5. 
37. Renmin ribao, December 30, 1980, pp. 1, 4; FBIS-PRC, January 2, 1981. 
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pessimistic appraisal of China's economic situation than had been put 
forward by Deng and his spokesmen in the preceding months. At the 
NPC session in September, for example, Deng and others tied to him 
had declared that the economic situation was good overall, that 
existing problems could be handled successfully, that the three-year 
"readjustment" program need not be extended past 1981, and that 
efforts to "restructure" and reform the economy should be acceler-
ated. By contrast, the December 2 editorial stated that several 
economic problems - including serious national budget deficits, a 
grain harvest shortfall, and energy resource shortages- have proven 
to be "unexpectedly" serious, that the economic "readjustment" 
program must be extended beyond 1981, and that economic reforms 
will have to be subordinated to the overriding task of readjusting 
sectoral imbalances and overcoming central financial deficits.38 The 
New Year's editorial in the People's Daily strongly reiterated and 
elaborated on the pessimism on the economic front contained in the 
December 2 editorial and noted that an upcoming NPC Standing 
Committee session would have to revise the economic plans put 
forward under Deng's impetus at the NPC's full session the preceding 
September.39 
Building on this new pessimism on the economy were other 
changes in line which equally hurt Deng Xiaoping. Beginning with a 
December 5 People's Daily editorial, authoritative central press 
commentary began to stress the necessity of effective "political and 
ideological work" to counter the effects on social order of prolonged 
economic retrenchment.40 The party paper's New Year's editorial was 
striking in that regard, resurrecting from political disgrace several 
Maoist voluntarist economic slogans which had been discredited over 
the previous summer and fall -including the calls to "fear neither 
38. "Completely Execute and Firmly Implement the Guiding Principle of Read-
justment," Renmin ribao, December 2, 1980, p. 1. For examples of the earlier optimism 
of Deng Xiaoping and his supporters on the economy, see Yao Yilin's comments to 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs adviser Ushiba Nobuhiko, as reported by Xinhua 
on September 5, 1980, in Renmin ribao, September 6, 1980, p. 4 and FBIS-PRC, 
September 8, 1980, and Deng Xiaoping's comments to Komeito leader Takeiri 
Yoshikatsu as reported by Xinhua on September 14, 1980, in Renmin ribao, September 
15, 1980, p. 1, and FBIS-PRC, September 16, 1980. 
39. "On the Basis of Stability and Unity Carry Out the Great Task of National 
economic Readjustment," Renmin ribao, January 1, 1981, p. 1. 
40. "Strengthening Ideological and Political Work is an Important Guarantee for 
Fulfilling the Four Modernizations," Renmin ribao, December 5, 1980, pp. 1, 4. 
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hardship nor death" and to imitate the spirit of "the foolish old man 
who moved the mountain."41 
In the months after December these shifts in party line were 
followed by other signs of leadership disarray, as one by one the 
whole range of Deng's political initiatives were either stalled or 
reversed altogether. Campaigns to promote China's "spiritual civi-
lization" unfolded as part of an effort to shore up the party's prestige 
and position in a context of serious economic difficulty and retrench-
ment. Party rectification, insofar as it involved expanded efforts to 
"readjust" lower-level leadership groups, seemed to recede in priority 
and to refocus on the need to reform and cultivate a party workstyle 
appropriate to economically hard times. Efforts to liberalize party 
controls over trade unions were reversed outright, as a January 15 
People's Daily editorial strongly reaffirmed the necessity of CCP 
supervision over trade union organizations and condemned any effort 
to "throw off' such control - a striking indication of the party 
leadership's uneasiness at the implications of developments in Poland 
for the CCP in a situation of economic uncertainty in China itself.42 
Many of these shifts appear to have vindicated the views of 
leadership moderates long opposed to Deng, and especially those of 
Hua Guofeng. Hua had publicly challenged - and subsequently 
suffered implicit but clearly pointed criticism - the political wisdom 
of Deng's excessive reliance on "material incentives" in economically-
constrained circumstances and had stressed the continuing necessity 
of "political and ideological work" in a highly controversial speech in 
the previous spring. Many of Hua's views thus expressed may have 
seemed, in the context of December's evaluation of the economy, more 
realistic than Deng's optimism at the NPC session in September.43 
The political upshot of these policy shifts clearly was to stall the 
advance of Deng's reform program. The central work conference, 
scheduled to resolve sensitive questions in party history and concern-
ing Hua Guofeng's status, was held in mid-December, but was 
unusually short in duration, judging by the lengths of previous 
conferences. The work conference, moreover, appears to have dealt 
41. "On the Basis of Stability and Unity Carry Out the Great Task of National 
Eonomic Readjustment," supra note 39. 
42. "Strengthen Trade Union Work in a Big Way," Renmin ribao, January 15, 
1981, pp. 1, 4. 
43. Hua Guofeng speech to a PLA conference on political work, delivered on April 
29, 1980, in Renmin ribao, May 8, 1980. 
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with economic rather than political problems!• Hua Guofeng's status 
has not been clarified, and he has even appeared publicly in early 
February in a curious signal that the party still had not resolved its 
difficulties.45 And most telling of all, the anticipated sixth party 
plenum was not held until June 1981. At that meeting, Hua was 
demoted to a junior vice chairman of the party. 
In the confused political context in Beijing, the courts finally 
passed judgement on the Cultural Revolution cliques on January 25, 
1981!6 If Deng had intended the trials as both a new indication of the 
steady advance of his political reform program and as a demonstra-
tion of the impartial application of law to political criminality 
untainted by party interference, the verdicts handed down must have 
been seen as disappointing or at least as politically ambiguous. The 
two defendants who had repeatedly earned the most vitriolic 
invective from the press throughout the proceedings - Jiang Qing 
and Zhang Chunqiao - were given death sentences with two year 
reprieves, evidently in an effort to give them the opportunity to 
repent their crimes. This surprising leniency with regard to "crimin-
als" implicated directly or indirectly in the formal indictment in the 
persecution and deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in the 
Cultural Revolution contrasts with Beijing's apparent readiness to 
sanction immediate execution of convicted leftists at lower levels 
responsibile for far less extensive crimes. Such leniency, extended to 
the two defendants who had done the most throughout the trials to 
demonstrate their contempt for the proceedings, thus seems to 
provide a measure of the enormous political sensitivity that still 
surrounds the Cultural Revolution left. 
Similarly, the sentencing of Wang Hongwen to life imprisonment 
seems excessively harsh, both in light of the more moderate sentences 
given to leaders convicted of such crimes as attempting to assassinate 
Mao and in view of the implicitly sympathetic treatment Wang 
received in the press throughout the trials for his youth and attitude 
of apparent cooperation and repentance. One speculates that political 
concerns that Wang may eventually emerge as a focus of leftist 
44. Note in particular the comment by Hu Yaobang in his toast at a party New 
Year's reception on January 1, 1981 that the recent central work conference had 
discussed "problems in the national economic situation" and his failure to note that the 
meeting had discussed political issues. Renmin ribao, January 2, 1981, p. 2. 
45. Renmin ribao, February 5, 1981, p. 1. 
46. Renmin ribao, January 26, 1981, p. 1. and pp. 2-3; FBIS·PRC, January 26, 
1981. 
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discontent in the future may account for the seeming immoderation 
in his sentence. 
Conclusion 
While the opening of the Beijing trials must be seen as yet 
another measure of Deng Xiaoping's steady advance, the trials' 
results may also have fallen significantly short of their intended 
goals. Proceeding amid a dramatic shift in the overall political 
climate away from Deng, the trials probably served only to exacer-
bate central leadership tensions already sharpening under the strains 
of other issues. At lower levels of the party where "lingering fears" of 
a leftward turn away from Deng's controversial reform programs 
remain alive among the broad body of cadres, the trials' temporary 
halt amid signs of renewed leadership contention over questions 
raised by the trials themselves, as well as the curious verdicts at 
their conclusion, may not have provided the convincing symbol of 
firm central consensus under Deng's hegemony necessary to dispel 
such concerns. Certainly the trials' ambiguous and evidently politi-
cally skewed results in the overall context of leadership reversals on 
economic policy and other issues could have reassured very few at 
lower levels of the party. 
Similarly, the apparent renewal of leadership debate as the trials 
proceeded and over the trials themselves may have poisoned the 
atmosphere of impartial legality necessary for the trials to stand as a 
lasting demonstration of socialist law as the ultimate arbiter of 
political conflict. Despite the repeated affirmations of the Beijing 
press to the contrary, the balancing of political concerns and 
sensitivities among the party leadership, and not the impartial 
workings of firmly-esta.blished legal institutions, decided the course 
of the trials from beginning to end. 
How the trials come to be viewed in the future in China, of 
course, depends heavily on the political fortunes of Deng Xiaoping 
himself. If Deng recovers from what may yet turn out to be only a 
momentary lapse in the momentum of his drive for drastic political 
reform in China, the trials will undoubtedly emerge as an important 
milestone in that campaign. However, if the current economic 
difficulties mark a major turning point in Deng's record of political 
advance over the previous years - if Deng's reform programs stall or 
fail in the face of Chinese political, social and economic realities 
which require more conservative approaches - then the trials and 
their verdicts may again become the focus of political controversy 
themselves. 
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CERTAIN LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE RECENT 
PEKING TRIALS OF THE "GANG 
OF FOUR" AND OTHERS 
Hungdah Chiu 
The Pinyin system is used for Chinese names from the Mainland, the 
Wade-Giles system is used for those from Taiwan and Hong Kong.) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
27 
On November 20, 1980, more than four years after the coup 
d'etat which resulted in the arrest of the leaders of the Cultural 
Revolution, and more than nine years after the arrest of the alleged 
leaders of the abortive coup d'etat against Mao, Peking began its 
trials of these former leaders. Sixty-seven days later, Peking's special 
court handed down sentences: Jiang Qing, the 67-year-old widow of 
Mao and a Polibureau member, and Zhang Chunqiao, the 63-year-old 
former Vice-Premier, mayor of Shanghai and also a Polibureau 
member, both labeled "chief culprits" by the court, received death 
sentences suspended for two years, 1 commutable to life imprisonment 
if the malfactors show "evidence of repentence during the period of 
suspension of execution."2 Eight others received sentences ranging 
from 16 years to life in prison. Most of those receiving specific prison 
terms are probably too old or too ill to survive the years in jail. 
Most observers outside China would agree that the "Gang of 
Four" trial and the Lin Biao trial were primarily political exercises to 
liquidate the losers of a power struggle. The Chinese press, however, 
has consistently maintained that the trials were strictly legal 
proceedings. Soon after the announcement of the sentences, China's 
press called the judgments against the leaders of the Cultural 
Revolution a victory for the country's new legal system and described 
the trials as a landmark - the end of a lawless era, a successful test 
of China's new legal system and a demonstration that all are equal 
1. See "Written Judgement of the Special Court under the Supreme People's 
Court of the People's Republic of China," Beijing Review, Vol. 24, No. 5 (Feb. 2, 1981), 
pp. 13-23. 
2. See Article 46 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted 
on July 1, 1979 and effective on January 1, 1980. See Guangming Ribao <Enlighten-
ment daily), July 8, 1979. 
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before the law.3 In view of the Chinese insistence on regarding the 
trials strictly as a legal proceeding, it is illuminating to consider the 
proceedings from the perspective of their place within the Chinese 
legal structure. The legality of the Peking trials is properly measured 
against the recently enacted Arrest and Detention Law, Criminal 
Law, Criminal Procedure Law, and Constitution, and against certain 
basic principles of the administration of justice which are also 
embodied in these laws and in recent Chinese legal writings. This 
paper analyzes the process of arrest and detention, the composition of 
the trial court, the defendants' use of their right to defense, the 
special court's evaluation of the evidence, the applicable law, and 
related matters in accordance with these legal criteria. 
II. LEGAL DEFECTS IN THE PROCEEDINGS 
A. Arrest and Detention 
The six defendants of the Lin Biao case were arrested in 
September 1971, following an abortive coup d'etat, and the four 
defendants of the "Gang of Four" were arrested in October 1976. It 
was not until April 1980, however, that the accused were finally 
referred to the Ministry of Public Security (the police) for investiga-
tion, and it was not until September 1980 that the case was finally 
referred to the Supreme People's Procuracy for prosecution.• 
There were three serious legal defects in the arrest and pretrial 
detention. Fim,=-the-c organ arresting and detaining the defendants 
,::-r was I}Ot a government agency, but a party organ. Such an arrest and 
u detention was in clear violation of the 1954 Arrest and Detention Act 
"- - of the PRC/ which was applicable throughout most of the relevant 
period. Article 1 of this Act provides that "no citizen may be arrested 
except by decision of a people's court or with the approval of a 
people's procuracy." Article 2 of the recently enacted 1979 Arrest and 
::r Detention Act6 contains similar provisions and also provides that on 
3. "China's Press Hail Trial As Victory for Legal System," The New York Times, 
January 27, 1981, p.A5. 
4. See Fox Butterfield, "In China, They're Presumed Guilty Until Found Guilty," 
The New York Times, November 23, 1980, p. 4E. 
5. Translated in part in Jerome Alan Cohen, The Criminal Process in the People's 
Republic of China, 1949-1963: An Introduction, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universi-
ty Press, 1968, pp. 360-362. 
6. "Regulation for Arrest and Detention," Beijing Review, Vol 22, No. 10 (March 
9, 1979), p. 4. Complete text released by Xinhua (New China) News Agency on 
February 24, 1979. 
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the effective date of the new Act, February 23, 1979, the 1954 Act 
would be abrogated, thus making it clear that the 1954 Act was in 
force when all the defendants were arrested or detained. The 1979 
Act further provides that evidence against the detainees must be 
submitted to the appropriate people's procuratorate within three days 
or, in special circumstances, seven days after the arrest. The 
procuratorate must then either sanction the arrest or order the 
release of the detainee within three days (Aritcle 8). These provisions 
were not complied with in the arrest and detention of the ten 
defendants. 
The second serious legal defect concerning the arrest and 
detention arises from Article 92 of the Criminal Procedure Law,7 
effective January 1, 1980, which provides: 
The maximum period for an accused to be detained pending 
preliminary investigations shall not exceed two months. If the 
circumstances of a case are complicated and the investigation of 
a case is not concluded after two months, an extension of one 
month may be granted by the people's procuratorate at the next 
higher level. 
If a case is particularly serious and complicated and the 
investigation of the case is not concluded after an extension of 
one month has been granted in accordance with the preceding 
provision, the Supreme People's Procuratorate shall report the 
case to the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress (NPC) for approval of an extension for further inves-
tigation. 
The Ministry of Public Security took over the case in April 1980~ 
but it took that grgan five months to conclude the invest~~;~tion. 
During that five-month period,-·however, the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate had neither approved a one-month extension of the 
investigation period nor requested the Standing Committee of the 
NPC for a further extension of the investigation period.8 
The third legal defect in the arrest and detention arises from the 
1954 Act of the PRC for Reform Through Labor.9 (The continued 
7. Chinese text published in Guangmin Ribao (The Enlightenment Daily), July 
8, 1979, pp. 2, 3. 
8. See "Principal Culprits of the Counter-Revolutionary Cliques of Lin Biao and 
Jiang Qing to be Tried," Beijing Review, Vol 23, No. 40 (October 6, 1980), p. 3. 
9. Translated in part in Cohen, supra, note 5, pp. 589-594. 
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validity of this Act was confirmed by the NPC Standing Committee's 
decision of November 29, 1979.)10 Article 8 of the Act provides that 
"detention houses shall be used primarily for confining in custody 
offenders whose cases have not been adjudged," while Article 13 
provides that "prisons shall be used primarily for holding counterr~­
voluiiuna.ry offenders and other important criminal offenders whose 
cases have already been adjudged .... " In contravention of.these 
provision~ the ten defendants in the November 1980 trials had been 
detained in Qin Cheng Prison for periods of four to ten years before 
sentences were handed down on January 25, 1981Y 
B. The Establishment and the Composition of the Prosecuting and 
Trial Organs . 
On September 29, 1980, the Standing Committee of the NPC 
decided to establish a special procuratorate and a special court to 
prosecute and try the ten defendants. Huang Huoqing, the Supreme 
People's Procurator, was appointed chief of the special procuratorate, 
and Jiang Hua was named chief judge of the special court. 12 The legal 
basis for organizing a special procuratorate and a special court was 
as~~d to .t:,eside in Article 20 of the Organic Law of the Procuracy 
an~~rticle 3~of the Organic Law of the Court. The first of these 
provisions states:13 
The Supreme People's Procuratorate shall establish criminal, 
disciplinary, prison and economic procuratorial divisions. It may 
also, according to its need, establish_other or~an;; [to carry out its 
functions]. 
Article 31 of the Organic Law of the Court states:14 
The Supreme People's Court may establish Criminal Division, 
Civil Division, Economic Division and other necessary divisions. 
10. See Renmin Ribao, November 30, 1979, p. 1. 
11. See "Before the Opening of the Trial," dispatch from Peking, Dagong Bao 
(Impartial daily - a Hong Kong Chinese Communitst newspaper), November 19, 1980. 
For a vivid description of the Qin Cheng prison, see Fox Butterfield, "Peking Dissident, 
in Rare Account, Tells of Political Prisoners' Torture," The New York Times, May 7, 
1979, pp. AI, A10. 
12. See supra note 8. 
13. See Jianpan Wu and Tao Ouyang; "On Problems of the Application of Law 
Concerning the Trials in the Counterrevolutionary Cases of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing," 
Faxue Yenjiu (Studies in Law), 1980, No. 6, p.3. 
14. Ibid. 
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PRC jurist Zhang Y ouyu explained that the special court was 
established in accordance with the above-quoted Article 31 of the 
Organic Law of the Court. 15 One may, however, argue that the 
Organic laws for both procuracy and court appear to provide for the 
establishment of standing organs (divisions), while the special 
procuratorate and court here are purely ad hoc creations. Thus, it 
may be argued that the establishment of the special procuratorate 
and court was without statutory basis and therefore null and void. 
Even assuming that the establishment of the special 
procuratorate and court was legal, their compostition was clearly in 
violation of the PRC Criminal Procedure Law and of basic principles 
regarding the administration of justice. First, many of the judges and 
procurators were not selected from within the judicial and 
procuratorial branches; in fact, some were even selected from among 
persons in active military service. For instance, one of the deputy 
chiefs of the special procuratorate, Shi Jinqian, is deputy-director of 
the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA). Wu Ziuquan, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, was 
appointed as chief judge of the second tribunal of the special court. 16 
Moreover, the composition of the prosecuting and trial organs 
violated Article 23 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides: 
Judges, procurators and investigators involved in one of the 
following situations should withdraw from a case, and the 
accused and his or her legal representative have the right to ask 
them to withdraw if: 
(1) They are parties to the case or close relatives of the parties 
to the case; 
(2) They themselves or their close relatives have an interest in 
the case ... 
Among the alleged victims listed in the indictment are Jiang Hua, 
chief judge of the special court, and Huang Huoqing, chief procurator 
of the special procuratorate. 17 Among the thirty-five judges were at 
least twenty who had allegedly been persecuted during the Cultural 
15. Zhongguo News Agency dispatch from Peking, November 21, 1980, cited in 
Wang Hsiao-tang, "Trial of Lin-Kiang Clique and Legalism," Chung-kung yen-chiu 
<Studies in Chinese Communism Monthly), Vol. 14, No. 12 (December 15, 1980), p. 40. 
16. See supra note 8 and Wang Hsiao-tang, supra note 15, p. 40. 
17. See Indictment of the Special Procuratorate, November 2, 1980., Renmin 
Ribao, November 22, 1980, p. 2. 
32 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Revolution, and most of the others were directly related to people who 
had suffered similarlyY 
In addition, the compostion of the tribunal clearly violated 
Article 105, paragraph 2, of the Criminal Procedure Law, which 
provides: 
Trial at higher people's courts and the Supreme People's Court as 
the court of first instance, should be conducted by a collegiate 
tribunal composed of one to three judges two to four people's 
assessors. 
In the trial of the ten defendants, no people's assessors participated in 
the proceedings. PRC jurist Zhang Y ouyu explained this deviation 
from normal procedure by saying that because the special court was 
not an ordinary court, there was no need to have people's assessors. 19 
However, this deviation from the prescribed lawful procedure was not 
explicitly authorized by the appropriate legislative organ, the 
Standing Committee of the NPC, and its legality is at best 
questionable. 
C. Exercise of the Right to Defense 
Under the Criminal Procedure Law, a defendant has the right to 
put forth a defense or to hire a lawyer to do so (Article 26); thus, 
when the special court served on Jiang Qing and the nine other 
defendants copies of the indictment on November 10, 1980, it also 
informed them that they had the right of defense and could hire 
lawyers to make a defense. 2° Five of the defendants did appoint or 
accept the court's appointment of defense counsel. Four defendants, 
18. See James P. Sterba, "Former Chinese Leaders Given Long Prison Terms," 
The New York Times, January 26, 1981, p. A3. 
19. See Wang Hsiao-tang, supra, note 15, p. 41. Zhang also said that among the 
judges appointed by the NPC Standing Committee were several persons from 
democratic parties and people's organizations, so that there was no need to appoint 
people's assessors. However, according to PRC law, people's assessors must be "elected" 
by the people, and not appointed by the NPC Standing Committee. See Teaching and 
Research Office of Beijing (Peking) Political-Legal Institute, Zhonghua renmin 
gonghequo xinshi susong fa jiangyi (Lectures on the criminal procedure law of the 
People's Republic of China), Peking: Qunzhong chupanshe, 1979, pp. 31-34. 
20. "Trial of Jiang Qing and Others to Begin," Beijing Review, Vol. 23, No. 46 
(November 17, 1980), p. 3. 
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including Jiang Qing.21 declined to accept the appointment of a 
defense lawyer, and one defendant, Zhang Chungqiao, sat mute 
throughout the entire court proceedings.22 
In the course of the trial, the defense lawyers did not play any 
active role in protecting or defending the defendants. None of the 
defense lawyers objected to any of the prosecution's questions or 
asked to cross-examine a witness.23 The lawyers appeared to make 
some perfunctory remarks for their clients only on the day when the 
court concluded the debates concerning each defendant. Even then, 
the complete text of the remarks was not released and only a small 
part of their defense was published in the official newspaper. 
Three of the defendants, Jiang Tengjiao,24 Chen Boda25 and Wu 
Faxian,26 pleaded guilty; their defense lawyers primarily argued that 
their clients should be treated with leniency because of their guilty 
pleas. One defendant, Li Zuopeng, former first political commissar of 
the PLA Navy, denied some of the charges but admitted others. His 
lawyers argued that he had, on his own initiative, confessed some 
crimes during the pretrial phase and had shown a certain degree of 
repentance since the court investigation started. They therefore 
requested that the court mete out lighter punishment to Li Zuopeng 
according to law.27 
Yao Wenyuan, a former Polibureau member, acknowledged that 
he had committed mistakes but denied the allegation that he had 
controlled and used the mass media to agitate an overthrow of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. His defense lawyers, however, said 
that Y ao was one of the main culprits of a counterrevolutionary 
clique led by Jiang Qing. They nevertheless challenged the charge in 
21. However, according to Lui Cen Pu of the law faculty of Hangzhou University, 
Jiang Qing did ask two of her friends to represent her but they declined to do so 
because her insistence on violating the norms of Chinese courtroom procedure and 
decorum constituted "illegal demands." See David Quinto, "Chinese Law: A Closer 
Look," Harvard Law Record, Vol. 71, No. 10 (January 23, 1980l, p. 5. 
22. See "Jurist Qiu Shaoheng," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, I, January 
29, 1981, PRC, p. L3. 
23. See Fox Butterfield, "Revenge Seems to Outweigh Justice at Chinese Trial," 
The New York Times, December 6, 1980, p. 2. 
24. The debate on his case was concluded on December 1, 1980. See "Jiang 
Tengjiao Pleads Guilty," Beijing Review, Vol. 23, No. 50 (December 15, 1980l, p. 20. 
25. The debate on his case was concluded on December 18, 1980. See "Report from 
the Court(sl, Special Court Continues Debates," Beijing Review, Vol. 23, No. 52 
mecember 29, 1980), p. 18. 
26. The debate on his case was concluded on December 18, 1980. See ibid., p. 20. 
27. See ibid., p. 21. 
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the indictment that Y ao had prepared public opinion for an armed 
rebellion in Shanghai; their challenge was based on facts which 
allegedly showed that the criminal conduct could not be established 
and that Y ao should not be held legally responsible. 28 Y ao's lawyers 
did not plead leniency for him. 
Foro those. dEifendaQ.t~ who de.clined counsel 41-nd e:hose to defelld 
themselves, the complete texts of their statements in defense were 
not released. These defendants were denied the right to call witnesses 
they requested and were prevented from seriously cross-examining 
the prosecution witnesses. 
D. Evaluation of Evidence 
According to the reports of Western correspondents, many of the 
prosecution witnesses read from notes while testifying. Moreover, 
many witnesses were either co-defendants or had been detained for 
years before the trial. The defense lawyers, however, failed to argue 
that these circumstances might have tainted the testimony or 
credibility of these witnesses. At the end of each day, the presiding 
judge read a text pronouncing the evidence sufficient and conclusive 
and adjourned the court until the next day and the next charge.29 
To western observers, the procurators failed to link the defen-
dants directly to their alleged crimes in at least some charges. For 
instance, Chen Boda was accused of causing the death of 2,955 people 
and the persecution of 84,000 by giving a speech attacking a 
provincial party organization. While Chen did admit that he had 
"played a counterrevolutionary part" in the affairs, the procurators 
failed to establish or even indicate how the speech could have led to 
the alleged result. 30 In the course of the trial of Jiang Qing, the 
procurators brought a group of witnesses to the court, each of whom 
alleged that in 1966 Jiang Qing ordered the ransacking of the homes 
of five of their former associates in the Shanghai film world of the 
1930's for the purpose of finding and destroying letters, diaries and 
photographs about her earlier life as an actress. However, the entire 
body of evidence connecting Jiang with the break-ins was apparently 
based on hearsay. Even the general who organized the Shanghai 
searches testified that it was the wife of former Defense Minister Lin 
Biao, Y e Qun, now dead, who gave him the instructions. The 
28. See ibid., pp. 18-19. 
29. See supra note 23. 
30. Ibid. 
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assumption that Y e Qun was acting at the behest of Jiang, while 
possible, was not proved in court. 31 
Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish a direct causal link 
between the defendants and the numerous deaths that took place 
during the Cultural Revolution. The court frequently referred 
vaguely to the "persecution to death" of many victims of the Cultural 
Revolution, but presented no direct evidence linking the Gang of 
Four with any of the deaths.32 
E. Applicable Law and Other Miscellaneous Problems Concerning 
the Trials 
Article 9 of the Criminal Law provides: 
Acts committed ... before the entry into force of this law [i.e., 
January 1, 1980] which were not considered as offenses under the 
law, decrees and policies at that time shall be dealt with 
according to the law, decrees and policies at that time. Those 
which were considered offenses under the law, decrees and 
policies at that time and are punishable according to Section 8 of 
Chapter IV of the General Principles of this law [i.e., 
prescription] shall be punished in accordance with the law, 
decrees and policies at that time. But if the act is not deemed an 
offense or the penalty for the offense is lighter under the present 
law, the present law shall apply. 
In accordance with the above provisions, the court was required to 
apply the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act33 - the only important 
criminal legislation before 1979. In spite of the provisions of Article 9 
of the Criminal Law, however, the special court decided to apply the 
31. See Richard Berstein, '"Gang of 4' Trial Dramatic But Case Far From Proved," 
Washington Star, December 14, 1980, p. All. 
32. Ibid. 
33. The Act was translated in Cohen, supra note 5, pp. 299-302. It has only 21 
articles and fails to define with reasonable precision the kinds of conduct that come 
within its reach. Moreover, it explicitly permits the use of analogy and the retroactive 
application of the Act to cover "pre-liberation" <1949) activities. For an analysis of how 
the PRC's criminal justice system worked before 1977, see generally Hungdah Chiu, 
"Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province 
Documents," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 68, No. 3 (1977), pp. 
374-398 and the sources cited therein. 
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1979 Criminal Law to acts committed before the effective date of the 
statute. This decision clearly violates one of the most basic maxims of 
criminal justice: nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a 
pre-existing law making the act a crime). The rationale for the 
special court's retroactive application of the 1979 law was that the 
punishment under present law was lighter. This is hardly convincing, 
because there were no provisions in the 1951 Act on the alleged 
"framing and persecuting party and state leaders" or "usurping party 
authorities or seizing power", with which the defendants were 
charged. While the 1951 Act permits the use of analogy in applying 
the Act, there was no similar provision in the Act to justify those 
alleged activities as criminal.34 As a matter of fact, before 1976 none 
of the losers in any top-level power struggle in the PRC had ever been 
accused of violating the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act. 
Assuming that it was appropriate to apply the newly enacted 
criminal law, the special court sustained almost all the charges in the 
indictments despite some serious problems in direct cause link 
34. Cf the following explanation made by two PRC writers: 
"Some argued that the prerequisite for comparing the severity of punishment 
between the [Counterrevolutionary] Act and the Criminal Law is that the same 
offense be provided in both statutes. Only when an offense provided in both is the 
same, can one compare the severity of punishment between the two. If an offense is 
defined differently in the two statutes, then the two are not comparable. Now, only 
a small part of the counterrevolutionary provisions in the Act and the Criminal 
Law have the same contents, while most of them are not identical or even similar; 
therefore, it would be difficult to compare the two statutes to determine which one 
imposes more severe punishment [on the counterrevolutionary offense]. 
This view is hardly convincing. Whether an offense is the same in both 
statutes should be determined by looking to the substance of the offense as defined 
in both statutes and not merely by looking at the precise wording of the statutes. 
So far as the substance of an offense is concerned, it is submitted that the contents 
of the counterrevolutionary offense provided in the Act and the Criminal Law are 
in most part the same. Most of the provisions of the Act could be found in the 
corresponding provisions in the Criminal Law. Of course, the offenses provided in 
the Criminal Law are more complete and some offenses such as subversion against 
the government and splitting the country are not found in the Act. However, this 
situation should not obstruct us from making comparison . . . as the Act provided 
[in Article 16] that [a defendant] could be sentenced by applying analogous 
provisions in the Act and we could make comparison between the two statutes by 
analogy." See Jianpan Wu and Tao Ouyang, supra note 13, p. 5. Article 16 of the 
Counterrevolutionary Act provides: "Those who, with a counterrevolutionary 
purpose, commit crimes not covered by the provisions of the Act may be given 
punishment prescribed for crimes enumerated in the Act which are comparable to 
the crimes committed." 
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between the defendants and the charges mentioned above. The most 
important charges dismissed by the special court was a charge 
against Jiang Qing that she plotted with three other members of the 
Gang of Four to persuade Mao not to appoint Mr. Deng Xiaoping as 
Premier when the late Premier Chou En-lai died in 1974. Even to 
Chinese legal minds, this charge is clearly a political rather than a 
criminal accusation and the special court in its judgment decided to 
drop this charge.35 This appears to be the only admirable part of the 
trials. 
Moreover, the trial was closed to the general public and to 
foreign correspondents, although the PRC had claimed that it was an 
"open trial" in the sense that "the various provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the central government, 
political parties, people's organizations, government organs and PLA 
can send representatives to attend the trials as observers."36 None of 
these observers, however, was permitted to make any comment on 
the trials, other than to praise the proceedings as fair. Moreover, the 
30 Chinese media correspondents who had been invited to observe the 
trial were not allowed to issue any individual reports; all news 
concerning the trials was uniformly released by the Xinhua News 
Agency. 
Finally, under the 1979 Criminal Procedure Law and even 
according to PRC practice before the implementation of this law, a 
person sentenced to long term imprisonment or death has the right of 
appeai.37 This right was expressly denied to the ten defendants 
because no appeal was permitted from the verdict of the special 
court.38 The rationale for not allowing appeal may have been that the 
trials were conducted by the highest judicial organ, so no appeal 
would be necessary; nevertheless, the abridgement of the right of 
appeal is without statutory foundation. 
III. PoLITICAL ANALYSIS oF LEGAL DEFECTS IN THE PRoCEEDINGs 
Certain legal defects in the trials may have resulted from 
political considerations on the part of the Peking leadership. First, 
35. See Fox Butterfield, "Mao's Widow Denies any Role in Plot," The New Y ark 
Times, November 27, 1980, p. A2 and "Mass Support for Sentences on Jiang Qing and 
Others," Beijing Review, Vol. 24, No.6 (February 9, 1981), pp. 6-7. 
36. See "Principal Culprits ... " supra note 8, p. 4. 
37. See Xing Zhong, "Judicial Organs and Judicial Procedure in China," Beijing 
Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 32. 
38. See "Principal Culprits ... " supra 8, p. 4. 
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the creation of a special court with no right of appeal and of a special 
procuratorate to handle the trials of the Gang of Four and the Lin 
Biao Clique may have been a political necessity. Because these trials 
were essentially political in nature, it was desirable to include among 
the judges and procurators representatives of all factions opposing 
the Gang of Four and the Lin Biao Clique, so as to demonstrate the 
unity of these factions against their common enemy. Moreover, the 
creation of a special court and a special procuratorate was the only 
way to ensure the participation of the military in the trials. Since no 
group in the PRC can retain power without the support of the 
military, their participation was politically essential. 
Second, because the trials were political in nature, the unity of 
the judges in conducting the trials and rendering the sentences was 
essential. This unit could be guaranteed only if each and every judge 
had a personal grievance against the defendants. While a judge in the 
PRC would rarely, if ever, refuse to follow a party directive as to the 
outcome of a judicial case, the PRC sought to avoid the slightest risk 
of possible diviation in these politically sensitive cases. For this 
reason, Article 23 of the Criminal Procedure Law requiring with-
drawal of judges and other interested persons was totally ignored. 
Third, the "open trial" requirement of the Criminal Procedure 
Law was not strictly followed simply because the PRC leaders did not 
want to allow the defendants, especially Jiang Qing, to present their 
cases to the public, anticipating that the defendants would try to shift 
the blame to Mao, attributing all their alleged crimes to Mao's 
instructions. Similarly, the Peking leadership denied the right of 
appeal so as to bring the cases to a speedy conclusion and thereby 
avoid undue publicity for the defendants. Thus, a policy of informa-
tion containment pervaded the entire proceedings and political 
considerations overrode legal safeguards and guarantees. 
V. CoNCLUSIONS 
From the preceding analysis of the trial proceedings, it is clear 
that the trials were essentially a political proceeding and, in fact, an 
act of vengeance by the officials currently in power against the losers 
of a power struggle.39 
It has been suggested that the Peking trials should be compared 
with the Nuremburg war crimes trial held by the Allies after World 
39. This is the view expressed by most Western press. See e.g. "Guilty Verdict: The 
Gang of Four," Time, February 2, 1981, p. 66. 
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War ll. 40 However, there are several major differences between the 
two. First, in the Nuremburg trial, none of the judges and prosecutors 
was a direct victim of Nazi aggression or persecution. Second, the 
Nuremburg trial was genuinely open, while the Chinese trials were, 
in fact, closed to all but a limited few and were subject to highly 
restricted media coverage. Third, it was well known that it was Mao 
who had started the Cultural Revolution and who had issued many 
directives which caused the persecution of millions of people in 
China. In the course of the trials, however, Mao's responsibility was 
never reviewed by the Court, while his subordinates who im-
plemented his orders or instructions were held to bear full criminal 
responsibility.41 This is equivalent to saying that Hitler was not 
responsible for the start of the Second World War and the·resulting 
atrocities. Moreover, the Chinese trials never convincingly responded 
to Jiang Qing's defense that she had acted on the instructions of 
Chairman Mao and other top officials and that her deeds had been 
ratified by the then-sitting Community Party Central Committee.42 
The trials were characterized as a showcase for China's recently 
enacted Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Law and praised by 
Chinese jurist Qiu Shaoheng (known as Henry Chiu abroad) as the 
turning over of "a new leaf in the history of the administration of 
justice in China."43 There is little doubt that the trials were of 
immense public and political importance. However, the record belies 
the assertion that China has entered a new era in the administration 
of criminal justice. Consistent failures to observe individual rights 
and procedural rules raise serious questions as to the legitimacy of 
the proceedings and of the verdicts handed down after over four years 
of preparation and two months of trials. 
40. See Butterfield, supra note 4. 
41. On Mao's close relations with the ten defendants, see an interesting report in 
"Mao and the Two Gangs," Inside China Mainland, December 1980, pp. 8-12. 
42. See Bradley K. Martin, "Despite Guilty Verdict, Jiang Remained Defiant," 
The Sun, January 26, 1981, p. A2. See also Ding Wan, "Tenuous Legal Basis for Peking 
'Big Trial'," T'ang T'ai (Contemporary Monthly), No. 3 (November 1980), pp. 28-30. 
43. See supra note 22. 
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Chapter III 
IMAGES AND REALITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FOUR 
By Lillian Craig Harris* 
An examination of the Gang of Four trial from a human rights 
perspective confronts us immediately with the Procrustean dilemma 
of whether Chinese society can fairly be measured against an 
essentially western concept. Chinese society seeks to offer individuals 
basic rights to life, happiness, health and opportunity. But for the 
Chinese the concept of society as a whole takes precedence over the 
rights of individuals. "The notion that individuals might have rights 
against their social group, society or the state [is] an utterly alien 
concept."' Thus, what would be an obvious human rights violation in 
New York City might not necessarily be any such thing in Shanghai. 
A related problem involves Chinese value systems. Revenge, 
anger and hatred against "untruth" and "evil" are accepted virtues in 
both Chinese tradition and in the lexicon of the Chinese Communist 
Party.2 But the Christian tradition which fathered the present 
Western definition of human rights finds glorification of such 
concepts and motives at least theoretically both repugnant and 
foreign. Can we judge the Chinese according to rules which violate 
their basic spiritual and philosophical concepts? On the other hand, 
can we, in the words of Simon Leys, fail "to apply standards of 
common sense and common decency to the analysis of the Maoist 
experiment?" Can we adhere to the "remarkable doctrine" held by 
some that the Chinese "were so different from the rest of mankind 
that they had no need for human rights and no desire for individual 
justice?"3 
Further, how can anyone really measure a totalitarian gov-
ernmental system for the white hat and leisure suit of "human 
rights"? Beijing simply does not dress that way. The party's 
* Views expressed here are author's. 
1. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979. Washington, D. C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1980, p. 437. 
2. Cf. "People's Daily on Gang Trial" <Beijing People's Daily in Chinese, 
November 18, 1980, p. 4) People's Republic of China-Daily Report, Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS), November 18, 1980. L-2. 
3. Simon Leys, "A Passage to China," The New Republic, January 3, 1981, p. 33. 
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insistence that it remains the only legitimate source of doctrine and 
authority appears to violate the most basic principles of human 
conscience and intellectual freedom. But the CCP has merely built on 
traditional Chinese values in seeking to develop "a socialist society in 
which collective state aims took precedence over individual rights."4 
How then can analysis and examination continue? They can continue 
only on the basis that some totalitarian systems are more repressive 
than others. 
Here, however, we confront an even more difficult dilemma. The 
Chinese concept of reforming the wrongdoer is through reeducation, 
not elimination as remains typically the case in other totalitarian 
societies and systems. In China thousands of people remain without 
trial in "reeducation through labor" camps.5 How does one assess the 
extent to which human rights are violated by coercion as opposed to 
death? Orwellian thought reform may be a greater violation of the 
human spirit than mere torture and slaughter of the physical body. 
Given these difficulties of adjustment and definition, we might be 
hard put to justify any comment on the human rights situation in 
China, were not the Chinese people and government themselves 
presently so seized by human rights considerations. Chinese tradition 
calls for redress of the people's grievances by their leaders and 
despite awareness of the Gang of Four trial's political content and 
their fears of once again being misled, it is in that tradition that the 
Chinese people would like to see the trial. Despite the theatrics and 
manipulation, it is in that tradition that China's leaders intend for 
the trial to be seen. "The principle of revolutionary humanitarian-
ism," said the People's Daily as the trial drew to a close, "has been 
applied."6 
For outsiders, however, it is necessary to study the trial in the 
broader context of present and past political and social conditions. 
What occurred during the November 20 to December 29 trial was not 
simply an examination of the criminal behavior of Lin Biao, Jiang 
Qing and their respective colleagues. Often what appeared in the 
popular and official media gave profound insight into an ongoing 
power struggle and a society's attempts to come to terms with its 
continuing problems. 
4. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, p. 437. 
5. June Teufel Dreyer, "Limits of the Permissible in China," Problems of 
Communism, November-December 1980, p. 63. 
6. "Trials Based on Socialist Principles" (People's Daily, December 22, 1980! 
FBIS, December 23, 1980. L-6. 
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Human Rights in China 
Recent developments in China suggest that the human rights 
situation is gradually improving. This improvement is closely tied to 
the success of far-reaching reforms introduced under the leadership of 
Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, reforms which have encompassed 
party and governmental structure and practice, civil and political 
liberties, the judicial and legal systems and economic and social 
practice. Restrictions on religious practice have been relaxed, for 
example, and there is movement toward the administration of 
minority districts in ways that take greater account of ethnic 
customs, cultures and special circumstances. 
The September 1980 session of the National People's Congress 
formalized a series of Dengist reforms, including the decentralization 
of decision making, strengthened the role of law and, as a signal of 
"nothing to hide" to the world, opened the NPC session to foreign 
observation. The 12th CCP Congress, expected this year, will 
probably place greater limits on official powers. But serious human 
rights problems and violations continue in China and failure of the 
Dengist reform program could bring a return to greater reliance on 
ideology and mass campaigns against political opponents. The extent 
of social unrest revealed by a brief period of relaxed restrictions 
caused the September 1980 NPC to rescind the "four big rights" - to 
speak out freely, air views freely, hold great debates, and write big 
character posters-rights, which had been: guaranteed by the state 
constitution of 1978.7 "Despite signs of improvement, the Chinese 
media and officials still condemn 'human rights' as a 'bourgeois 
slogan' without any relevance for China today."8 
Although China has shown greater willingness to discuss human 
rights in the international arena (at the UN, for example), Beijing 
has continued to assert that 
. . . each country's own legal provisions affecting the rights of 
citizens are bound to differ and are internal matters and that, 
moreover, individual freedom must not be detrimental to the 
national public interest.9 
Several factors restrict "a fair and disciplined inquiry" into the 
actual conditions of human rights inside China, including the 
7. Beijing Review, March 10, 1980. Vol. 23, No. 10. p. 10. 
8. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979, p. 438. 
9. Ibid., p. 440. 
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different Chinese definition of human rights, blurring of the line 
between the formal and informal process in the Chinese legal system 
and difficulty in "striking a balance in our analysis between 
quantitative and qualitative aspects" of Chinese human rights 
conditions.10 
The situation is further complicated by lack of evidence on labor 
reform practices and treatment of political prisoners. "It is impossible 
to calculate the exact number of inmates in labor reform camps; 
estimates by former convicts vary from several thousand to a 
million."11 Although execution for political crimes appears to have 
ended, most people including the Chinese certainly question whether 
Jiang Qing's death sentence was the result of criminal behavior 
alone. 
In sum, the present , human, rights position of the Chinese 
government appears to be that people have the right to choose their 
government (as they are said to have done in 1949), but that 
government is then free to exercise control without undue internal -
and certainly withqut,external- interference .. 
The Political Basis for the Trial 
Why, however, did Beijing try the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
groups and why at this time? Several answers are immediately 
evident. On January 26, the People's Daily hailed the successful 
conclusion of the trials as a "great victory for the socialist system," 
declaring that China can now, with a demonstrably established legal 
system, "effectively defend the people's democracy, safeguard political 
stability and unity, and ensure the success of the four 
modernizations."12 This statement reveals a desire to: 
(1) Reinforce the moderate (Dengist) leadership; 
(2) Show leadership commitment to political stability through 
strict, universal application of law; and 
(3) Motivate citizens to implement the new economic and 
political reforms without fear. 
Although it appeared to be the Cultural Revolution, personified by 
the Gang of Four, which was on trial, dee!>' seated. political- issues 
10. Samuel S. Kim. China, the United Nations and World Order. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 484. 
11. Fox Butterfield, Orange County Register, January 4, 1981. 
12. "The Just Court Verdict," !People's Daily editorial in Chinese, January 26, 
1981, pp. 1 and 4) FBIS, January 26, 1981. L-27. 
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which relate to the governing of China were even more profoundly 
involved. 
Two issues, modernization and party reform, stand out as the 
major sources of contention in the current Chinese leadership 
struggle. The moderates, who pushed for the trial, hoped ultimately 
to discredit Mao as well as the officials who benefited from the 
Cultural Revolution and to enhance their programs of separating the 
roles of party and government, promoting greater decentralization 
and downgrading ideology in favor of the pragmatic and the 
technical. 
In the compromise reached as a prelude to the trials, the 
Dengists apparently agreed to avoid dealing publicly with the issue of 
Mao's responsibility. However, evidence presented at the trials, in 
particular the statements of Jiang Qing and Yao Wenyuan severely 
strained these artificial limitations and further complicated relations 
within the CCP. On December 22, the People's Daily published the 
harshest indictment to date of Mao's role in the Cultural Revolution, 
blaming him officially for the first time for mistakes which caused 
China "grave misfortunes."13 
A secondary rationale for the trials was the underlying need for 
scapegoats for the wrongs of the Cultural Revolution, an era which 
probably left few Chinese families unscathed by political or economic 
loss or by humiliation, injury or even death of a family member. The 
anger of the Chinese people has been in real measure in need of 
placating. Publication of long lists of names of victims furthered the 
atmosphere of personal vendetta. 14 Nor was the moderate leadership 
itself free from the need for this cathartic experience of self 
vindication, as repeated references to injustices done to such notables 
as Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi made clear. 
The leftists could only hope to gain by draining off some popular 
discontent through using Jiang Qing as a scapegoat in the endeavor 
to slow down the demythologizing of Mao. The trial represented a 
triumph for the Dengists, however, at least in the sense of its 
implications for Hua Guofeng. There were unconfirmed reports that 
Hua had agreed at a CCP politburo meeting in late October or early 
November to step down as party chairman in exchange for his 
opponents' agreement to delete several politically explosive charges 
13. "People's Daily Comments on Trial of Lin.Jing Clique" (Beijing People's Daily 
in Chinese, December 22, 1980, pp. 1 and 5) FBIS, December 24, 1980. L-6. 
14. "Text of Indictment" (Beijing Xinhua in English, November 20, 1980l FBIS, 
November 20, 1980. L-6. 
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from the Gang of Four indictment.15 Nonetheless, the extremely 
defensive tone of the December 22 indictment of Mao in the People's 
Daily suggests that Deng and his group may not have gotten from the 
trial all that they had hoped for. 
The possibility that some Chinese may have been reinforced in 
their cynicism toward their government - particularly as the death 
sentences were not carried out - was swept aside by publicity given 
to the trial as an event which "gives the people great satisfaction."16 
Opportunity to provide this satisfaction was hardly to be passed up by 
those Chinese leaders who found themselves in position to settle their 
personal scores while furthering their political objectives. Whether 
the people are truly satisfied or the intended political objectives met 
remains unclear. 
Charges and Procedures: An Effort to Distort Reality? 
Several aspects of the trial were clearly in violation of the 
internationally applied definition of human rights, although these 
aspects were not always contrary to traditional Chinese practices. 
These included: 
(1) Incarceration for several years before trial or indictment. 
(2) The officially sponsored pre-trial propaganda buildup which 
pilloried the defendants before the verdict was pronounced. 
(3) The foregone conclusion of a guilty verdict, including public 
statements "that death sentences probably awaited some of 
the defendants."17 
(4) Evidence of interference by party officials in the judicial 
process and indications that party officials played key roles 
in preparing the trials. 
(5) Prosecution of the defendants - Jiang Qing in particular -
in a manner demonstrative of that very crime of which they 
were most frequently accused: persecution and deprivation of 
human rights for reasons of political power and personal 
vendetta. 
15. "China's Hua Now Expected to Quit Soon," Washington Post, December 16, 
1980. 
16. "Trial by 900 Million People" <People's Daily editorial, November 22, 1980> 
FBIS, November 24, 1980. L-9. 
17. David Bona via, "Give Them Rice and Circuses," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
December 5, 1980. p. 12. 
46 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
From the outset authoritative comment sought to present the 
trial's goals as punishment of the strictly criminal behavior of a small 
group of living defendants with the vastly more sensitive political 
judgments of the Cultural Revolution left for CCP deliberation. Given 
continuing disagreement among the Chinese leadership over the 
merits of the Cultural Revolution - at the center of which is, of 
course, Mao Zedong's personal culpability - this tactic can only be 
seen as a compromise making a virtue out of a necessity. 
The four major indictments - plotting to overthrow the govern-
ment, false charges, persecution of and suppression of the human 
rights of others, and plotting of assassination and of armed rebellion 
- are, to be sure, all internationally cognizable as illegal and 
punishable by law.18 Nonetheless, persistent official efforts to divide 
the defendants' crimes from their political motivations were not 
convincing, particularly when it was publicly acknowledged that "the 
activities of even the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary 
cliques were not all counter-revolutionary crimes, some of them were 
mistakes," i.e. errors arising "from a deviation of subjective recogni-
tion of the objective world and action that goes against objective 
laws."19 This measure of the "objective world" and its "objective laws" 
is, of course, Marxist doctrine as the present leadership defines it. 
And the basic reason, as most observers recognized, why such 
mistakes could not be publicly debated was that, "during his later 
years, Comrade Mao Zedong made mistakes, especially in initiating 
and leading the Cultural Revolution."20 
Careful attention was given, nonetheless, to refuting suspicions 
and charges from some quarters that the trial was actually political 
in nature. Only counterrevolutionary crimes and "not . . . mistakes 
in party work and regarding the line, would be investigated this 
time," the People's Daily pointed out just before the trial began.21 
"Tens of thousands of people were killed as a result [of frameups and 
persecution]," the People's Daily claimed a few days later, "What kind 
of mistake in political line was that?"22 This theme was continued 
18. "Text of Indictment," <Beijing Xinhua in English, November 20, 1980> FBIS, 
November 20, 1980. L-4. 
19. "People's Daily Special Commentator Mentions Mao's Mistakes," (People's 
Daily of December 22, 1980) FBIS, Dec. 23, 1980. L-4. 
20. Ibid. 
21. "People's Daily on Gang Trial," (Beijing People's Daily in Chinese, November 
18, 1980, p. 4) FBIS, November 18, 1980. L-4. 
22. "Trial by 900 Million People," (People's Daily editorial, November 22, 1980) 
FBIS, November 24, 1980. L-8, 
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throughout, providing insight into Chinese sensitivity towards both 
international and local belief that politics as well as criminal 
behavior stood in the dock. It was publicly denied that "a difference of 
political opinions" was involved and affirmed that the defendants 
were being tried for "extremely grave counterrevolutionary crimes, 
not what some people called mistakes in work."23 
Efforts were also made to avoid the appearance of kangaroo court 
proceedings. Publicity surrounding the trial emphasized that the rule 
oflaw prevailed. On January 27, the People's Daily claimed that the 
trial had been conducted without outside interference in the judicial 
process: "Any eventuality was adjudicated according to the law by the 
judges, and no one had the right or ability to interfere."24 The 
authorities in Beijing steadfastly refuted charges that guilt of the 
defendants was predetermined25 and post-trial interviews with jurors 
and judges have highlighted satisfaction that justice was carried out. 
Nonetheless, evidence indicates behind the scenes manipulation 
both before and during the hearings. It is probable that the verdicts 
and perhaps even the sentences were determined by party leaders 
before the trial began. But controversy and contention continued 
while the trial was in session. Evidence given during the trial and 
the refusal of Jiang Qing to play the role assigned to her undoubtedly 
exacerbated the intraparty debate, particularly over Mao's culpabil-
ity, as the controversy became more public. 
Failure to begin the trials or even to announce the charges until 
the defendants had been in custody for from four to almost ten years 
is itself indicative of profound controversy at the highest levels and 
fear of judging the actions of the accused on the basis of unfiltered 
evidence. Even the disclaimers are sometimes illustrative. The 
People's Daily admitted that, "many of the complicated details had 
been investigated by the party earlier," but claimed "they were 
re-investigated and re-examined by the public security 
organizations."25 Extended recesses and the nearly month-long delay 
between verdicts and sentencing also suggests controversy and party 
maneuvering. Certainly related to this undercurrent of contention 
23. "Beijing Radio" (Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin, January 25, 1981. 
Station Commentary: "A Major Victory for the Socialist Legal System) FBIS, January 
27, 1981. F-5. 
24. "Reaction to Lin-,Jiang Clique's Verdict Continues" <Beijing People's Daily in 
Chinese, January 27, 1981, p. 5) FBIS, January 28, 1980. L-2. 
25. "People's Daily: Trials Based on Socialist Principles" (Beijing Xinhua in 
English, December 22, 1980) FBIS, December 23, 1980. L-5. 
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and intended as a rebuke was an article, published while the court 
was still out deliberating, which condemned interference by county 
level party leaders in local courts. 26 
The cooperative and submissive behavior of most of the defen-
dants reveals, moreover, the tremendous psychological pressures to 
which they were subjected. The People's Daily sought to soften this 
point, probably in direct response to the refusal of both Jiang Qing 
and Zhang Chunqiao to admit guilt, by declaring that after all, 
"evidence weighs more than admissions, and admissions alone cannot 
form the basis for the verdict."27 
And through it all, of course, ran the presupposition of guilt in 
constant reference to "the trial of the case against the Lin Biao and 
Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary cliques."26 The People's Daily, which 
described the defendants as "the bunch of big thieves," "the bunch of 
public enemies" and "the bunch of vermin," exulted on November 22 
that "the open trial of this bunch of counterrevolutionary arch 
criminals, long expected by the people of the whole country, has 
officially begun."29 Defined at the outset as counterrevolutionaries, 
the defendants were then taken to court on that charge. The press, 
furthermore, portrayed the victims of the alleged criminals as 
"martyrs" and informed the world as the trial began that "the people 
long to see this day!"30 
Jiang Qing: Images and Reality 
The case of Jiang Qing, the only woman on trial and the arch 
villain of the proceedings, needs to be examined in greater detail 
from the human rights perspective. There are clear indications that 
at least part of the rage against Jiang arose from the perception that 
she had no right to have used her position as Mao's wife to traffic in 
political affairs, to interfere in the operations of government and to 
pursue, as Xinhua put it, "her fond dream of becoming an 
26. "Beijing Ribao Decries Interference in Court Cases" !Hong Kong AFP in 
English, January 23, 1981) FBIS, January 26, 1981. L-28. 
27. "People's Daily: Trials Based on Socialist Principles" (Beijing Xinhua in 
English, December 22, 1980) FBIS, December 23, 1980. L-6. 
28. "Beijing Television Report" <Beijing Domestic Service in Mandarin, November 
20, 19801 FBIS, November 20, 1980. L-3. 
29. "22 November People's Daily Editorial" (Beijing Domestic Service in Chinese, 
November 21, 19801. FBIS, November 24, 1980. L-7. 
30. "People's Daily on Gang Trial" (Beijing People's Daily in Chinese, November 
18, 1980, p. 4. "Trial by History - Writing Before Special Court Begins Its Session by 
Ji Xichenl FBIS, November 18, 1980. L-2. 
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'empress'."31 The perception is that unfair advantage was taken using 
femining wiles. 
A pre-trial publicity campaign against Jiang Qing included a 
serialized biography in Hong Kong's PRC-controlled Hsin Wan Pao.32 
Unfolding like a soap opera, the account traces Jiang's early 
insinuation of herself, a low-born actress, into the confidences and 
bedrooms of the mighty. She is presented as the personification of all 
that a woman traditionally should not be: corrupt, manipulative, a 
behind-the-scenes schemer who had not her husband's or society's 
interests at heart but her own political ascendency. In contrast to her 
behavior are references to the faithful Wang Guangmei, wife of Liu 
Shaoqi, who stood by her husband in his misfortunes, did not seek to 
elevate herself at his expense and who now, ironically, has been 
rewarded by the party by placement in an honorable, if largely sym-
bolic, public position. 
The picture of Jiang which has emerged over the years is of a 
highly intelligent and unpleasant woman obsessed with power. 
Although it will never be possible to learn the full details of Jiang's 
motivation and activities, it is probable that she did single out for 
particular acrimony those others surrounding her husband who vied 
with her for authority and position. She probably also paid particular 
and petty attention to persecution of their wives, as is publicly 
claimed.33 It is difficult to believe, however, that had Jiang Qing been 
merely a close associate of Mao and not his wife that the attacks on 
her character would now be so vitriolic. Some Chinese recognized this 
situation, as indicated in one exchange in Beijing Wanbao. 
Two articles, which appeared in the Beijing Wanbao's "Talk of a 
Hundred Schools" column during the trial, discuss the sexist 
approach to political affairs with obvious application to Jiang Qing. 
Neither discusses the practical inavailability of power to most women 
either in traditional or modem China, making female power plays by 
necessity manipulative and devious. But, dealing in historical 
31. "Xinhua 'Jottings' on Jiang Qing" (Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in 
Chinese, December 7, 1980. "Why Are the Masses to Blame?" by Li Fengl FBIS, 
December 9, 1980. L-10. 
32. "Unofficial History of Jiang Qing" <HongKong Hsin Wan Pao, October 
editions, 1980). 
33. "Xinhua 'Jottings' on Jiang Qing" (Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service in 
Chinese, December 7, 1980. "Why Are the Masses to Blame?" by Li Fengl FBIS, 
December 9, 1980. L-10. 
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analogy, the authors discuss the effects of interference by eunuchs, 
empresses and imperial concubines in state affairs. 
The first article quotes Emperor Taizu of the Ming Dynasty, who 
is reported to have said "there were very few occasions when no 
disasters and upheavals occurred when state affairs were controlled 
by women."34 The emperor's wife is praised because she "took the 
initiative to keep herself within bounds," a situation said not to have· 
been repeated since the Han and Tang dynasties. The modern author, 
with never a nod to official Marxist adherence to the doctrine of 
equality of the sexes, sighs in conclusion: "I am afraid that this 
comment is in line with reality."35 
The second author, however, takes the first to task for implying 
that "women cause all the troubles" and "women violate the 
constitution." This, he sayf,'!, js a feudal idea and, besides, "the fe,udal 
rulers very often connived at the eunuchs, empresses and imperial 
concubines interfering in state affairs."36 This last statement appears 
to indicate the author's own feelings about who was ultimately 
responsible for Jiang'~ behavior .. 
Jiang's treatment "l:)y both' the court and the media are so 
intricately involved with the central question of Mao's culpability 
that no clear line could be drawn between the actions of Mao and 
Jiang - although both the media and the judges strove mightily to 
do so. Jiang's marriage to Mao made her a part of him in a way no 
one else could claim. That closeness, a result of her sex, brought great 
advantage for many years and an insoluble dilemma at the end. 
Bijing was, in short, faced with the age-old problem of the legal and 
social unity of married couples, a problem which in the West has 
given rise to the inadmissibility of one spouse's testimony against 
another in court. 
The moderates, whose insistence on the trial brought Jiang Qing 
to court in the first place, were well aware of this perception on the 
part of many Chinese. Some of those who suffered during the 
Cultural Revolution were undoubtedly delighted to hear Jiang's 
public statements that "by arresting and putting me on trial, you are 
34. "Beijing Wa~ l)ao on Wo~en's Interference in St~~e Aff~irs (~eijing ~.an. Bao 
in Chinese, November 27, 1980, p. 3 in "Talk of a Hundred Schools" Column by Zhu 
Xiaoxun) FBIS, December 16, 1980. L-13. 
35. Ibid. 
36. "Beijing Wan Bao on Attitude to Concubines, Eunuchs" (Beijing Wan Bao in 
Chinese, December 9, 1980, p. 3 in "Talk of a Hundred Schools Column by Lin 
Hanbiaol FBIS, December 23, 1980. L-6. 
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vilifying Chairman Mao Zedong" and "I implemented and defended 
Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line."37 It became obvious, 
in other words, that, for some Chinese, Jiang was a substitute for 
Mao, available for punishment although the real Mao was inaccessi-
ble both for political reasons and because he had had the final 
deviousness to escape by going to visit Marx. 
However, it would seem evident that the leadership's unwilling-
ness to try Mao himself so prejudiced the case against Jiang Qing 
that no fair trial was possible. She, whatever her culpability, was 
forced in effect to bear a large part of his. Her efforts, moreover, to 
strengthen her defense by presenting evidence that she and Mao were 
of one mind were strictly limited, although Jiang had insisted on 
serving as her own defense counsel. Xinhua reported that "Jiang 
Qing also repeatedly made the request that evidence and witnesses 
irrelevant to the case be presented in court."3" Little imagination is 
needed to surmise what such evidence and witnesses would have 
uncovered. 
Jiang herself, finally, was not adverse to chiding her tormenters 
on the basis of her sex. She is reported to have said "shamelessly" 
that, "During wartime, I was the only female comrade accompanying 
Chairman Mao Zedong at the frontline. Where were you hiding?"39 
The official report could only say that people laughed at this 
preposterous statement, adding sternly that "it is futile for Jiang 
Qing to attempt to cover-up her counterrevolutionary crimes by using 
Chairman Mao's high prestige."40 
The Trial as a Negative Propaganda Event 
Although for several reasons the trial of the Lin Biao and Jiang 
Qing groups may have been necessary from an internal Chinese 
viewpoint, the overall immediate impact on the rest of the world, the 
West in particular, has been negative. The event has generally been 
seen as a show trial. The San Diego Tribune, for example, ran a 
cartoon of two middle-class Americans watching the trial on televi-
sion with wide incredulous eyes, as one remarked to the other: 
"China has accused the Gang of Four of shooting J.R."41 
37. "Xinhua Account of Jiang Qing's Final Hearing" !Beijing Domestic Service in 




41. San Diego Tribune, late November 1980. 
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By Chinese practice, what is defined as a trial is the equivalent 
of a sentencing hearing in the United States. Counsel acts as 
advocate for mercy but does not contest the guilt of the defendent (as 
Jiang Qing attempted to do). Media and official statements assuming 
guilt of the defendants contributed, therefore, to a Western percep-
tion of an Alice in Wonderland trial in which the Queen of Hearts 
screamed: "Off with his head." 
China may also have damaged its credibility as a rational power 
by dredging up vivid horror scenes from the Cultural Revolution era, 
thus reviving a radical image which Beijing has for ten years sought 
to overcome. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review: 
China's biggest show trial has degenerated into the judicial 
bullying of decrepit former military commanders ... There is an 
increasingly uneasy feeling that the trial shows how little the 
official professions of fair-mindedness, rules of evidence and 
impartiality are being applied, less than a year after the new 
criminal code and code of criminal judicial procedure came into 
effect._42 
Publication of the Jiang Qing biography, as well as other 
publicity surrounding the trial, spotlighted a central question asked 
by both outsiders and by the Chinese themselves. The picture of Mao 
which emerges is that of a gullible leader so preoccupied by lofty 
ideas that he was easily duped into marriage by a power-hungry and 
devious minor camp follower. Whether or not some of those who 
produced and published the Jiang Qing biography intended this 
result, is not clear. But a central question remains unanswered: What 
sort of mature leadership could be expected from a man so naive and, 
even if he was not naive, was he not then aware of who Jiang Qing 
really was and what she was doing? 
Extensive television coverage and a well-orchestrated propagan-
da campaign brought the drama of the trial before the world. 
However, as the Far Eastern Economic Review remarked at the trial's 
opening, "What is certain is that the Chinese public and the world at 
large are being given a highly selective account; nobody expected 
anything else."•3 Referring to the trial as "a Nuremberg-style 
42. David Bonavia, op. cit., p. 12. 
43. David Bonavia, "In the Limelight Again," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
November 28, 1980, p. 13. 
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tribunal," a Washington Post correspondent wrote that "the trial was 
served up in short, carefully edited television segments that are 
believed to have been screened by ruling Politboro members."« 
Chinese attendees at the trial were, moreover, carefully selected to 
represent a cross-section of the Chinese people and foreigners were 
excluded from certain sessions on the basis that "state secrets" were 
to be discussed. 45 
Nonetheless, despite skepticism on the part of some Chinese as 
well as foreigners, the trial was, according to certain foreign press 
reports from Beijing, "well received by a Chinese public hungry for 
revenge. Large crowds gathered around the few community television 
sets, and the official press frequently carried letters by outraged 
viewers urging death for the defendants."46 
Publicity surrounding the trial served the additional purpose of 
setting the stage for the provincial trials of Gang of Four followers 
promised for later this year. Thousands of "leftists" await trial in 
China's prisons on various Cultural Revolution related charges and 
some sixty more trials are expected:7 The atmosphere surrounding 
the Beijing trial and the sentences handed down are expected to set 
the tone for these secondary trials, during which severe human rights 
abuses could occur. Amnesty International reported executions of 
alleged supporters of the Gang of Four in 197748 and persons less 
powerful than Jiang Qing can probably expect less leniency. 
The Chinese leadership, however, clearly recognizes the extreme 
sensitivity of the situation and can be expected to move swiftly to 
suppress any mob action against the radicals and perhaps even any 
blatantly abusive sentencing. Of the 38 million CCP members, nearly 
half were recruited during the Cultural Revolution and thus carry a 
"leftist" label. Therefore, although the Dengists are dedicated to 
party reform which must inevitably involve removal of many of these 
persons, a mass purge would be much too dangerous. This need to 
avoid provocative action is perhaps also related to press reports that 
44. Michael Weisskopf, "Jiang Will Face Execution Threat for Two Years," 
Washington Post, January 25, 1981. 
45. "Xinhua Interviews Jurist" (Beijing Xinhua in English, November 21, 1980l 
FBIS, November 24, 1980. L-4. 
46. Weisskopf, op. cit. 
47. Bryan Johnson, "Jiang's Fate Delays Verdict from Trial of Chinese Radicals," 
Washington Post, January 15, 1981. 
48. The Death Penalty: An Amnesty International Report. London: Amnesty 
International Publications, 1979, p. 77. 
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Vice Chairman Deng himself was among those who opposed the 
death sentence for Jiang Qing.49 Creation of martyrs would obviously 
play into the hands of the leftists. 
Conclusion 
Preliminary assessment of the trial indicates that the hand of 
Beijing's moderates has been strengthened against those who prefer 
"red over expert." If this is so, the chances for political stability and 
economic reform in China have been increased. And there are other 
benefits to having the Gang of Four trial behind us. 
By having exposed the Cultural Revolution as even a greater 
travesty than had previously been imagined, China appears to have 
taken a step toward a more honest appraisal of its history. Much 
Chinese media comment on the trial emphasized the inevitable 
verdict of history on evil doers. 50 Even if largely intended to discredit 
political opponents, certain historical realities have been accepted. 
This in itself is useful and commendable. 
It is also a move in the right direction that China now seeks to 
portray itself as conducting the affairs of society and government by 
measurement against legal, as opposed to ideological, criteria. An 
effort was made to make the trial public. The signal was given that 
party and government officials would henceforth be publicly responsi-
ble for their actions. This, too, is commendable. 
The trial has, furthermore, benefited the outside world not only 
with new insight into recent Chinese history and the workings of 
China's government, but possibly with increased sympathy for the 
aspirations of China's people. Beyond the political motivations for the 
trial was a tremendous yearning for "justice" on the part of millions 
of Chinese. In this sense the trial, though conducted from mixed 
motives and along lines which violated the western, and in some 
instances Chinese, sense of criminal justice, may be a step toward 
greater individual freedom in China. There is, of course, evidence of 
continuing mass cynicism about the government's motives and the 
permanence of present standards.S1 Some even fear that the Gang or 
its radical supporters could return to power - a fear which will 
49. Johnson, op. cit. 
50. "The Just Court Verdict" {People's Daily. January 26. 1981 I FBIS, January 26. 
1981. L-24; "People's Daily on Gang Trial" !People's Daily, November 18. 19801 FBIS. 
Nobember 18, 1980. L-4; etc. 
51. Dreyer, op. cit., p. 59. 
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probably remain as long as the Gang of Four or any of those who 
suffered because of its actions still live. Nonetheless, for millions of 
the persecuted and disadvantaged, the trial may have served as a 
necessary catharsis, and may have helped the present leadership 
reassure the people that arbitrary violation of basic human rights 
will not in future be allowed with impunity.52 
In providing insights to China's inner dynamics, the trial may 
also have given other states a broader basis upon which to consider 
future relations with China. There are tremendous pitfalls in 
attempting to use human rights as a major yardstick to measure how 
far to support another government. But we can use human rights 
criteria to assess how closely we can identify one society with 
another. 
The trial gives opportunity to reconsider the western euphoria 
over China's re-emergence on the world scene which has colored so 
much information about China in the past several years. We need to 
steer a straight path between those over zealous persons who 
condemn China and its manner of doing things and those willing to 
excuse all excesses in the name of brotherhood or from fear of losing 
their own special privileges of access. A Washington Post editorial 
about the trial warned against giving China the benefit of the doubt 
"that Chinese do not even claim for themselves ... Americans do 
neither themselves nor the Chinese a favor by smiling on such 
fictions. "53 
Finally, despite the obvious political context of the trial and its 
failure to adhere to the standards of Western justice, can we conclude 
that justice was grossly miscarried? It would appear that even if the 
defendants were guilty of only a fraction of the crimes of which they 
were accused, they deserved the verdicts which were handed down -
if not those which will be carried out. The major failure appears to 
have been the inability for political reasons to place Mao himself on 
trial, make a clean breast of it and go on from there. And the major 
threat of the trial appears to be the ominous tranche of secondary 
trials now expected. It is there that immoderation and violations of 
human rights reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution era itself 
remain possible. 
52. "Public Reaction" IBeijing Domestic Service in Chinese. January 26. 19811 
FBIS, January 27, 1981. L-7. 
53. "Show Trial in Peking," Washington Post, December 7, 1980. 
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But for the present a cloud has been lifted, a roadblock to 
progress at least parl~y removed. The Chinese people appear 
relieved that the long awaited event has occurred. And we on the 
outside have been given both a window on the past and present 
human rights situation in China and some assurance that the 
Chinese leadership recognizes the need to place greater emphasis on 
the basic human rights of its one billion citizens. 
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DOCUMENTS 
(Note: Documents 1 and 2 are reproduced from Great Trial in 
Chinese History, The Trial of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
Counter-Revolutionary Cliques, Nov. 1980- Jan. 1981, Peking: New 
World Press, 1981.) 
INDICTMENT 
OF 
THE SPECIAL PROCURATORATE UNDER 
THE SU-PREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
To the Special Court Under the 
Supreme People's Court of the 
People's Republic of China: 
Te Jian Zi No. 1 
The Ministry o! Public Security of the People's Re-
public of China, after concluding its investigation, has 
referred the case of the plot of the Lin Biao and Ji~~.ng 
Qin3 counter·r~volutionary cliques to overthrow the 
political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat to 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate of the People's Re-
public of China for examination and prosecution. 
Having examined the case, the Special Procuratorate 
Under the Supreme People's Procuratorate confirms that 
the principal. culprits of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary cliques, namely, Lin Biao, Jiang 
Qing, Kang Sheng,. Zhang Chunqiao, ~ao Wenyunn, W:mg 
1-Iongwc:-n, Chen Doda, Xic Fuzhi, Ye Qun, Huang Yong-
sheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopcng, Qiu Huizuo, Lin Liguo, 
Zhou Yuchi and Jiang Tcngjiao, acted in collusion during 
the "great cultural revolution" and, taking advantage of 
thl'ir positions and the power at theit· dispo.sal, framed 
and persecuted Communist Party and state lcade:-s in a 
premeditated way in thcit· attempts to usurp Pa1·ly lcndcl·-
ship and state power and overthrow the political power of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. They 'did this by re-
sorting to all kinds of intrigues and using every possible 
means, legal or illegal, overt or covert, by pen or by gun. 
In September 1971, after the plot of Lin Biao, Ye Qun, 
Lin Liguo, Zhou Yuchi and Jiang Tengjiao to murder 
Chairman Mao Zedong and stage an armed counter-
revolutionary coup d'etat failed, Lin Biao and others de-
fected and fled the country, and the counter-revolutionary 
clique headed by him was exposed and crushed. The 
counter-revolutionary gang of four consisting of Jiang 
Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hong-
wen, with Jiang Qing at the head, continued its conspira-
torial counter-revolutionary activities until it was exposed 
and smashed in October 1976. The Lin Biao and Jiang 
Qing counter-revolutionary cliques brought untold dis.1s-
ters to our country and nation. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolulionnry 
cliques committed the following crimes: 
I 
Frame-Up and Persecution of Party and 
State Leaders and Plotting to Overthrow 
the Political Power of the Dictatorship 
of the Proletariat 
To overthrow the political power of the dictatorship of 
149 the proletariat, the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-

































state leaders and leading cadres in all walks of lift.> in a 
premeditated way. 
(1) They instigated the persecution of Party and state 
leaders at all levels in their attempts to seize leadership. 
On January 23, 1967, Lin Biao plotted the usurpation of 
power, saying, "All power, be it at the top, middle or 
lower levels, should be seized. In some cases, this should 
be done sooner, in others later." "This may be done at 
the top or lower levels, or done in co-ordination at both 
levels." He also instigated the persecution of leading 
cadres. He said, "Put some of them in custody, cap some 
with tall paper hats, and search and ransack the homes 
of others." "It is necessary to use measures such as the 
'jet aircraft' (forcing a person to bow with both hands 
raised over his back, like the swept-back wings of a jet 
plane - Tr.) against people like Peng Zhen, Luo Ruiqing, 
Lu Dingyi and Yang Shangkun." 
Zhang Chunqiao said in Shanghai on January 22, 1967, 
"Our aim in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 
has always been to seize power, from the grass roots to 
the c~ntral organizations, including the powers of the 
Party and the government, as well as in the financial, 
cultural and other fields." "We must seize power every-
where." With regard to veteran cadres he said in Shang-
hai in April, "All of them are bad" and "None shall be 
spared!" From 1967 to 1975, he said on many other oc-
casions in Shanghai and Beijing that "the great cultural 
revolution" meant "a change of dynasty." In plotting to 
usurp power and effect a "change of dynasty," the Lin 
Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques laid 
bare their counter-revolutionary objective of overthrow-
ing the political power of the proletarian dictatorship. 
(2) They brought false charges against and persecuted 
Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China 
and Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Com-
munist Party of China (C.P.C.). In August 1966, when 
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Liu Shaoqi was still Chairman of the People's Republic of 
China (P.R.C.) and was re-elected to the Standing Com-
mittee o! the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Com-
mittee, Lin Biao instr·ucted Ye Qun to summon Lei Yin::t-
!u twice to her presence, fil·st on August 11 and then 1:!. 
Lei Ying!u was then deputy director of the Operations 
Department of the Headquarters of the General Staff of 
the Chinese People's Liberation Army (P.L.A.). She pro-
vided him verbally with material containing false charg~s 
fabricated by Lin Biao and herself against Liu Shaoqi and 
instructed him to put these charges in writing. On August 
13, Lin Biao read what Lei had written. At his residence, 
Lin told Lei the next day that "it willloQk more political" 
if Lei would write an accompanying lelter addressed to 
Lin Biao and Chairman Mao Zedong, so that Lin could 
write his comments on the letter before forwarding it to 
the Chairman. On the same day, Lin Bia,o sent Lei Ying-
fu's letter together with his material incriminating Liu 
Shaoqi to Jiang Qing for her to "consider forwarding" 
them to the Chairman. • 
On the afternoon of December 18, 1006, Zhang Chun-
qiao met privately with Kuai Dafu, a Qinghua University 
student, in the reception room at the we'&t gate of Zhong-
nanhai, Beijing. He said, "That coupleoof persons in the 
Central Committee who put forward7 the reactionary 
bourgeois line have not yet surrendered.- ... You young 
revolutionary fighters should unite, carry forward your 
thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit and flog the cur that 
has fallen into the water. Make their very names stink. 
Don't stop half way." Incited by Zhang, Kuai organized 
a demonstration in Beijing on December 25. The demon-
strators put up slogans and big-character posters, handed 
out leaflets and shouted demagogically,: ~'Down with Liu 
Shaoqi!" and "Down with Deng XiaopiRg!" 
In July 1967, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Chen Boda 

























repudiated and struggled against. Qi Benyu, a member 
of the "Cultural Revolution Group Under the C.P.C. Cen-
tral Committee," organized a "rally for repudiating and 
struggling against Liu Shaoqi" on July 18 of the same 
year; th~ rc::;id~ncc of Liu Shaoqi und Wang Guangmei 
was searched and ransacked and the two were physically 
harassed. During July and August 1967, Kang Sheng, Xie 
Fuzhi and Qi Benyu incited people to organize a "front-
line for getting Liu Shaoqi out of Zhongnanhai," surround 
the place and attempt to break into the State Council. 
Jiang Qing assumed direct control of the "group for in-
quiring into the special case of Liu Shaoqi and Wang 
Guangmei" and directed its work in collusion with Kang 
Sheng and Xie Fuzhi. They rigged up false evidence by 
extorting confessions through torture in order to vilify 
Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei as "renegades," "enemy 
agents" and "counter-revolutionaries." From May to 
October 1967, acting on her own, Jiang Qing took the 
deCision to arrest and imprison Yang Yichen, Deputy Gov-
ernor of Hebei Province; Yang Chengzuo, a professor at 
the China People's University in Beijing; Wang Guangen, 
a resident of Tianjin (originally assistant manager of the 
!ormer Fengtian Cotton Mill); Liu Shaoqi's former cook 
Hao Miao; and seven others. When Yang Chengzuo be-
came critically ill, Jiang Qing said to the group for in-
quiring into the special case, "Step up the interrogation 
to squeeze out of him what we need before he dies." Yang 
Chengzuo died as a result of persecution. So was Wang 
Guangen. On October 23, 1967, Xie Fuzhi said to the spe-
cial case group, "It is necessary to be firm and ruthless 
in interrogation. . .. It is necessary to carry out group 
interrogation for hours at a time until confessions are 
obtained." In order to frame Wang Guangmei as an 
"enemy agent," Jiang Qing and Xie Fuzhi ordered the 
interrogation and torture of Zhang Zhongyi, a professor at 
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the Hebei Provincial Normal College in Beijing who was 
critically ill. Zhang was tortured to death. In order to 
frame Liu Shaoqi as a "renegade," they extorted confes-
sions from Ding Juequn, who worked with Liu Shaoqi in 
the workers' movement in Wuhan in 1927, and Meng 
Yongqian, who was arrested with Liu Shaoqi in Shenyang 
in 1929. On September 25, 1967, Ding declared in prison. 
that the confession he was compelled to write "does not 
strictly conform to facts." Between June 15, 1967 and 
March 18, 1969, Meng wrote 20 statements in prison de-
claring that what he had. written about Liu Shaoqi under 
duress "was mere fabrication" and should be withdrawn. 
But all their requests to make corrections to their state-
ments and all their appeals were withheld and not allowed 
to be submitted to higher authorities. Liu Shaoqi died 
. as a result of persecution. 
(3) Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng cooked up false 
charges to persecute Members of the Eighth Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C. On July 21, 1968, Kang Sheng wrote 
a strictly confidential letter. On the envelope he wrote 
"Important. To be forwarded immediately to and per-
sonally opened by Comrade Jiang Qing." In the letter, 
he wrote, "Enclosed please find the name list you have 
asked for." On this list drawn up by Kang Sheng in his 
own handwriting, 88 of the 193 Members and Alternate 
Members of the Eighth Central Committee of the· C.P.C. 
·were falsely charged as "enemy agents," "renegades," 
"elements having illicit relations with foreign countries" 
ot· "anti-Party elements." Another seven were classified 
a:. havimz been temporarily "removed from their posts but 
not yet included among the specia·l cases" and 29 were 
classified as "having made mistakes or needing to be sub-
jected to· investigation for their historical records." Later, 
the great majority of them were also framed and !'lersecut-


























Among the Party and state leaders and the first secre-
taries of the regional bureau: c! ~he Cent.-al Cu;~-..-nittee c: 
the Communist Party who were thus framed were: 
Members and Alternate Members of the Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.: Liu Shao-
qi, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Chen 
Yi, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Li Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Li 
Jingquan, Tao Zhu, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Ye 
Jianying, Ulanhu, Zhang Wentian, Lu Dingyi, Bo Yibo 
and Song Renqiong. 
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.C. Deng Xiaoping; Members and Alternate Members 
of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the C.P.C.: 
Peng Zhen, Wang Jiaxiang, Tan Zhenlin, Li Xiannian, Lu 
Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing, Tao Zhu, Ye Jiallying, Liu Ningyi, 
Liu Lantao, Yang Shangkun and Hu Qiaomu. 
Vice-Premiers of the State Counc1!: Chen Yun, Deng 
Xiaoping, He Long, Chen Yi, Ulanhu, Li Xiannian, Tan 
Zhenlin, Nie Rongzhen, Bo Yibo, Lu Dingyi, Luo Ruiqing 
and Tao Zhu. 
Vice-Chairmen of the Military Commission of the Cen-
tral Committee of the C.P.C.: He Long, Nie Rongzhen, 
Chen Yi, Xu Xiangqian and Ye Jianying. 
First secretaries of the regional cun~aus ;;f the Central 
Committee of the C.P.C.: Song Renqiong, Liu Lantao, Li 
Jingquan and Wang Renzhong. 
Other Members and Alternate Members of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.C.: Xiao Jingguang, Su Yu, Xiao 
Ke, Chen Shaomin, Wang Zhen, Zeng Shan, Ouyang Qin, 
Wang Shusheng, Wang Enmao, Deng Hua, Deng Zihui, 
Tan Zheng, Liu Xiao. Li Weihan, Yang Xiufeng, Zhang 
Jichun, Cheng Zihua, Wu Xiuquan, Qian Ying, Wang 
Congwu, Ma Mingfang, Li Baohua, Xu Guangda, Lin Tie, 
Zheng Weisan, Xu Haidong, Xiao Hua, Hu Yaobang, Xi 
Zhongxun, An Ziwen, Lu Zhengcao, Zhang Jingwu, Li::o 
Chengzhi, Ye Fei, Yang Xianzhen, Zhang Dingcheng, Shu 
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Tong, Pan Zili, Yang Yong, Huang Huoqing, Chen Man-
yuan, Su Zhenhua, Feng Baiju, Fan Wenlan, Li Jianzhen, 
Gao Kelin, Zhong Qiguang, Jiang Hua, Li Zhimin, Yang 
Chengwu, Zhang Hanfu, Shuai Mengqi, Liu Ren, Wan Yi, 
Zhou Yang, Xu Zirong, Liu Lanbo, Kui Bi, Ou Mengjue, 
Zhu Dehai, Zhang Qilong, Ma Wenrui, Wang Shitai, Liao 
Hansheng, Hong Xuezhi, Zhang Yun, Xu Bing, Liao Lu-
yan, Song Shilun, Zhou Huan, Chen Pixian, Zhao Jian-
min, Qian Junrui, Jiang Nanxiang, Han Guang, Li Chang, 
Wang Heshou, Chen Zhengren, Zhao Yimin, Kong Yuan, 
Zhang Su, Yang Yichen, Zhao Boping, Zhang Aiping, Yao 
Yilin, Wang Feng, Fang Yi, Wang Shangrong, Liu Zhen, 
Zhang Jingfu, Li Jiebo, Liao Zhigao, Jiang Weiqing, Tan 
Qilong, Zhang Zhongliang and Zhang Pinghua. 
(4) Chen Boda, Xie Fuzhi and Wu Faxian made use of 
the case of the so-called "Extraordinary Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of China" leaflet, which 
had been uncovered in Tianjin in November 1967, to 
frame and persecute Party and state leaders under the 
pretext of tracking down the "behind-the-scenes bosses." 
On April 28 and August 19, 1968, when they received 
Zhao Dengchen~, then a member of the leading group at 
the Ministry of Public Security, and others, Chen Boda 
said that the uncovering of the case was merely "the be-
ginning." He added, "It is not the end. The bosses are 
hidden behind the scenes, and they are no ordinary per-
sons, for ordinary people aren't capable of doing such a 
thing. It isn't the act of one individual. Very likely, 
there's an organization behind all this." Xie Fuzhi cut in 
saying, "Yes, it's merely the beginning, not the end." 
He added, "Somebody from the notorious Liu-Deng head-
quarters is at the root of it all." Wu Faxian said, "Who 
else can it be but Capitalist Roader No. 2?" In December 
1968, while tracking down the "behind-the-scenes bosses," 
Xie Fuzhi, Zhao Dengcheng and others cooked up the 























Zhu De as the alleged "secretary., of its central commi~tee, 
Chen Yi as "deputy secreta~') IIIld concurrentl:>- minister 
of.defence," and Li Fuchun as "premier." Its members 
allegedly included Dong Biwu, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, 
He Long, Liu Bocheng, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, Tan 
Zhenlln, Yu Qiuli, Wang Zhen and Liao Chengzhi, who 
were falsely accused of having "illicit relations with 
foreign countries," "making preparations for an armed 
insurrection" and attempting to "stage a coup." Even up 
to August 21, 1969, Xie Fuzhi told those who were re-
sponsible for inquiring into the case, "Be firm and keep 
up your inquiries, for some evidence is still lacking. The 
verbal confessions made by those jailed can be used as 
evidence, too." 
(5) Kang Sheng and his wife Cao Yiou instr1:1.cted Guo 
Yufeng, who was in charge of the Organization Depart-
ment of the C.P.C. Central Committee, to provide on 
August 23, 1968 a fabricated "Report on the Political 
Background of Members of the Control Commission of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.c.•• In the report, 37 of 
the 60 Members and Alternate Members of the Control 
Commission of the Eighth Central Committee of the C.P.C. 
were falsely labelled "renegades," "enemy agents" or 
"counter-revolutionary revisionists." They w .. re: Liu 
Lantao, Wang Congwu, Qian Ying, Liu Xiwu, Shuai Meng-
qi, Li Yunchang, Wang Weigang, Yang Zhihua, Li Shiying, 
Li Chuli, Ma Mingfang, Gong Zirong, Chen Shaomin, Fang 
Zhongru, Liu Yaxiong, Zhang Ziyi, Wang Hefeng, Liu 
Shenzhi, Li Peizhi, Zhou Zhongying, Chen Peng, Chen 
Zenggu, Zheng Ping, Xue Zizheng, Gao Kelin, Ji Yatai, 
Wang Shiying, Qiu .Tin. Wn Gl\izhi, M" Gllnrui, Zhang 
Dingcheng, Wu Defeng, Zhang Jiafu, Liao Suhua, Gong 
Fengchun, Li Jingying and Xiao Hua. 
(6) Kang Sheng and Cao Yiou instructed Guo Yufeng 
to fabricate on August 27, 1968 a "Report on the Political 
Background of Members of the Standing Committee· of 
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the Third National People's Congress," which was subse-
quently revised and finalized by Kang Sheng himself. In 
the report, 60 of the 115 Members were framed as "rene-
gades," "suspected renegades," "enemy agents," "sus-
pected enemy agents," "counter-revolutionary revision-
ists, capitalist roaders or anti-Party, anti-socialist and 
anti-Mao Zedong Thought elements" and "highly dubious 
characters." They were: Chairman of the Standing Com-
mittee Zhu De; Vice-Chairmen Peng Zhen, Li Jingquan, 
Lin Feng,·Liu Ningyi and Zhang Zhizhong; and Members 
Chen Shaomin, Yang Zhihua, Shuai Mengqi, Zhao Yimin, 
Qian Ying, Liu Yaxiong, Li Da, Xu Liqing, Wang Shitai, 
Hu Ziang, Liu Lanbo, Xu Bing, Xu Zirong, Zhang Jingwu, 
Yang Shangkun, Li Yanlu, Han Guang, Mei Gongbin, 
Wang Kunlun, Nan Hanchen, Gong Yinbing, Cao Meng-
jun, Shi Liang, Tang Shengzhi, Kong Yuan, Hu Yaobang, 
Xie Fumin, Luo Qiong, Wu Lengxi, Zhang Su, Wu Xinyu, 
Ma Chungu, Yu Aifeng, Liu Changsheng, Gu Dacun, 
Zhou Li, Zhao Shoushan, Hu Yuzhi, Hu Qiaomu, Liang 
Sicheng, Tong Dizhou, Ye Zhupei, Chen Qiyou, Wang Wei-
zhou, Ye Jianying, Lin Qiangyun, Guo Jian, Yang Yunyu, 
Hua Luogeng, Zhao Zhongyao, Chen Shaoxian, Zhao Jiu-
zhang, Mao ·Yisheng and Hu Juewen. 
(7) Kang Sheng and Cao Yiou instructed Guo Yufeng 
to fabricate on August 27, 1968 a "Report on the Political 
Background of Members of the Standing Committee of 
the Fourth National Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference," which was subse-
quently revised and finalized by Kang Sheng himself. In 
the report, 74 of the 159 Members were falsely accused .of 
being "renegades," "suspected renegades," "enemy 
agents," "suspected .enemy agents," "Kuomintang agents," 
"counter-revolutionary revisionists," or "having illicit re-
lations with foreign countries." They were: Vice-Chair-
men Peng Zhen, Liu Lantao, Song Renqiong, Xu Bing 




















Liu Xiwu, Ping Jiesan, Yang Dongchun, Li Chuli, 
Wang Weigang, Zhang Ziyi, Li Yunchang, Gong Zirong, 
Li Chulee, Cao Ying, Liu Qingyang, Kong Xiangzhen, Ma 
Huizhi, Zhang Youyu, Zhang Yun, Wang Zhaohua, Zhou 
Yang, Wu Gaizhi, He Changgong, Lin Xiude, Tang Tianji, 
Zhu Yunshan, Su Ziheng, Gong Tianmin, Zou Dapeng, 
An Ziwen, Chu Tunan, Wang Jinxiang, Li Lisan, Zeng 
Xianzhi, Sa Kongliao, Zhang Xiuyan, Ji Yatai, Yu Yifu, 
Ha Fenga, Wang Shiying, Liu Xiao, Yan Baoh,.ng, Yang 
Qiqing, Sun Qimeng, Zhao Puchu, Che Xiangchen, Bain-
qen Erdini Qoigyi Gyaincain, Wang Jiaxiang, Wu Xiu-
quan, Zhang Zhizhong, Sun Xiaocun, Shi Liang, Chu 
Xuefan, Liu Fei, Zhang Xiaoqian, Cun Shusheng, Yu Da-
fu, Zheng Weisan, Chen Guodong, Gao Wenhua, Wang Zi-
gang, Zhang Bangying, Hu Keshi, Li Chang, He Cheng, 
Zhong Huilan, Wu Hongbin, Fu Lianzhang, Jin Rubai, 
Chen Qiyou, Xiong Qinglai and. Zhang Jingfu. 
(8) The frame-up and persecution of Zhou Enlai, Vice-
Chairman of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and 
Premier of the State Council. In October 1974, Jiang 
Qing falsely accused Zhou Enlai and others of conspiracy, 
saying, "Those people in the State Council often maintain 
illicit contact with each other on the pretext of discussing 
work. . . . The Premier 1s the boss behinci th~ scenes." 
On October 17, 1974, the gang of four, namely, Jiang Qing, 
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, 
hatched a plot in Building No. 17 at Diao Yu Tai in Bei-
jing and the following day sent Wang Hongwen to Chang-
sha to make a false and insinuating report to Chairman 
Mao Zedong. He said, "Although the Premier is ill and 
hospitalized, he is hn~y ~~.lmmoning pt:>ople for taJks fnr 
into the night. Almost every day someone visits him. 
Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian are frequent 
visitors." He added, "The atmosphere in Beijing now is 
very much like that at the Lushan Meeting." He was 
falsely accusing Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others 
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of engaging in activities to usurp power as Lin Biao had 
during the Lushan Meeting in 1970. In 1974, Jiang Qing, 
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan instructed Chi Qun, 
then secretary of the C.P.C. Committee of Qinghua Uni-
versity, Xie Jingyi, then secretary of the Beijing Munic-
ipal Committee of the C.P.C., Lu Ying, editor-in-chief of 
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Zhu Yongjia, then head 
of the Shanghai Writing Group, and others to make use 
of the media to stir up nationwide criticism of the "big 
Confucian of our time," the "chief minister" and the 
"Duke of Zhou," thus attacking Zhou Enlai by innuendo. 
(9) The frame-up and persecution of Zhu De, Vice-
Chairman of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress. From September 1966 to December 1968, 
Lin Biao, Zhang Chunqiao, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo and 
others slandered Zhu De and falsely accused him of being 
a "sinister commander," an "old-line opportunist" and a 
"warlord" and of "harbouring wild ambitions to become 
the leader." 
At the end of January 1967, at the instigation of Qi 
Benyu, some people from the China People's University 
put up large-size slogans in Beijing, which read "Down 
with Zhu De." Presently the "Liaison Centre for Ferret-
ing Out Zhu De" was set up and a plot was under way to 
hold meetings to repudiate him. On March 4, Qi Benyu 
received people from the China People's University and 
incited them to continue with their persecution of Zhu 
De. He said, "If you do it yourselves, you will succeed. 
But if j'OU tell people that I'm behind all this, you won't 
succeed. You think you're smart. Actually you're a 
bunch of fatheads. It's up to you to decide whether you 
go on or not." 
(10) The frame-up and persecution of Deng Xiaoping, 

























Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., General 
Secretary of the Central Committee and Vice-Premier of 
the State Council. On December 6, 1966, Lin Biao 
slandered Deng Xiaoping as a "member of a sinister 
gang" and as an "anti-Party element." And on January 
29, 1967, Kang Sheng vilified Deng Xiaoping, as a 
"Khrushchov-type person." 
On October 4, 1974, Chairman Mao Zedong proposed 
that Deng Xiaoping be First Vice-Premier of the State 
Council. In an attempt to prevent Deng Xiaoping from 
taking office, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wen-
yuan and Wang Hongwen conspired together on October 
17 in Building No. 17 at Diao Yu Tai in Beijing and had 
Wang Hongwen go to Changsha the following day to re-
port to Chairm;m Mao Zedong with the false charge that 
Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and otht:.-:; v;tn:! -:ng<>!>.:ci in 
activities to seize powet·. 
From February to May 1976, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chun-
qiao, Yao Wenyuan and Mao Yuanxin, another key 
member of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique, 
went a step further in their false accusations against 
Deng Xiaoping. Document No. 1 of the Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C. of 1975 had carried the ::.p~oint­
ment of Deng Xiaoping as Vice-Chairman of the Military 
Commission of the C.P.C. Central Committee and con-
currently Chief of the General Staff of the P.L.A. and 
Document No. 1 of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. 
of 1976 had carried the appointment of Hua Guofeng as 
Acting Premier of the State Council. Regarding these 
two documents, Zh11ng Chunqiao wrntf' nn February ~. 
1976, "Here is yet another Document No. 1. There was 
a Document No. 1 last year. This is truly a case of in-
flated arrogance at an upturn in fortune. Moving up so 
fast and so hurriedly spells a downfall that will be just 
as rapid." and he quoted a classical poem: 
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A year ends amidst the crepitation of firecrackers, 
An easterly breeze has warmed the New Year's 
wine. 
The doors of every household are bathed in the 
sunshine, 
A new peach-wood lintel charm invariably replaces 
the old. 
This again revealed Zhang Chunqiao's counter-revolu-
tionary ambition to effect a "change of dynasty." On 
February 22, Mao Yuanxin said to Ma Tianshui and ·Xu 
Jingxian, then vice-chairmen of the Shanghai Municipal 
Revolutionary Committee, and others that Deng Xiao-
ping "worships things foreign and sells out the sov-
ereignty of the country" and that he "represents the 
interests of the comprador bourgeoisie" and was trying 
to bring about an "all-round retrogression" so that "there 
would be a change in the nature of the state." On March 
2, at a forum of leading members from a number of 
provinces and autonomous regions, Jiang Qing maligned 
Deng Xiaoping, calling him a "counter-revolutionary 
double-dealer," the "general manager of a rumour-
mongering company," a "fascist," a "big quisling" and 
a "representative of the comprador bourgeoisie." On 
April 26, Jiang Qing falsely charged that Deng Xiaoping, 
like Lin Biao, had "big and small fleets" (gangs formed 
to carry out plots and assassinations - Tr.) and that 
"their fleets operated in about the same way in some 
cases, and differently in others. Deng's small fleets are, 
however, more active." On April 5, Zhang Chunqiao 
slande~·:::"Jsly accused Deng Xiaoping of being a "Nagy." 
On May 16, in an article entitled "There Is Really a 
Boutgeoisie Within the Party- Analysis of the Counter-
Revolutionary Political Incident at Tian An Men Square," 
which Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) sent him for 


























"is the chief boss behind this counter-revolutionary 
political incident." 
(11) The frame-up and persecution of Chen Yi, 
Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Commit-
tee of the C.P.C., Vice-Premier of the State Council 
and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the 
C.P.C. Central Committee. On August 7, 1967, Wang 
Li, a member of the "Cultural Revolution Group Under 
the C.P.C. Central Committee," said, "Picking on Chen 
Yi is of course correct in orientation." He added, "What's 
wrong with the slogan 'Down with Liu (Shaoqi), Deng 
(Xiaoping) and Chen (Yi)?'" He was agitating people 
to usurp leadership over foreign affairs. In November 
1968, upon Zhang Chunqiao's instruction, Wang Hong-
wen, Xu Jingxian and others compiled a Collection of 
Chen Yi's Reactionary Views and Utterances while 
nominally preparing documents for the forthcoming 
C.P.C. Ninth National Congress. This fabricated Collec-
tion was distributed in the study class of deputies from 
Shanghai to the Ninth National Party Congress, falsely 
accusing Chen Yi of "capitulating to imperialism, revi-
sionism and reaction" and "whipping up public opinion 
for restoring capitalism." At the same time, they collect-
ed and compiled another 76 copies of material, running 
to a total of 1,163 pages, which carried false charges 
against Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, 
Nie Rongzhen, Li Fuchun, Tan Zhenlin and others. 
(12) The frame-up and persecution of Peng Dehuai, 
Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Commit-
tee of the C.P.C. In July 1967, when Kang Sheng, Chen 
Boda and Qi Benyu n~ceivad Ilan Aijing and other' 
students of the Beijing Aeronautical Engineering In-
stitute, Qi Benyu made arrangements with them for• the 
repudiation and persecution of Peng Dehuai. On Novem-
ber 3, 1970, Huang Yongsheng examined and approv-
ed a report prepared by the special case group, which 
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contained the proposal that "Peng Dehuai be dismissed 
from all posts inside and outside the Party, expelled 
from the Party for good, sentenced to life imprisonment 
and deprived of civil rights for life." Peng Dehuai died 
as a result of persecution. 
(13) The frame-up and persecution of He Long, 
Member of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central 
Committee, Vice-Premier of the State Council and Vice-
Chairman of the Military Commission of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.C. In the summer of 1966, at a 
students' rally at the Beijing Normal University and at 
meetings of the "Cultural Revolution Group Under the 
C.P.C. Central Committee," Kang Sheng falsely charged 
He Long and Peng Zhen with "secretly deploying troops 
to stage a February mutiny." In August 1966, Lin Biao 
instructed Wu Faxian to fabricate material accusing He 
Long of plotting to usurp leadership in the Air Force. 
On September 3, Wu Faxian sent Lin Eiao the material 
he had prepared. Between late August and early Septem-
ber, Ye Qun spoke to Song Zhiguo, then chief of the 
Guards Division of the General Office of the Military 
Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.C., in-
forming him of what she had fabricated in order to frame 
He Long. Then she directed him to put the material 
in writing, saying, "Make it sound as if you yourself 
were giving me the information, and not as if I had 
directed you to do so." From September 7 to 24 Song 
Zhiguo sent Lin Biao four collections of material he had 
prepared for framing He Long. On May 16, 1968, Kang 
Sheng went a step further in maligning He Long, saying, 
"Judging He Long's present behaviour in the light of his 
betrayal of the revolution and surrender to the enemy 
in the past, it is inconceivable that he is not now engag-
ed in active counter-revolutionary activities. The past 
provides the clue to the present." He Long died as a 






















(14) The frame-up and persecution of Xu Xiangqian, 
Member of the Political l::surellu of the Central Commit-
tee of the C.P.C. and Vice-Chairman of its Military 
Commission. In April 1967, at Ye Qun's instigation 
Kuai Dafu sent people to collect material for framing 
Xu Xiangqian and Ye Jianying and published a slander-
ous article entitled "Bombard Xu Xiangqian- Down 
with Xu Xiangqian, the Military Counterpart of Liu 
(Shaoqi) and Deng (Xiaoping)." In June that y~>ar, Qiu 
Huizuo instructed Wang Xike, then director of the 
"cultural revolution office" of the P.L.A. General 
Logistics Department, and others to concoct material 
vilifying Xu Xiangqian and to edit and print leaflets 
slandering him as a "big time-bomb" planted in the 
Party and army and a "typical careerist and conspirator" 
and putting forward the slogan "Down with Xu Xiang-
qian." 
(15) The frame-up and persecution of Nie Rongzhen, 
Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Commit-
tee of the C.P.C., Vice-Premier of the State Council, 
and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.C. In April 1968, Lin Biao 
ordered the Beijing Units of the P.L.A. to convene an 
enlarged Party committee meeting so as to .,,lgiru::er the 
repudiation of what they called the ~·mountain-stronghold 
mentality of north China." He then sent Huang Yong-
sheng, Wu Faxian and Xie Fuzhi to the meeting. Jiang 
Qing and Chen Boda falsely charged Nie Rongzhen 
with being the boss behind those with the "mountain-
stronghold mentality of north China" and plotted to 
overthrow him. In Novt>mh<>r of thE.' llliTT'P. year, Huang 
Yongsheng slandered Nie Rongzhen, saying that "he has 
never done anything good all his life" and that "these 
people will never give up. Whenever the climate is 
right, they're up to something." On ·January 5, 1971, 
Jiang Qing slandered Nie Rongzhen and others, saying 
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that they had been "bad people in the saddle" in north 
China. 
(16) The frame-up and persecution. of Ye Jianying, 
Member of the Political Bureau and qf the Secretariat 
of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. and Vice-
Chairman of its Military Commission. On June 23, 1967, 
Huang Yongsheng approved the "Plan on Investigation 
for Rounding Up Renegades," submitted by the head of 
the military control commission stationed in the Guang-
zhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, and its appendix, 
"Plan for Investigation, No. 1," which was directed 
against Ye Jianying, whom they were plotting to per-
secute. In June 1968, making use of the false charges 
he concocted in Guangzhou against Deputy Commander 
Wen Niansheng and others in the Guangzhou Units of 
the P.L.A., Huang Yongsheng launched an investigation 
concerning the so-called "sinister line." He later sub-
mitted to Ye Qun confessions which had been extorted, 
charging Ye Jianying and others with having called 
"secret meetings" and with "trying to usurp Party and 
state leadership by plotting a counter-revolutionary 
coup." 
On· April 3, 1968, Li Zuopeng, together with Wang 
Hongkun, then second political commissar of the Navy, 
and Zhang Xiuchuan, then director of the Navy's Polit-
ical Department, wrote material in which they trump-
ed up charges alleging that "He (Long) and Ye (Jian-
ying) attempted to seiz.e command of the armed forces 
to oppose the Party" in co-ordination with Liu (Shaoqi), 
Deng (Xiaoping) and Tao (Zhu). 
(1'{} The frame-up and persecution of Lu Dingyi, 
Alternate Member of the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.C. and Member of its Secretariat, 
Vice-Premier of the State Council and Director of the 
Propaganda Department of the C.P.C. Central Commit-



























Lu Dingyi, labelling him a "counter-revolutionary." 
Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng, Chen Bocia, Xie Fu:.!hi, Vv"u 
Faxian and others slandered him as a "renegade," "hid-
den traitor'! and "special agent of the Bureau of In-
vestigation and Statistics of the Kuomintang Govern-
ment's Military Council." Chen Boda said that Lu Ding-
yi should be "handed over to the Red Guards for trial." 
At the instigation and under the direction of the Lin 
Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, nine 
deputy directors of the Propaganda Department of the 
C.P.C. Central Committee were slandered as "renegades," 
"enemy agents" or "Kuomintang elements." 
(18) The frame-up and persecution of Luo Ruiqing, 
Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of 
the C.P.C., Vice-Premier of the State Council and Chief 
of the General Staff of the P.L.A. Lin Biao, Ye Qun, 
Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, 
Li Zuopeng and others trumped up charges against him, 
alleging that he had "illicit relations with foreign coun-
tries," was a "hidden traitor" and a "counter-revolu-
tionary who has committed heinous crimes" and "hatch-
ed a major plot" against the Navy. 
(19) Besides those people mentioned in Items (3), 
(4), (5), (6) and (7), others who were fra..r.i!d. al1u per-
secuted by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolu-
tionary cliques and the principal members of their fac-
tional setups include the following leading members of 
departments under the Central Committee of the C.P.C., 
ministries and commissions under the State Council, and 
C.P.C. committees and people's governments in prov-
inces, autonomou~ rt>gion!' and municip::tlities directly 
under the Central Government, and high-ranking P.L A. 
cadres: Kang Keqing, Jia Tuofu, Zhou Rongxin, Gu 
Mu. Lu Dong, Gao Yang, Duan Junyi, Liu Jie, Sun Zhi-
yuan, Wang Zhcng, Zhang Linzhi, Liu Yumin, Sun 
Daguang, Yuan Baohua, He Wei, Qian Xinzhong, Xiao 
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Wangdong, Wan Xiaotang, Zhang Huaisan, Zhao Lin, 
Zhao Ziyang, Wu Zhipu, Yan Hongyan, Wei Wenbo, 
Zeng Xisheng, Hui Yuyu, Wang Yanchun, Fang Zhi-
chun, Wen Minsheng, Wei Heng, Huo Shilian, Yang 
Zhilin, Wang Zhao, Yang Jingren, Fu Qiutao, Liu Shao-
wen, Liang Biye, Liu Zhijian, Li Jukui, Rao Zhengxi, 
Li Yao, Peng Jiaqing, Tang Ping, Zhao Erlu, Xiao Xiang-
rong, Wang Ping, Cai Shunli, Liu Daosheng, Du Yide, 
Tao Yong, Fang Zhengping, Cheng Jun, Xu Shenji, Zhang 
Tingfa, Nie Fengzhi, Wu Fushan, Wu Kehua, Ouyang 
Yi, Liu He, He Jinnian, Cheng Shicai, Dun Xingyun, 
Tan Youlin, Cui Tianmin, Fu Chongbi, Zhuang Tian, 
Yan Fusheng, Chen Zaidao, Zhong Hanhua, Yang Xiu-
shan, Tang Jinlong, Liu Peishan, Liu Zhuanlian, Zhang 
Zhonghan, Huang Xinting, Guo Linxiang, Gan Weihan, 
Yuan Shengping, Yang Jiarui, Qin Jiwei, Hu Ronggui, 
Kong Fei, Ting Mao and Wang Qimei. 
(20) The frame-up and persecution of leading cadres 
of the Organization Department of the Central Commit-
tee of the C.P.C. and the usurpation and control of the 
vital organizational power of the Central Committee of 
the Party. In January 1968, Kang Sheng ordered Guo 
Yufeng to produce charts and reports to frame up 
charges against Zhang Wentian, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, 
Deng Xiaoping and An Ziwen, who had successively 
served as director of the Organization Department of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.C. since 1937. They were 
falsely accused of being "renegades," "enemy agents," 
"elements who oppose the Party, socialism a'ld Mao 
Zedong Thought," or "any combination of these." 
Twenty-two people, who had at one time or another 
served as deputy directors of the Organization Depart-
ment, were falsely charged with being "renegades," 
"enemy agents," "elements maintaining illicit relations 
with foreign countries," or "elements who oppose the 

























alleged that a "counter-revolutionary clique" had 
entrenched itself in the Orgbl>ization Department, which 
had become "a sinister den'' and had "established a na-
tionwide network of counter-revolution which recruited 
renegades to form a clique to pursue its own selfish in-
terests." And it was proposed that the Organization 
Department "be disbanded and abolished." 
(21) The frame-up and persecution of leading cadres 
of the public security organs, the procuratorial organs 
and the courts at ·various levels, and the usurpation and 
control of the instruments of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. At the instigation and under the direction of 
the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques, the nation's public security, procuratorial and 
judicial organs were completely destroyed. Xie Fuzhi 
incited people to. "smash the public security, procuratorial 
and judicial organs" all over the coumry. Zhcmg uing-
cheng, Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Proc-
uratorate, Yang Xiufeng, President of the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court, and large numbers of cadres and policemen 
working in the public security organs, the procuratorial 
organs and the courts at various levels were framed and 
persecuted. .Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi and others concoct-
ed false charges against the Ministiy of Pt;blic Scc~rity, 
alleging that there was a so-called "underground sinister 
ministry of public security headed by Luo Ruiqing." 
With the exception of Xie Fuzhi himself and one vice-
minister who held other posts concurrently, all the vice-
ministers of the then Ministry of Public Security were 
arrested and imprisoned. Vice-Minister Xu Zirong died 
as a result of- persecution. 
(22) In January 1967, Lin Biao personally attached 
the comment, "I fully approve," to the slogan put for-
ward by Guan Feng, Wang Li and other members of 
the "Cultural Revolution Group Under the Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C.," that is, "Thoroughly expose the 
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handful of capitalist roaders in power in the People's 
Liberation Army." They plotted to plunge the armed 
forces into chaos. 
In order to control the armed forces, Lin Biao fabricat-
ed charges against large numbers of cadres and masses 
in the Headquarters of the P.L.A. General Staff and 
framed and persecuted them. In April 1968, Huang 
Yongsheng said at the Headquar-ters of the General 
Staff, "Quite a few bad people have surfaced here, peo-
ple such as Huang Kecheng, Luo Ruiqing, Zhang Aiping 
and Wang Shangrong," and "the verdicts against them 
can never be reversed; they must never be allowed to 
stage a comeback." 
On July 25, 1967, Lin Biao called for the "thorough 
smashing of that Palace of Hell- the General Political 
Depat·tment of the People's Liberation Army." On 
many occasions Lin Biao and Y e Qun slandered Luo 
Ronghuan and Tan Zheng, former directors of the 
General Political Department. They trumped up charges, 
alleging that there was a "Luo (Ruiqing) -Liang (Biye) 
anti-Party clique." Huang Yongsheng vilified the 
General Political Department, saying that it "has been 
recruiting renegades under a succession of several direc-
tors." Qiu Huizuo also slandered it, saying that it 
was "not very different from the Kuomintang secret 
service." He took an active part in conspiratorial activi-
ties to "thoroughly smash the General Political Depart-
ment." Large numbers of cadres and masses in the de-
partment were framed and persecuted. Four comrades 
who had been director or deputy director and another 
20 who had been section chiefs and deputy chiefs were 
imprisoned and investigated under the false charge of 
attempting to "usurp leadership over the Army and op-
pose the Party" and of being "renegades," "enemy 



























qin, Wang Bing and 15 other persons died as a result of 
persecution. 
On March 5, 1974, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao 
r:eceived Chen Yading, former deputy head of the 
cultural section of the P.L.A. General Political Depart-
ment, and others. Jiang Qing said, "Chen Yading, we 
have invited you here today in order to straighten things 
out in the Army." She added, "It seems that we have 
to seize power. Chen Yading, why don't you go and do 
it? In my opinion, we might as well let Chen Yading 
take charge of the Army's cultural work." She said to 
him and others, "You should kindle a prairie fire," thus 
inciting them to grab power in the Army by throwing 
it into disorder. 
(23) Through Chen Boda and Yao Wenyuan, the Lin 
Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutinnflry o:-liones -:-~::.­
trolled the mass media and instigated the overthrow of 
the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In June 1966, Chen Boda organized people to write, and 
cleared such editorials as "Sweep Away All the Monsters 
and Demons," thus trying to shape counter-revolutionary 
public opinion so that the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary cliques might usurp power after 
throwing the whole country into chaos. From 1974 to 
1976, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan 
instructed the "Liang Xiao" writing group of Qinghua 
and Beijing Universities, the "Luo Siding" writing group 
in Shanghai, the "Chi Heng" writing group of the 
magazine Hongqi (Red Flag), and the "Tang Xiaowen" 
writing group of the Higher Party School of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.C. to spr~aci counter-revolutionary, 
demagogic propaganda. In the spring of 1976, Yao Wen-
yuan personally revised and cleared such articles as 
"From Bourgeois Democrats to Capitalist Roaders" 
published in Hongqi (Red Flag) and Renmin Ribao (Peo-
ple's Daily). He and Zhang Chunqiao also cleared 
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speeches prepared for Ma Tianshui and Xu Jingxian. 
In these articles and speeches, they vilified veteran 
cadres in leading organs of the Party, government and 
army at various levels as "bourgeoi:1 democrats," "cap-
italist roaders" or "long-time capitalist roaders" and in-
cited further persecution of them. 
At the ~nd of March 1976, slogans written in bold 
characters opposing Zhang Chunqiao appeared in Nan-
jing. Yao Wenyuan slandered the people who had put 
up the slogans, calling them "counter-revolutionaries." 
He said to Lu Ying, "It seems there's a command office 
stirring up this adverse, counter-revolutionary current." 
He added, "The situation in Beijing merits attention." 
Prompted by Yao Wenyuan, Lu Ying dispatched people 
to Tian An Men Square to collect and compile material 
which was then adulterated by Yao Wenyuan. Thus 
the revolutionary words and deeds of the masses op-
posing the gang of four, commemorating Zhou Enlai and 
supporting Deng Xiaoping were made out to be "counter-
revolutionary speeches and slogans" and a "manifestation 
of last-ditch struggle and frenzied counterattack by the 
declining, moribund forces." The masses themselves 
were vilified as "a handful of bad elements" and "coun-
ter-revolutionaries." Yao Wenyuan even called for the 
"execution of a bunch of them." 
From January to September 1976, at the instigation 
of Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, Lu Ying dispatched 
people to certain departments of the Party and the 
Gove~r>ment as well as to Fujian, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Heilongjiang and other prov-
inces. There they collected material which they distort-
ed in order to frame leading cadres in the Party, govern-
ment and o.rmy, calling them "unrepentant capitalist 
roadcrs" or "capitalist roadcrs still travelling the capital-






















landlords' restitution corps" and "trying to reverse cor-
rect verdicts and stage a comeback." 
n 
The Persecution and Suppression of 
Large Numbers of Cadres and Masses 
In order to seize Party and state leadership and 
establish their counter-revolutionary rule, the Lin Biao 
and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques incited 
beating, smashing and looting, whipped up violence, and 
trumped up false charges, thus persecuting and sup-
pressing large numbers of cadres and people. 
(24) At the instigation and under the directio!". of 
Lin Biao, Jiang Qing, Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, seven 
secretaries of the Beijing Municipal Committee of the 
C.P.C., including Liu Ren, Zheng Tianxiang, Wan Li 
and Deng Tuo, and six deputy mayors, including Wu 
Han and Yue Songsheng, were charged with being 
"enemy agents," "renegades," "counter-revolutionary 
revisionists," "reactionary capitalists" or "reactionary 
academic authorities." In January 1968, Kang Sheng 
falsely charged Liu Ren and deputy mayors Feng Jiping, 
Cui Yueli and others with "selling out vital secrets of 
the Party, government and army and betraying the 
Par~y and the nation." And he gave instructions to the 
effect that "the ordinary methods of dealing with 
criminals cannot be used in their case," and that "we 
should put them in !::.::.nd;:;;.ff~ an:i .:;att.)i uut sudden, 
gruelling interrogations." In May of the same year, 
Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi concocted the case of a 
"counter-revolutionary clique within the former Beijing 
Municipal Public Security Bureau, headed by Feng 
Jiping and Xing Xiangsheng," falsely accusing Feng 
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Jiping and others of "carrying out espionage in collab-
oration with U.S. and Chiang Kai-shek spies." Liu 
Ren, Deng Tuo, Wu Han and Yue Songsheng died as a 
result of persecution. 
(25) In January 1968, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 
Wenyuan slandered the Shanghai Municipal Committee 
of the C.P.C., saying that it was a "stubborn bourgeois 
stronghold" and consisted of an "evil bunch." They 
falsely accused Chen Pixian, its first secretary, of being 
"an extremely cunning and 'treacherous counter-revolu-
tionary double-dealer" and "the most dangerous enemy 
of the proletariat," and concocted the charge of "ren-
egade" against Cao Diqiu, a secretary of the municipal 
Party committee and mayor of Shanghai. At the instiga-
tion and under the direction of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 
Wenyuan, 17 people, who were secretaries or standing 
committee members of the Shanghai municipal commit-
tee of the Party and mayor or deputy mayors of the 
municipality, were falsely charged with being "ren-
egades," "enemy agents," "capitalist roaders" or 
"counter-revolutionaries." Cao Diqiu and deputy mayor 
Jin Zhonghua died as a result of persecution. 
(26) In December 1967, Chen Boda said in Tangshan 
that the C.P.C. organization in eastern Hebei Province 
"was probably a party embodying Kuomintang-Com-
munist co-operation, and in fact it might be Kuomintang 
members and renegades who were playing a dominant 
role here." A case was trumped up at his instigation, 
and more than 84,000 Party cadres and masses in eastern 
Hebei Province were framed and persecuted. Zhang 
Wenhao and 2,955 others died as a result of persecution. 
(27) On January 21, 1968, at the Jingxi Hotel in 
Beijing, Kang Sheng slandered Zhao Jianmin, secretary 
of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the C.P.C., saying 
to hi:; face, "You are a renegade ... I can tell. Forty 

























kind of intuition ..• you have a deep-seated class hatred." 
He falsely accused Zhao Jianmin of carrying out the plans 
of a group of Kuomintang agents in Yunnan and of 
"trying to take advantage of the Great Cultural Revolu-
tion to create chaos in the border areas." Kang Sheng 
and Xie Fuzhi forbade Zhao Jianmin to argue, and Xie 
announced there and then Zhao's arrest. Thus at the 
instigation of Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, the "case of 
enemy agent Zhao Jianmin" was fabricated, lc~ding to 
the frame-up and persecution of large numbers of cadres 
and masses in Yunnan, over 14,000 of whom died as a 
result. 
(28) Under the pretext of digging out the so-called 
"Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party," Kang 
Sheng framed and persecuted large numbers of cadres 
and masses in Inner Mongolia and sabotaged the unity 
between the various nationalities. On February 4, 1968, 
he said, "The Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary 
Party is still active underground. When we begin to fer-
ret out its members, we may overdo it a little, but we 
needn't be worried about that." Again, on February 4, 
1969, he said, "There are members of the Inner Mongo-
lian People's Revolutionary Party inside the army too. 
This is a very serious matter." Xie I<'uzhi sa1ei, "Tne In-
ner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party is disguised 
as a Communist Party but actually it is not. We must 
wipe it out." At the instigation of Kang Sheng and Xie 
Fuzhi, more than 346,000 cadres and other people in the 
Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region were framed and 
persecuted in the case of the "Inner Mongolian People's 
Revolutionary Party" o>.!ld o~hf'!" false c~se~, :md 16,222 
persons died as a result of persecution. 
(29) In 1967, Kang Sheng and others trumped up the 
case of a "Xinjiang renegade clique." One hundred and 
thirty-one Party cadres, who had been arrested and im-
prisoned in September 1942 by Sheng Shicai, the Xin-
m 
jiang warlord, were falsely accused of having "sur-
rendered to the enemy, betrayed the revolution" and 
"concealed themselves inside our Party" and of forming 
a "renegade clique." Ninety-two cadres, including Ma 
Mingfang, Zhang Ziyi, Yang Zhihua and Fang Zhichun, 
were persecuted, and Ma Mingfang and 25 others died 
as a result of persecution. 
(30) In February 1946, in accordance with a decision 
of the Northeast Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee 
which had been approved by the Central Committee in 
1945, Lu Zhengcao, Wan Yi, Zhang Xuesi, Jia Tao, Liu 
Lanbo, Li Youwen, Yu Yifu and 35 others jointly sent a 
telegr~ph to Chiang Kai-shek through the Xinhua News 
Agency in Yanan, demanding the release of Zhang 
Xueliang. From 1967 to 1969, the Lin Biao and Jiang 
Qing counter-revolutionary cliques and their key mem-
bers distorted the facts about this incident, accused them 
of engaging in a "major, long premeditated, counter-
revolutionary scheme to betray the Party and capitulate 
to the enemy" and fabricated the case of a "counter-
revolutionary 'northeast gang' that betrayed the Party 
and capitulated to the enemy," framing and persecuting 
90 persons. Zhang Xuesi, Jia Tao, Che Xiangchen and 
Chen Xianzhou died as a result of persecution. 
(31) The counter-revolutionary cliques of Lin Biao 
and Jiang Qing falsely accused the underground organiza-
tions of the C.P.C. in Beiping, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guang-
dong, Sichuan, Yunnan and other places of having 
"recruited renegades" during the War of Resistance 
Againc;t Japan and the Liberation War and of being a 
"Kuomintang," a "renegade party" and a "U.S.-Chiang 
special detachment." The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary cliques decided to "make the 
underground Party organizations the first target of at-
tack." Consequently, large numbers of leaders and 






















many ordinary people who had fought heroically against 
the enemy were charged with being "renegades," "hidden 
traitors," "Japanese agents," "Kuomintang agents," "U.S. 
agents," "spies" or "counter-revolutionaries." 
In October 1967, Huang Yongsheng, in collusion with 
Liu Xingyuan, then political commissar of the Guangzhou 
Units of the P.L.A., and others, decided to investigate the 
history of the underground Party organization in Guang-
dong and set up a special group for this purpose. They 
slandered the underground Party organization as having 
"recruited renegades," and alleged that a number of 
"renegades," "enemy agents" and "spies" had sneaked 
in. This was the false case of "the Guangdong under-
ground Party organization," wilich led to the framing 
and persecution of more than 7,100 people. Lin Qiang-
yun and 84 others died as a result o! pPr:>Pcution. 
(32) The Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique 
trumped up false charges against large numbers of peo-
ple in the P.L.A. Over 80,000 people were framed and 
persecuted, of whom 1,169 died. 
From May 1967 to November 1970, Huang Yongsheng, 
in collusion with Liu Xingyuan, concocted the case of a 
"counter-revolutionary clique" in the Guangzhou Units of 
the P.L.A., falsely accusing Deputy Commander Wen 
Niansheng and others of attempting to "usurp power by 
staging a coup." More than 700 cadres were implicated. 
Wen Niansheng and some others died as a -result of per-
secution. 
"!Wu Faxian, in collusion with Wang Fei, then deputy 
chief of staff of the Air Force Command, and Liang Pu, 
its chief of staff, framed and persecuted iarge· numbers 
of cadres and of the rank and file in the Air Force. Wu 
Faxian said, "If you don't strike them down, they will 
turn around and pounce on us and have us beheaded." 
He laid false charges against a number of leading cadres 
in the Air Force, alleging that they were "conducting 
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underground activities" in an attempt to ''seize power" 
and "stage a coup." Wu Faxian directly framed and 
persecuted 174 persons, among whom Gu Qian and Liu 
Shanben died as a result of persecution. 
Li Zuopeng, in collusion with Wang Hongkun and 
Zhang Xiuchuan, framed and persecuted a large number 
of cadres and rank and file in the Navy. In January 1968, 
Li Zuopeng said that working on special cases was 
equivalent to "the Communist Party dealing blows at the 
Kuomintang." In October of the same year he again said 
that there should be "fierce attacks, vigorous charges and 
hot pursuit." Li Zuopeng directly framed and persecuted 
120 persons, among whom Lei Yongtong and two others 
died as a result of persecution. 
Qiu Huizuo, in league with Chen Pang, then deputy 
director of the General Logistics Department of the 
P.L.A., set up a kangaroo court in the department to ex-
tort confessions through torture. Qiu Huizuo said that 
there should be "ruthless struggle," "ruthless interroga-
tion" and "ruthless dictatorship." Many of the cadres 
and of the rank and file were framed and persecuted. 
Qiu Huizuo directly framed and persecuted 462 people. 
Eight people, including Shen Maoxing and Wang 
Shuchen, died as a result of persecution. 
(33) In order to suppress the "Workers' Red Detach-
ment," a mass organization in Shanghai, and seize Party 
and government leadership there, Zhang Chunqiao made 
a phone call from Beijing to his wife, Li Wenjing, in 
Shanghai on December 28, 1966. He said, "The fruits of 
victc::y mustn't be snatched by the Red Detachment. Tell 
the revolutionary rebels that they mustn't just stand idly 
by." Li Wenjing informed Xu Jingxian, who then passed 
on the message. At the instigation of Zhang Chunqiao 
and others, Wang Hongwen worked in collusion with 
Geng Jinzhang, a criminal guilty of beating, smashing 


























ple who were ignorant of the real situation to at-
tack the "Workers' Red Det;:.ch.-nent." Tl,is a•·med da!;il, 
known as the Kangping Road Incident, resulted in 91 
being injured or maimed. 
On August 4, 1967, Wang Hongwen engineered and 
directed an armed attack on the mass organization known 
as the "Rebel Headquarters of the Revolutionary Al-
liance of the Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant." Six hundred 
and fifty people were imprisoned or injured. Afterwards, 
Zhang Chunqiao acclaimed Wang Hongwen as "our com-
manding officer" and "leader of the working class in 
Shanghai." 
(34) In May 1967, while in Jinan, Zhang Chunqiao 
and Yao Wenyuan supported the suppression of the local 
masses by Wang Xiaoyu, then chairman of the Shandong 
Provincial Revolutionary Committee. Zhang told him, 
"You'll have my support if you're st1·ong." Thereupon, 
on May 7, Wang Xiaoyu engineered a violent incident in 
the compound of the provincial revolutionary committee, 
resulting in the arrest and imprisonment of 388 persons. 
Later, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan again ex-
pressed their support for Wang Xiaoyu and congratulated 
him on his "victory in battle." 
(35) In October 1966, Jiang Qing collab(lrated wHh Ye 
Qun in ordering Jiang Tengjiao to search and ransack 
the homes of a number of writers and artists in Shanghai. 
Ye Qun asked Wu Faxian to summon Jiang Tengjiao to 
Beijing, where she said to him, "One of Comrade Jiang 
Qing's letters has fallen into the hands of Zheng Junli, 
Gu Eryi and company. It's not clear who has the letter 
now, but you can or~;tanize some people to search the 
homes of five persons including Zheng Junli, Gu Eryi, 
Zhao Dan and Tong Zhiling. Bring me all the letters, 
diaries, notebooks and such like you can lay your hands 
on." And she added, "Keep this absolutely secret." After 
returning to Shanghai, Jiang Tengjiao got together more 
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than 40 people. They disguised themselves as Red 
Guards and, in the small hours of October 9, searched 
the homes of Zhao Dan, Zheng Junli, Tong Zhiling, Chen 
Liting and Gu Eryi. Jiang Tengjiao sent wnat they had 
seized in two batches to Ye Qun's residence in Beijing. 
In January 1967, under Jiang Qing's personal supervi-
sion, Xie Fuzhi and Ye Qun burnt all the letters, photos 
and other material relating to Jiang Qing, which had 
been obtained in the search. 
(36) While in Shanghai in 1967, Zhang Chunqino 
ordered a counter-revolutionary secret service organiza-
tion- the "You Xuetao Group" (code named "244")-
to undertake the special tasks of fascist espionage such 
as tailing, shadowing, kidnapping, ransacking people's 
homes, taking people into custody, secretly interrogating 
and torturing them, and gathering intelligence. From 
November 1967 to March 1968, this organization collected 
or fabricated for Zhang Chunqiao's use slanderous in-
formation on 97 leading cadres of the East China Bureau 
of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. It drew up a 
"Diagram Showing the Relationships Between Persons 
Working for the Sinister Line in the East China Bureau" 
and compiled 300 issues of the publications Minesweeping 
Bulletin and Trends. All told, it provided over one mil-
lion words in intelligence material, trumping up cases to 
persecute 183 cadres and other people. In the winter of 
1967 and the spring of 1968, this organization sent people 
to Jiangsu, Zhejiang and other places to carry out 
espionage. It falsely charged the leading Party, govern-
ment and army cadres in eastern China with "organizing 
an underground armed detachment south of the Chang-
jiang River" and "plotting a mutiny." On October 26, 
19~7, Wang Shaoyong, then vice-chairman of the Shang-
hai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, relayed Zhang 
Chunqiao's words to You Xuetao, "Be careful. You can 
























mary of the Year's Work" submitted to Zhang Chunqiao 
on November 30, 1968, this organization said that it had 
been "fighting on a special front" and that "over the past 
year our work has been mainly covert struggle against 
the enemy .... From the central down to the local levels, 
we have directly or indirectly kicked the backsides of 
many bigshots." Zhang Chunqiao expressed his approval 
by writing "Thanks, Comrades" on the summary. 
(37) From 1974 to 1976, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao 
and Yao Wenyuan instructed Chi Qun and Xie Jingyi to 
use their base of activity at Qinghua University t~ make 
secret contacts and exchange information with key 
members of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique 
in certain departments of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.C. and the State Council and in Shanghai and Liao-
ning. They collected records of speeches made by leading 
cadres of provincial Party committees and documents of 
these committees and wrote up such material as The 
Capitalist Roaders Are Still Travelling the Capitalist 
Road and Information for Reference to frame leading 
Party, government and army cadres. 
(38) As a result of instigation and instructions from 
the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques 
and their backbone elements, frame-ups were ubiquitous 
in the country. Numerous cadres and other people in 
the democratic parties, in people's organizations such as 
trade unions, the Communist Youth League and women's 
federations, and in cultural, educational, scientific, 
technological, journalistic, publishing, public health and 
physical culture circles were falsely charged and per-
secuted and disabled c:: ciccl :!S ::. ::c::;.Ut, ::.s did large 
numbers of returned overseas Chinese. 
The following are the leading members of the democrat-
ic parties who were falsely charged and persecuted: 
Deng Baoshan, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee 
of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang; Gao 
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Chongmin and Wu Han, Vice-Chairmen of the Central 
Committee of the China Democratic League; Sun Qimeng, 
Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the China 
Democratic National Construction Association; Che 
Xiangchen, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of 
the China Association for Promoting Democracy; Zhou 
Gucheng, member of the Presidium of the Central Com-
mittee of the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic 
Party; and Pan Shu, Vice-Chairman of the Central Com-
mittee of the Jiu San (September the Third) Society. 
Large numbers of standing committee members and 
members and alternate members of the central commit-
tees of the democratic parties as well as of the All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce were falsely 
charged and persecuted, among whom Huang Shaohong, 
Mei Gongbin, Chu Xichun, Gao Chongmin, Liu Qingyang, 
Pan Guangdan, Liu-Wang Liming, Liu Nianyi, Wang 
Xingyao, Tang Xunze, Xu Chongqing, Li Pingxin, Chen 
Linrui, Zheng Tianbao, Wang Jiaji, Liu Xiying, Zhang Xi, 
Wang Tianqiang and others died in consequence. 
In the literary and art circles, more than 2,600 people 
were falsely charged and persecuted in the Ministry of 
Culture and units directly under it alone. Noted writers 
and well-known art workers including Lao She, Zhao 
Shuli, Zhou Xinfang, Gai Jiaotian, Pan Tianshou, Ying 
Yunwei, Zheng Junli and Sun Weishi died in con-
sequence. 
In the educational circles, more than 142,000 cadres 
and teachers in units under the Ministry of Education 
and i., 17 provinces and municipalities were falsely 
charged and persecuted. Noted professors including 
Xiong Qinglai, Jian Bazan, He Sijing, Wang Shourong, 
Gu Yuzhen, Li Guangtian, Rao Yutai, Liu Pansui and Ma 
Te died in consequence of such persecution. 
In scientific and technological circles, more than 53,000 


























the Chinese Academy of Sciences, two research institutes 
under the Seventh Ministry oi Iviachine-Bu1lding and 17 
provinces and municipalities were falsely charged and 
persecuted. Noted scientists such as geophysicist Zhao 
Jiuzhang, metallurgist Ye Zhupei, theoretical physicist 
Zhang Zongsui, entomologist Liu Chongle, taxonomist 
Chen Huanyong, and metal ceramist Zhou Ren died in 
consequence of such persecution. 
In health circles, more than 500 of the 674 professors 
and associate professors in the 14 medical colleges and 
institutes direcUy led by the Ministry of Public Health 
were falsely charged and persecuted. Such famous med-
ical scientists as pathologist Hu Zhengxiang, phar-
macologist Zhang Changshao, specialist in thoracic 
surgery Ji Suhua, specialist in acupuncture Lu Shouyan, 
and traditional Chinese doctors Ye Xichun and Li 
Zhongren died as a result of persecution. 
In physical culture circles, large numbers of cadres, 
coaches and sportsmen we1·e falsely charged and per-
secuted. Outstanding coaches such as Fu Qifang, Rong 
Guotuan and Jiang Yongning were victimized and died. 
Also falsely charged and persecuted were large num-
bers of national celebrated model workers, among whom 
Meng Tai and Shi Chuanxiang diea in consequ~uce. 
In 19 provinces and municipalities, over 13,000 re-
turned overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese family 
members were falsely charged and persecuted, of whom 
281 died as a result. Such well-known figures in the field 
of overseas Chinese affairs as Fang Fang, Xu Li, Huang 
Jie, Chen Xujing, P.uang Qinshu and Chen Manyun died 
as a result of their p~r~ccution. 
Also persecuted on the false charges of being "ren-
egades," "enemy agents," "counter-revolutionaries" or 
"lackeys of capitalist roaders" were innumerable cadres 
and other people working in Party, government and army 
organs, in enterprises and establishments, rural people's 
·183 
communes and production brigades and teams as well as 
in urban neighbourhood committees throughout the 
country. 
m 
Plotting to Assassinate Chainnan Mao Zedong 
and Engineer an Armed Counter-Revolutionary 
Coup d'Etat 
After the failure of their conspiracy to usurp Party and 
state leadership through "peaceful transition," the Lin 
Biao counter-revolutionary clique plotted to stage an 
armed counter-revolutionary coup d'etat and assassinate 
Chairman Mao Zedong. 
(39) In October 1~69, Lin Biao instructed Wu Faxian 
to make his son Lin Lig-vc deputy director of the General 
Office and concurrently deputy chief of the Operations 
Department of the Air Force Command. On October 18, 
Wu Faxian called together Lin Liguo, Wang Fei and 
Zhou Yuchi, another deputy director of the General 
Office of the Air Force Command, and said, "Yo:.~ are to 
report everything concerning the Air Force to Comrade 
Liguo. Everything is at his disposal and under his com-
mand." In this way Wu illegally put the Air Force under 
Lin Liguo's command. Zhou Yuchi and Wang Fei suc-
cessively passed on this message to the standing com-
mittee of the Air Force Party committee at one of its 
working sessions and to the offices under the Air Force 
Command. Lin Liguo formed an "investigation group" 
in collaboration with Zhou Yuchi, Wang Fei and others. 
On the evening of May 2, 1970, when Lin Biao received 
























a section head under the Air Force Command's General 
Office, he asked them who their leader was. On May 3. 
Zhou Yuchi, Wang Fei and others held a meeting to 
pledge allegiance to Lin Biao and made Lin Liguo their 
"leader." In October 1970, the "investigation group" 
he:~ded by Lin Liguo was reorganized into a "joint fleet." 
Ye Qun gave code names to Zhou Yuchi, Wang Fei and 
others. The "joint fleet" constituted the backbone of Lin 
Biao's plot to assassinate Chairman Mao Zedong and stage 
an armed counter-revolutionary coup d'etat. 
From 1970 to September 13, 1971, under the direction 
of Lin Liguo and Zhou Yuchi, Hu Ping, deputy chief-
of-staff of the Air Force Command, Wang Weiguo, polit-
ical commissar of P.L.A. Unit 7341, Mi Jianong, political 
commissar of the Guangzhou Branch of the Civil Avia-
tion Administration of China (CAAC), Gu Tongzhou, 
chief-of-staff of the Guangzhou Air Force Headquarters 
and others set up secret centres of activity in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. These centres were used by 
Lin Liguo and others for liaison purposes and for storing 
arms and ammunition, wireless sets, bugging devices and 
confidential Party and government documents. 
(40) From September 1970 onwards, Lin Biao stepped 
up his preparations for an armed counter-revolutionary 
coup d'etat. In February 1971, after plotting with Ye Qun 
and Lin Liguo in Suzhou, Lin Biao sent Lin Liguo to 
Shanghai, where from March 21 to 24, he called together 
such chief members of the "joint fleet" as Zhou Yuchi, 
Yu Xinye, a deputy section head under the General Office 
of the Air Force Command, and Li Weixin, then a deputy 
section head under tne Political Department of P.L.A. 
Unit 7341, and mapped out a plan for an armed counter-
revolutionary coup- Outline of "Project 571." They 
assessed the situation, worked out the outline of imple-
mentation and decided on the slogans and tactics. They 
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called for "gaining the upper hand by striking first mili-
tarily" and plotted to launch an armed counter-revolu-
tionary coup d'etat to "seize nationwide political power" 
or bring about "a situation of rival regimes" by taking 
advantage of "some high-level meeting to catch all in one 
net" or "using special means such as bombs, the 543 (code 
name for a kind of guided missile - Tr.), traffic ac-
cidents, assassination, kidnapping and urban guerrilla 
squads." They also plotted to· "seek Soviet help to tie 
down domestic and foreign forces." 
On March 31, 1971, while in Shanghai, Lin Liguo, im-
plementing the plan for establishing a "command team" 
as described in the Outline of "Project 571," summoned 
Jiang Tengjiao, Wang Weiguo, Chen Liyun, political 
commissar of the P.L.A. Unit 7350, and Zhou Jianping, 
deputy commander of the Nanjing Air Force, to a secret 
meeting at which Zhou · Jianping was made "head" in 
Nanjing, Wang Weiguo "head" in Shanghai and Chen 
Liyun "head" in Hangzhou. Jiang Tengjiao was to be 
"responsible for liaison between the three places with a 
view to co-ordination and concerted operation." 
In March 1971, instructed by Lin Liguo, Mi Jianong 
organized a "combat detachment" in Guangzhou. He 
made its members take an oath of allegiance to Lin Biao 
and Lin Liguo, and worked out argots and code words 
to be used in communications. 
In April 1971, Lin Liguo directed Wang Weiguo to set 
up a "training corps" in Shanghai in preparation for the 
coup. Trainees were taught special skills in arresting 
peop~::. hand-to-hand fighting, the use of various kinds of 
light weapons and driving motor vehicles. 
(41) On the evening of September 5, 1971, Zhou Yuchi 
and Yu Xinye telephoned Gu Tongzhou to find out what 
Chairman Mao Zedong had said in Changsha to leading 


























reported to Lin Liguo and Ye Qun at once, and Gu 
Tongzhou sent a written repc:.-: to Yc Qun. On September 
6, Li Zuopeng, then in Wuhan, received a confidential 
report from Liu Feng, political commissar of the P.L.A. 
Wuhan Units, containing Chairman Mao Zedong's con-
versations with leading personnel assembled in the city. 
Li Zuopeng returned to Beijing the same day and 
separately tipped off Huang Yongsheng and Qiu Huizuo. 
That very night Huang Yongsheng phoned Ye Qun about 
this, who was then in Beidaihe. After receiving the secret 
information from Gu Tongzhou and Hl!lang Yongsheng, 
Lin Biao and Ye Qun made up their minds to assassinate 
Chairman Mao Zedong. On September 7, Lin Liguo issued 
the order for first-degree combat readiness to the "joint 
fleet." On September 8, Lin Biao issued the following 
handwritten order for the armed coup: "Expect you to 
act according to the order transmitted IJy Comracies Liguo 
and Yuchi." On the same day, Lin Liguo brought from 
Ye Qun in Beidaihe a sealed document addressed to Huang 
Yongsheng personally. It was to be delivered by Wang Fei. 
On the morning of September 10, Wang Fei delivered the 
sealed dccument to Huang Yongsheng. On the same day 
Huang Yongsheng repeatedly contacted Ye Qun, making 
five phone calls to her. The two longest la:;~::d 9C o.r.d 135 
minutes respectively. Also on that day, Liu Peifeng 
brought a letter to Huang Yongsheng from Lin Biao in 
Beidaihe, in which Lin wrote: "Comrade Yongsheng, I 
miss you very much and hope that you will always be 
optimistic at all times. Take care of your health. If you 
have any problems, consult Comrade Wang Fei directly." 
The letter was given to Wang Fei by Lin Liguo and Zhou 
Yuchi, and Wang was instructed to deliver it to Huang 
Yongsheng when necessary. From September 8 to 11, at 
their secret centres at the Air Force Academy and the 
Xijiao Airport of Beijing, Lin Liguo and Zhou Yuchi sepa-
rately relayed Lin Biao·s handwritten order for an armed 
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coup to Liu Peifeng, Jiang Tengjiao, Wang Fei, Li Weixin, 
Lu Min, chief of the Operations Department of the Air 
Force Command, Liu Shiying, deputy director of its 
General Office, Cheng Hongzhen, secretary of the office, 
Guan Guanglie, political commissar of the P.L.A. Unit 
0190, and others. They worked out the details for assas-
sinating Chairman Mao Zedong. Jiang Tengjiao was 
appointed frontline commander for action in the Shang-
hai area. They plotted to attack Chairman Mao Zedong's 
train with flame throwers and 40-mm. bazookas, dyna-
mite the Shuofang Railway Bridge near Suzhou, bomb 
the train from the air, or blow up the oil depot in Shang-
hai, near which the special train would pull up, and then 
assassinate the Chairman in the ensuing commotion, or let 
Wang Weiguo carry out the murder when he was being 
received by Chairman Mao Zedong. 
Meanwhile, Lin Biao and Ye Qun were making prepara-
tions for fleeing south to Guangzhou to set up a separate 
Party central committee, and also for defecting to another 
country. On September 10, they ordered Zhou Yuchi and 
others to obtain from the Air Force Command maps 
showing where radar units were deployed in north, 
northeast and northwest China, frequency tables of the 
radio stations in neighbouring countries which could be 
used for navigation purposes, maps showing air lines lead-
ing from Beijing to Ulan Bator and Irkutsk and the loca-
tion of their airports and the latter's call signs and radio 
frequency tables, as well as information concerning the 
airports in the Guangzhou and Fuzhou areas. 
(42) Cn the evening of September 11, Wang Weiguo 
secretly telephoned Lin Liguo and Zhou Yuchi, informing 
them that Chairman Mao Zedong had already left Shang-
hai for Beijing. When Lin Biao and Ye Qun learned that 
their plot to murder Chairman Mao Zedong had fallen 























along Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopen.~ and Qiu 
Huizuo, and set up a separate FarLy central committee there 
to split the nation. They also planned to "launch a pincer 
attack from north and south in alliance with the Soviet 
Union should fighting be necessary." On September 12, 
Lin Liguo and Zhou Yuchi separately told Jiang Tengjiao, 
Wang Fei, Yu Xinye, Hu Ping and Wang Yongkui, a 
deputy section chief in the Intelligence Department of 
the Air Force Command, to make preparatic::.s for the 
flight south. Hu Ping and company had eight planes 
ready to leave for Guangzhou and helped Lin Liguo to 
fly to Shanhaiguan on special plane 256, which was then 
assigned for the use of Lin Biao, Ye Qun and Lin Liguo 
in Beidaihe. Wang Fei, Yu Xinye and He Dequan, chief of 
the Intelligence Department of the Air Force Command, 
prepared the name list of those whC' were to. flell' •-::-:.~th, 
assigned duties and made specific plans for action. Around 
10 o'clock that evening, Premier Zhou Enlai inquired 
about the details concerning the flight of special plane 256 
to Shanhaiguan and ordered it to return to Beijing at 
once. Hu Ping lied, saying that the plane was on a train-
ing flight to Shanhaiguan and had developed engine 
trouble. Thus he refused to carry out Premier 7hou's 
order. Meanwhile, he telephoned Zhou Yuchi and tipped 
him off on what had happened. 
Late at night on September 12, Lin Biao, Ye Qun and 
Lin Liguo received a secret report that Premier Zhou 
Enlai had been making inquiries about the special plane. 
Thereupon, they hurried to the Shanhaiguan Airport with 
Liu Peifeng and others. scrambled on to the plane and 
ordered it to start taxiing without waiting for the co-pilot, 
navigator and radio operator to board and the lights to 
be turned on. The aircraft took off at 00:32 hours on 
September 13 and crashed near Undur Khan in Mongolia, 
killing all those aboard. 
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At 03:15 hours on September 13, 1971, Zhou Yuchi, Yu 
Xinye and Li Weixing hijacked helicopter 3685 at the 
Shahe Airport in Beijing in an attempt to flee the country, 
taking with them piles of confidential state documents and 
large amounts of U.S. dollars which they had illicitly 
obtained. After seeing through their intention, pilot Chen 
Xiuwen took steps to fly the helicopter back to Huairou 
County, a suburb of Beijing, but was killed by Zhou 
Yuchi when the helicopter landed. 
(43) Before Lin Biao's defection, Premier Zhou Enlai 
had made the decision that special plane 256 "cannot take 
off without a joint ot·der from four persons," namely, 
Zhou Enlai, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian and Li 
Zuopeng. However, Li Zuopeng distorted this directive 
when relaying it to those in charge of the Navy's 
Shanhaiguan Airport, saying, "The plane must not be 
allowed to take of! unless one of the four leading officials 
gives the order." He added, "If anyone gives you such an 
order, you must report it to me. You will be held respon-
sible." At 00:20 hours on September 13, when special 
plane 256 was getting ready to take off but its engines 
were not yet started, the airport leadership phoned Li 
Zuopeng asking what they should do if the plane were 
to insist on taking off. Instead of taking any measures to 
prevent the plane from taking off, Li Zuopeng said 
evasively, "You may report directly to the Premier and 
ask for his instructions." He was procrastinating so that 
Lin Biao could have enough time to escape. Afterwards, 
Li Zuopeng tried to cover up his crime by altering the 
logbook entry of the relevant phone calls. 
(44) Aiter Lin Biao's defection on September 13, 1971, 
Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo and others 
separately destroyed incriminating evidence, including 
their col'respondence with Lin Biao and Yc Qun, note-
books, photographs. and other material, in an attempt to 

























Plotting Armed Rebellion in Shanghai 
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, 
as well as Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, Wang Xiuzhen and 
company, made Shanghai their base, built up their own 
armed force and plotted an armed rebellion in the face of 
their impending doom. 
(45) In July 1967, Zhang Chunqiao wrote in a report 
he finalized, "We must use the gun to protect revolution 
made with the pen" and instructed Wang Hongwen and 
others to organize an armed force in Shanghai under their 
control. In September 1973, Wang Hongwen said to Wang 
Xiuzhen, "A national general headquarters must be set up 
for the people's militia. I will take charge of it myself." 
In March 1974, Wang again told her, "The army must not 
be allowed to lead the militia whose command should be 
in the hands of the [Shanghai] municipal Party com-
mittee." On many occasions in January arid August 1975, 
Wang Hongwen told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang 
Xiuzhen in Beijing and Shanghai, "What worries me most 
is that the army is not in our hands." He added, "We must 
be on the alert against the danger of the rev.i:~~u.1ist.; taldng 
power" and "We must be prepared for guerrilla warfare." 
In February 1976, he said, "It's Chunqiao and I who 
organized the People's Militia in Shanghai." And he add-
ed, "I'm certainly going to keep firm control over it. You 
must run it well for me .... The army isn't so reliable." 
(46) On May 7, 1976, when talking in Beijing with Chen 
Jide, a member of !:!:.-;! Sh'!ngh<>i Wr!.t!n~ Group, Yao 
Wenyuan said, "The Great Cultural Revolution is an ex-
ample of violence, so is the Tian An Men Square Incident. 
And the outcome of future struggles will have to be decid-
ed through violence too." On returning to Shanghai, Chen 
.:Side communicated Yao's views to Ma Tianshui, Xu 
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Jingxian and others. In August of the same year, Yao 
Wenyuan personally revised and approved an article by 
the Shanghai Writing Group, entitled "Strengthen the 
Building of the Workers' Militia," which was later 
published in Hongqi (Red Flag). To prepare public 
opinion for violent suppression and armed rebellion, the 
article called for the struggle of the workers' militia 
against "the bourgeoisie inside the Party." 
(47) In August 1976, Ding Sheng, head of the Nanjing 
Units of the P.L.A., arrived in Shanghai and had a secret 
talk with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen 
at Yanan Hotel till midnight. Ding Sheng said, "My 
biggest worry is Unit 6453 .... I haven't the slightest 
control over it .... Several of its divisions are deployed 
along the Wuxi-Suzhou-Shanghai line. This is a big 
headache .... You must be prepared for any eventuality." 
Immediately afterwards, Ma Tianshui attended to the 
arming of the militia. Altogether, 74,220 rifles, 300 
artillery pieces and more than 10 million rounds of am-
munition were handed out in no time, as a concrete 
measure in preparation for an armed rebellion. On 
September 21 of the same year, Zhang Chunqiao received 
Xu Jingxian alone in Beijing. After hearing about Ding 
Sheng's secret talk with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and 
Wang Xiuzhen in Shanghai and about the hurried handout 
of weapons, Zhang Chunqiao said, "Be careful, keep your 
eyes open for new trends in the class struggle." On 
September 23, Wang Hongwen made a telephone call to 
Wang Xiuzhen, saying, "Be on your guard, for the strug-
gle isn't over yet. The bourgeoisie inside the Party will 
not b~: reconciled to defeat. Someone or other is sure to 
try to reinstate Deng Xiaoping." 
(48) On October 6, 1976, the gang of Jiang Qing, Zhang 
Chunqiao, Yao Wen yuan and Wang Hongwen was smashed. 
On October 8, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen sent to 




















ln charge of the preparatory group for the reorganization 
of the All..China Federation o! T:ace Unicns, to find gu~ 
what had happened. They adopted a secret code for contact 
purposes. That evening, Miao Wenjin and Zhu Jiayao, 
a member of the leading Party group in the Ministry o! 
Public Security, made a phone call to Kang Ningyi, 
political commissar~ of the Security Section of the 
Shanghai Municipal Committee of the C.P.C., asking him 
to tell Wang Xiuzhen that the worst had befallen Jiang 
Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang 
Hongwen, using the formula "My mother has contracted 
myocardial infarction." Soon afterwards, Zhu Jiayao 
phoned Kang Ningyi again, asking him to tell Wang 
Xiuzhen, "People have been assembled and locked up. 
They can no longer move about." So Xu Jingxian and 
Wang Xiuzhen immediately called an emergency 
mobilization meeting. They decided to "fight it out." They 
said, "Send the militia into action. If we cannot keep up 
the fight for a week, five or three days will suffice to let 
the whole world know what's happening." There and then, 
Xu Jingxian wrote an order to assemble and deploy 33,500 
militiamen. A command team and two secret command 
posts were set up for the armed rebellion, and the 
newspapers and•broadcasting stations in Shanghai were 
instructed to act in co~ordination. Li Binshan, deputy 
political commissar of the Shanghai Garrison, Shi Shang-
ylng and Zhong Dingdong, who were in charge of the 
Shanghai militia headquarters, and others drew up an 
initial plan for the armed rebellion, which was then 
approved by Wang Xiuzhen. Xue Ganqing and Xu 
Chenghu, deputy secretaries of the Party committee of 
the Shanghai Municipal Public Security Bureau, worked 
out the bureau's programme for action. On October 9, Shi 
Shangying called a meeting of the militia leaders of ten 
districts and of the five militia divisions directly under 
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the command of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee and ordered them to muster their forces and 
see to it that there were enough motor vehicles and 
drivers and that their arms and ammunition matched. 
Over 27,000 rifles and artillery pieces and 225 motor 
vehicles were assigned for use. A large quantity 
of food and other material was made available. Fifteen 
transmitter-receivers were installed at the command posts 
in the Jiangnan Shipyards and the China Textile 
Machinery Plant and at the militia headquarters of the 
various districts so as to link them up through telecom-
munications. Zhong Dingdong drew up more specific 
operation plans, code named "Han No. 1" and "Fang No. 
2," for the armed rebellion. They decided to throw up 
three cordons between the heart of Shanghai and its 
outskirts in order to bring under control the city's ad-
ministrative centre, railway stations, wharves, airports, 
harbours, the Pujiang River Tunnel, bridges and other 
main transport routes. Pass words and argots were also 
worked out. On October 12, they planned to publish a 
"Message to the People of Shanghai and the Whole 
Country" and drafted 21 counter-revolutionary slogans. 
On the evening of the same day, Wang Shaoyong and Zhu 
Yongjia, together with Huang Tao and Chen Ada, who 
were leading members of the group in charge of industry 
and communications under the Shanghai Municipal Rev-
olutionary Committee, and others met to plan production 
stoppages through strikes, parades and demonstrations, 
the acquiring of control over- the press and radio stations 
and t!:ckade of the news released by the central media. 
They planned to cut off the supply of electricity at the 
grid, barricade airport runways with steel ingots and 
scuttle ships to block the river mouth at Wusongkou. 
They put forward the counter-revolutionary slogans: 





















"Return Wenyuan to us" :m~ "Return Hcng-..v.:::1 to us,'' 
readying themselves for "a life-and-death struggle." 
The above-mentioned facts establish that the two 
counter-revolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
framed and persecuted the Chairman of the People's 
Republic of China, the Chairman of the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress, the Premier of 
the State Council, the General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and other 
leaders of the Party and state, persecuted and suppressed 
large numbers of cadres and people, plotted to assassinate 
Chairman Mao Zedong and planned to engineer an armed 
rebellion, and that they are counter-revolutionary cliques 
whose aim was to overthrow the· political power of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. Their felonies have bP"'n 
proved by a mass of conclusive evidence. The people of 
all nationalities, and in particular, the large numbers of 
cadres and other people who were framed, persecuted or 
implicated, are witnesses to their criminal activities. And 
so are those who, for a time, were hoodwinked or misled 
by them. 
In accordance with the provisions of Article 9 of the 
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China with 
regard to the standard for the application of law, this 
procuratorate affirms that the following ten principal 
culprits have violated the Criminal Law of the People's 
Republic of China and have committed the crime of at-
tempting to overthrow the government and split the state, 
the crime of attempting to engineer an armed rebellion, 
the crime of having people injured or murdered for 
counter-revolutionary ends, the crime of framing and 
persecuting people for counter-revolutionary ends, the 
crime of organizing and leading counter-revolutionary 
cliques, the crime of conducting demagogical propaganda 
for counter-revolutionary ends, the crime of extorting 
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confessions by torture, and the crime of illegally detaining 
people, and that they should be duly prosecuted according 
to their criminai liability. This Procuratorate hereby 
institutes, according to law, a public prosecution against 
the following ten principal accused: 
Defendant Jiang Qing, female, 67, of Zhucheng County, 
Shandong Province. Member of the Tenth Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party of Ckina and its Political 
Bureau prior to her arrest. Now.in custody; 
Defendant Zhang Chunqiao, male, 63, of Juye County, 
Shandong Province. Member of the Tenth Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C., its Political Bureau and the Bureau's 
Standing Committee, vice-premier of the State Council, 
director of the General Political Department of the Chi-
nese People's Liberation Army, first secretary of the 
Shanghai Municipal Committee of the C.P.C., and chair-
man of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee 
prior to his arrest. Now in custody; 
Defendant Yao Wenyuan, male, 49, of Zhuji County, 
Zhejiang Province. Member of the Tenth Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C. and its Political Bureau, second 
secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the 
C.P.C., and vice-chairman of the Shanghai Municipal 
Revolutionary Committee prior to his arrest. Now in 
custody; 
Defendant Wang Hongwen, male, 45, of Changchun, 
Jilin Province. Member of the Tenth Central Committee 
of the C.P.C., its Political Bureau and the Bureau's Stand-
ing Committee, vice-chairman of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.C., secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Com-
mittee of the C.P.C., and vice-chairman of the Shanghai 
Municipal Revolutionary Committee prior to his arrest. 
Now in custody; 
Defendant Chen Bodn, male, 76, of Huian County, 


















mittee of the C.P.C., its Political Bureau and the Bureau's 
Standing Committee prior to his arrest. Now in custody; 
Defendant Huang Yongsheng, male, 70, of Xianning 
County, Hubei Province. Member of the Ninth Central 
Committee of the C.P.C. and its Political Bureau, and 
chief of the General Staff of the P.L.A. prior to his arrest. 
Now in custody; 
Defendant Wu Faxian, male, 65, of Yongfeng County, 
Jiangxi Province. Member of the Ninth Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C. and its Political Bureau, and deputy 
chief of the P.L.A General Staff and concurrently com-
mander of the P.L.A. Air Force prior to his arrest. Now 
in custody; 
Defendant Li Zuopeng, male, 66, of Jian County, 
Jiangxi Province. Member of the Ninth Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C. and its Political Bureau, and deputy 
chief of the P.L.A. General Staff and concurrently first 
political commissar of the P.L.A Navy prior to his arrest. 
Now in custody~ 
Defendant Qiu Huizuo, male, 66, of Xingguo County, 
Jiangxi Province. Member of the Ninth Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.C. and its Political Bureau, and deputy 
chief of the P.L.A. General Staff and concurrently director 
of the P.L.A General Logistics Department prior to his 
arrest. Now in custody; and 
Defendant Jiang Tengjiao, male, 61, of Hongan County, 
Hubei Province. Air Force political commissar of the 
P.L.A. Nanjing Units prior to his arrest. Now in custody. 
In accordance' with Item 5, Article 11, of the Law of 
Criminal Procedure of the People's Republic of China, no 
criminal liability shall be pursued against those 
defendants who are dead. In this case, they are Lin Biao, 
Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Ye Qun, Lin Liguo and Zhou 
Yuchi, who were also principal culprits of the Lin Biao 
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and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques. The other 
defendants involved in this will be dealt with separately. 
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Huang Huoqing 
Chief Procurator of the Supreme Peo-
ple's Procuratorate of the People's 
Republic of China and concurrently 
Chief of the Special Procuratorate 
Under the Supreme People's Proc-
uratorate 






















THE SPECIAL COURT UNDER 
THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT OF 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Te Fa Zi No.1 
The prosecutors: Huang Huoqing. Cl.iei P•·o:::urator of 
the Supreme People's Procuratorate and concurrently 
Chief of the Special Procuratorate; Yu Ping and Shi Jin-
qian, Deputy Chiefs of the Special Procuratorate; and 
Procurators Ma Chunyi, Wang Wenlin, Wang Fang, Wang 
Zhenzhong, Wang Pusheng, Wang Yaoqing, Feng Chang-
yi, Qu Wenda, Zhu Zongzheng, Jiang Wen, Sun Shufeng, 
Li Tianxiang, Shen Jialiang, Zhang Zhongru, Zh~.!!g Ying-
jie, Zhang Zhaoqi, Meng Qingen, Tu Men, Zhong Shuqin, 
Yuan Tongjiang and Jing Yusong. 
The defendant, Jiang Qing, female, 67, of Zhucheng 
County, Shandong Province. Formerly deputy head of 
the "cultural revolution group under the Central Com-
mittee" of the Communist Party of China and a member 
of the Political Bureau of the Ninth ~nd Tenth C.P.C. 
Central Committees. Now in custody. 
The defendant, Zhang Cbunqiao, male, 63, of Juye 
County, Shandong Province. Formerly deputy head of 
the "cultural revolution group under the C.P.C. Central 
Committee," a member of the Political Bureau of the 
Ninth C.P.C. Central Committee, a Standing Committee 
member of the Political Bureau of the Tenth C.P.C. Cen-
tral Committee and chairman of the Shanghai Municipal 
Revolutionary Committee. Now in custody. 
The defendant, Yao Wenyuan, male, 49, of Zhuji 
County, Zhejiang Province. Formerly a member of the 
"cultural revolution group under the C.P.C. Central Com-
mittee," a member of the Political Bureau of the Ninth 
and Tenth C.P.C. Central Committees and vice-chairman 
of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee. 
Now in custody. 
The defendant, Wang Hongwen, male, 46, of Changchun 
city, Jilin Province. Formerly vice-chairman of the 
Tenth C.P.C. Central Committee and vice-chairman of the 
Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee. Now in 0 
custody. o 
The defendant, Chen Boda, male, 76, of Huian County, g 
Fujian Province. Formerly head of the "cultural revolu- ill 
tion group under the C.P.C. Central Committee" and a ~ 
Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau of 
the Eighth and Ninth C.P.C. Central Committees. Now :::1 
in custody. 
The defendant, Huang Yongsbeng, male, 70, of Xianning 
County, Hubei Province. Formerly chief of the General 
Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Now in 
custody. 
The defendant, Wu Faxian, male, 65, of Yongfeng 
County, Jiangxi Province. Formerly deputy chief of the 
P.L.A. General Staff and concurrently commander of 
the A;r Force. Now in custody. 
The dcfendnnt, Li Zuopeng, male, 66, of Ji'an County, 
Jiangxi Province. Formerly deputy chief of the P.L.A. 
General Staff and concurrently first political commissar 
of the Navy. Now in custody. 






















County, Jiangxi Province. Formerly deputy chief of the 
P.L.A. General Staff and concurrently director of the 
General Logistics Department. Now in custody. 
The defendant, Jiang Tengjiao, male, 61, of Hongan 
County, Hubei Province. Formerly air force political 
commissar of the P.L.A. Nanjing Units. Now in custody. 
The advocates: Defence lawyers Han Xuezhang and 
Zhang Zhong for the defendant Yao Wenyuan; 
Defence lawyers Gan Yupei and Fu Zhiren for the de-
fendant Chen Boda; 
Defence lawyers Ma Kechang and Zhou Hengyuan for 
the defendant Wu Faxian; 
Defence lawyers Zhang Sizhi and Su Huiyu for the 
defendant Li Zuopeng; 
Defence lawyers Wang Shunhua and Zhou Kuizheng 
for the defendant Jiang Tengjiao. 
The other defendants, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, 
Wang Hongwen, Huang Yongsheng and Qiu Huizuo, did 
not entrust their defence to any lawyers, nor did they 
request the Special Court to assign advocates for them. 
Task of the Special Court 
The Special Court Under the Supreme People's Court 
of the People's Republic of China was set up in line with 
the "decision on the establishment of a Special Procura-
torate Under the Supreme People's Procuratorate and a 
Special Court Under the Supreme People's Court to pros-
ecute and try the pd;-.cipal dd:;:ndancs in •he case of the 
Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques," 
which was adopted at the 16th Meeting of th~ Standing 
Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress held 
on September 29, 1980. The task of this court, as defined 
by the decision, is trying the principal defendants in the 
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case of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques. 
On November 5, 1980, the Special Procuratorate 
brought before this court the case of the Lin Biao and 
Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques plotting to over:.. 
throw the political power of the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, and lodged a public prosecution against the de-
fendants, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, 
Wang Hongwen, Chen Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Fa-
xian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo and Jiang Tengjiao. 
Article 9 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic 
of China states: "If an act performed after the founding 
of the People's·Republic of China and prior to the enforce-
ment of the present law was not deemed an offence under 
the laws, decrees and policies then in force, these laws, 
decrees and policies shall be the standard. If the act was 
deemed an offence under the said laws, decrees and 
policies and is also subject to prosecution under Section 
8, Chapter 4, of the general provisions of the present law, 
the standard of criminal liability shall also be the said 
laws, decrees and policies. But if the act is not deemed 
an offence or the penalty for the offence is lighter under 
the present law, the present law shall apply." In line with 
the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China and 
the Law of Criminal Procedure of the People's Republic 
of China, this court tried the principal defendants in the 
case of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques in Beijing from November 20, 1980, to January 25, 
1981. This court listened to the speeches of public pros-
ecutors in support of the public prosecution, interrogated 
the defendants and listened to their depositions, defences 
and final statements, heard the speeches of the advocates, 
the testimonies of the witnesses and the accounts of some 
of the victims, and verified various pieces of evidence 


























This court confirms that the counter-revolutionary 
clique headed by Lin Biao and the counter-revolutionary 
clique headed by Jiang Qing were both counter-revolu-
tionary cliques that carried out conspiratorial activities 
for the purpose of seizing the supreme power of the Party 
and the state. These two counter-revolutionary cliques 
had the common criminal motives and purpose of over-
throwing the people's democratic dictatorship, namely the 
dictatorship of the proletariat (including the s~:lte organs 
and military institutions and, in the present case, also 
including the Chinese Communist Party, the force that 
exercises leadership over the above-mentioned organs and 
institutions) in China, conspired together in committing 
criminal offences, and thus formed a counter-revolution-
ary alliance. The principal culprits in the case of the 
Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques are 
the defendants, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wen-
yuan, Wang Hongwen, Chen Boda, Huang Yongshcng, Wu 
Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo and Jiang Tengjiao, as 
well as the following who are dead: Lin Biao (formerly 
vice-chairman of the Eighth and Ninth C.P.C. Central 
Committees and minister of national defence), Kang 
Sheng (formerly advisor to the "cultural revolution group 
under the C.P.C. Central Committee" and vice-chairman 
of the Tenth C.P.C. Central Committee), Xie Fuzhi 
(formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the Ninth 
C.P.C. Central Committee and minister of public security), 
Ye Qun (formerly a member of the Political Bureau of the 
Ninth C.P.C. Central Committee and the wife of Lin Biao), 
Lin Liguo (formerly deputy chief of the Operations De-
partment of the P.L.A Air Force H~et:l-=!tta!'ters a.."l.d the 
son of Lin Biao) and Zhou Yuchi (formerly deputy director 
of the General Office of the P.L.A. Air Force Head-
quarters). 
It was in the decade of turmoil known as the "great 
cultural revolution" that the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
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counter-revolutionary cliques carried out their counter-
revolutionary criminal activities. During the "great cul-
tural revolution," the political life of the,state became ex-
tremely abnormal, and the socialist legal system was 
seriously undermined. Taking advantage of their positions 
and power at that time and resorting to every possible 
means, overt and covert, by pen and by gun, the Lin Biao 
and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques framed and 
persecuted state leaders and leaders of the Chinese Com-
munist Party and the democratic parties in a premeditat-
ed way, conspired to overthrow the government and sab-
otage the army, suppressed and persecuted large numbers 
of cadres, intellectuals and ordinary people from various 
social strata, poisoned the minds of large numbers of 
young people, and endangered the life and property and 
right of autonomy of the people of various national mi-
norities. The Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique 
plotted to stage an armed coup d'etat and conspired to 
assassinate Chairman Mao Zedong. The Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary clique plotted to stage an armed 
rebellion in Shanghai. The criminal activities of the Lin 
Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques lasted 
for a whole decade, bringing calamities to all fields of 
work and all regions across the country, subjecting the 
system of the people's democratic dictatorship and so-
cialist public order in our country to extraordinarily grave 
danger, inflicting very great damage upon the national 
economy and all other undertakings, and causing enor-
mous disasters to the people of all nationalities in the 
country. 
1'ne acts of the principal culprits in the case of the Lin 
Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, which 
endangered the state and society, constitute criminal of-
fences both under the laws and decrees then in force and 
under the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China 























this court is to hear the criminal offences committed bv 
the principal culprits in the case of the Lin Biao and 
Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques and pursue their 
criminal liability, in strict accordance with the Criminal 
Law of the People's Republic of China. This court does 
not handle other problems of the defendants that do not 
fall into the category of criminal offences. 
Criminal Offences by the Principal 
Culprits of the Lin-Jiang Cliques 
The offences committed by the principal culprits in 
the case of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolu-
tionary cliques are as follows: 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing c::untcr-rcvcl.ut~vhary 
cliques plotted to subvert the government and overthrow 
the people's democratic dictatorship in China. While 
formulating the policy for seizing Party and state leader-
ship, Lin Biao said on January 23, 1967: "All power, be it 
at the top, middle or lower levels, should be seized. In 
some cases, this should be done soon, in others later. . . . 
This may be done at the top or lower levels, or done in 
co-ordination at both levels." Zhang Chunqiao said on 
January 22: "We must seize power everywhere." From 
1967 to 1975, Zhang Chunqiao declared on many occasions 
that "the 'great cultural revolution' " meant "a change of 
dynasty." Although the above-mentioned counter-revolu-
tionary aim of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-rev-
olutionary cliques could not entirely succeed owing to 
resistance from the Party, ih~ gov~rnment and the people, 
they did succeed over a fairly long period of time in 
seriously disrupting government institutions and affecting 
their work, seriously undermining the people's public 
security organs. the people's procuratorates and the peo-
ple's courts. They controlled leadership in the depart-
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ments o! organization and propaganda under the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China, and the 
departments of culture, education, health, and nationali-
ties affairs under the State Council, seized leadership in 
most of the provinces, autonomous regions and munici-
palities directly under the central government, and for 
a time "smashed" the General Political Department of the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army and seized part of the 
leadership in some military institutions. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques worked hand in glove in scheming to frame and 
persecute Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's Republic 
of China. In August of 1966, Lin Biao asked Ye Qun to 
dictate to Lei Yingfu, deputy director of the Operations 
Department of the Headquarters of the P.L.A. General 
Staff, material containing false charges they had fabricat-
ed against Liu Shaoqi, and they instructed Lei Yingfu to 
put these charges in writing. In December of the same 
year, Zhang Chunqiao privately summoned Kuai Dafu, 
a student at Qinghua University, and instigated him to 
organize a demonstration and agitate first of all in society 
at large for "overthrowing Liu Shaoqi." In July of 1967, 
Jiang Qing, in collusion with Kang Sheng and Chen Boda, 
decided to have Liu Shaoqi persecuted physically, depriv-
ing him of his freedom of action ever since. Beginning 
from May of 1967, Jiang Qing assumed direct control of 
the "group for inquiring into the special case of Liu 
Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei" and, in collusion with Kang 
Sheng and Xie Fuzhi; directed the group to extort con-
fessions from people arrested and imprisoned and rig up 
false evidence vilifying Liu Shaoqi as a "renegade, .. 
"enemy agent" and "counter-revolutionary." In 1967, in 
order to fabricate false evidence against Liu Shaoqi, Jiang 
Qing made the decision to arrest and imprison Yang Yi-
chen, Deputy Governor of Hebei Province (formerly a 


























churia provincial committee), Yang Chengzuo, a professor 
at the China People's Unive1sity (formerly a p1·ofessor at 
the Catholic University in Beijing and Wang Guangmei's 
teacher); Wang Guangen, a citizen of Tianjin (formerly 
assistant manager of the Fengtian Cotton Mill); Hao Miao, 
Liu Shaoqi's cook, and seven others. When Yang Cheng-
zuo was critically ill, Jiang Qing said to members of the 
special case group: "Step up the interrogation to squeeze 
.out of him what we need before he dies." AJ; "' result of 
this decision made by Jiang Qing, Yang Chengzuo was 
hounded to death. The special case group under her 
control also persecuted Wang Guangen to death. In collu-
sion with Xie Fuzhi, Jiang Qing ordered people to extort 
confessions repeatedly from Zhang Zhongyi, a professor at 
the Hebei Beijing Normal College (formerly a professor 
at the Catholic University in Beijing. and Wang Guang-
mei's teacher), who was critically ill, so that he died 
barely two hours after an interrogation to extort con-
fessions from him. In order to rig up false evidence and 
frame Liu Shaoqi as a "renegade," Jiang Qing, along with 
Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi and others, ordered the special 
case group to extort confessions from Ding Juequn, who 
worked with Liu Shaoqi in the workers' movement in Wu-
han in 1927, and Meng Yongqian, who w~ o.rrcsted at 
the same time as Liu Shaoqi in Shenyang in 1929. As a 
result of the framing by Jiang Qing and others, Liu Shao-
qi was imprisoned and persecuted to death. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques framed and persecuted other Party and state 
leaders. In July of 1967, Qi Benyu, a member of the 
"cultural revolution group under tht> C PC. ~~>ntr11l. Com-
mittee," with the approval of Kang Sheng, instigated Han 
Aijing, a student at the Beijing Aeronautical Engineering 
Institute, to subject Peng Dehuai, a Member of the Politi-
cal But"t>:lU of the C.P.C. Central Committee, to physical 
persecution. As a result, Peng Dehuai was severely 
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wounded with several ribs fractured. On November 3, 
1970, Huang Yongsheng agreed to the proposal raised by 
the group in charge of the special case of Pcng Dehuai, 
that Peng Dehuai be "sentenced to life imprisonment and 
deprived of civil rights for life," in order to continue per-
secuting him. Peng Dehuai was later tormented to death 
because of the framing and persecution by the Lin Biao 
and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques. In July of 
1966, Kang Sheng falsely charged He Long, Vice-Premier 
and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the 
C.P.C. Centrhl Committee, with "deploying troops to stage 
a February mutiny" in Beijing. In August of the same 
year, Lin Biao instructed Wu Faxian to fabricate charges 
against He Long. In April of 1968, Li Zuopeng and others 
falsely charged He Long and others with "usurping army 
.leadership and opposing the Party." Framed by Lin Biao, 
Kang Sheng and others, He Long was imprisoned and 
tormented to death. On June 23, 1967, Huang Yong-
sheng approved the "report for instruction on investiga-
tion for the purpose of rounding up renegades," which 
was submitted by the head of the military control com-
mission stationed in the Guangzhou Municipal Public 
Security Bureau, and its appendix, "plan for investiga-
tion, No. 1," in a scheme to frame Ye Jianying, Vice-
Chairman of the Military Commission of the C.P.C. Central 
Committee, as a "renegade." In June of 1968, Huang 
Yongsheng turned over to Ye Qun the materials charging 
Ye Jianying with "plotting a counter-revolutionary coup." 
In August of 1968, Huang Yongsheng and Wu Faxian 
fabricated facts and framed Luo Ruiqing, Vice-Premier of 
the C~::.te Council, as a "counter-revolutionary who has 
committed heinous crimes." From late 1966 to 1968, Chen 
Boda on quite a few occasions framed Lu Dingyi, Vice-
Premier of the State Council, as an "active counter-
revolutionary," "renegade" and "hidden traitor," and 




















On July 21, 1968, Jiang Qing and Kang Sheng drew 
up a list of names, aimi.'lg 11t frami.I'~ Memb"rs of tht.? 
Eighth C.P.C. Central. Committee. In August of the same 
year, Kang Sheng again drew up lists of names aimed at 
framing Members of the Standing Committee of the Third 
National People's Congress and Standing Committee 
Members of the Fourth National Committee of the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference. In December 
of the same year, Xie Fuzhi rigged up the case of a "Chi-
nese communist party (Marxist-Leninist)" with still an-
other list of names. On these four lists, 103 Members 
and Alternate Members of the Eighth C.P.C. Central 
Committee, 52 Members of the Third N.P.C. Standing 
Committee and 76 Standing Committee Members of the 
Fourth C.P.P.C.C. National Committee were labelled 
"enemy agents," "renegades," "elements having illicit re-
lations with foreign countries," "counter-revolutionaries," 
"suspected renegades" or "suspected enemy agents." The 
people framed were subsequently persecuted. They in-
cluded the Chairman and seven Vice-Chairmen of the 
N.P.C. Standing Committee, 12 Vice-Premiers of the State 
Council, 22 Members and Alternate Members of the ~oliti­
cal Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee, the General 
Secretary and 13 Members and Alternate Members of the 
Secretariat of the C.P.C. Central Committee, six Vice-
Chairmen of the Military Commission of the C.P.C. Central 
Committee, and 11 leading members of various demo-
cratic parties. From 1966 to 1970, Jiang Qing at various 
meetings named 24 Members and Alternate Members of 
the Eighth C.P.C. Central Committee and hurled false 
charges at them, so that they were persecuted one after 
another. After Jiang Qing named and made false accusa-
tions against Zhang Linzhi, Minister of the Coal Industry, 
he was illegally incarcerated and subsequently died of 
serious injuries !rom beating. 
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The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques framed and persecuted large numbers of officers 
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army in an attempt to 
put it under their complete control. On July 25, 1967, 
Lin Biao called for the "thorough smashing of the P.L.A. 
General Political Department." Huang Yongsheng, Wu 
Faxian, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo respectively framed 
and persecuted large numbers of officers in the Head-
quarters of the General Staff, the General Political De-
partment, the General Logistics Department, the Air Force 
and the Navy of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques cooked up so many false cases in the Chinese 
People's Liberation Army that over 80,000 people were 
framed and persecuted, of whom 1,169 died under per-
secution. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques framed and persecuted Party and government 
leaders at various levels in an attempt to seize depart-
mental and regional leadership that they had not yet got 
hold of. In January of 1968, Kang Sheng and others 
framed cadres in the Organization Department of the 
C.P.C. Central Committee and directly controlled leader-
ship in that department. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary cliques framed and persecuted large 
numbers of cadres and people's policemen in people's 
public security organs, people's procuratorates and peo-
ple's courts at various levels, of whom 1,565 were hound-
ed to death. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-
revolutionary cliques framed and persecuted large num-
bers c! cadres in various provinces, autonomous regions 
and municipalities directly under the central government. 
Under the instruction and instigation of Kang Sheng, Xie 
Fuzhi and others, leadership of Beijing municipality was 
seized and 13 of its leading cadres were framed and per-





















ipal Party committee, and Vice-Mayors Wu Han and Yue 
Songsheng, were persecuted to death. Leadership of 
Shanghai municipality was seized and 12 of its leading 
cadres were framed and persecuted as a result of the 
instruction and instigation of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao 
Wenyuan. Mayor Cao Diqiu and Vice-Mayor Jin Zhong-
hua died from persecution. In 1967 and 1968, Zhang 
Chunqiao directly manipulated and ordered the "You 
Xuetao group" in Shanghai to undertake sucn special 
tasks of espionage as tailing, shadowing, kidnapping, ran-
sacking people's homes, taking people into custody, ex-
torting confessions by torture, and fabricating intelligence. 
The group trumped up false cases, framed and persecuted 
cadres and ordinary people, and falsely charged leading 
cadres in east China with "organizing an underground 
armed detachment south of the Ch<~ngji::mg (Y::1"~tze) 
River" and "plotting a mutiny." 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques created large numbers of false cases, incited beat-
ing, smashing and looting throughout the country, and 
persecuted large numbers of cadres and ordinary people. 
In 1967, Kang Sheng and others trumped up the case of a 
"Xinjiang renegade clique." In 1967 and 1968, Huang 
Yongsheng and company concocted, one after another, 
the case of a "Guangdong underground Party organiza-
tion" and that of a "counter-revolutionary clique" in the 
P.L.A. Guangzhou Units. Under Chen Boda's instigation, 
a false case in eastern Hebei Province brought serious 
consequences with a large number of cadres and ordinary 
people persecuted in 1967. Kang Sheng anti Xie Fuzhi 
rigged up the case vi ''o::no::m:t <:<geul Zhau J:anmin" in 
Yunnan in 1968. In the same year, because of the agita-
tion of Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, the false case of an 
"Inner Mongolian people's revolutionary party" entailed 
disastrous consequences, with large numbers of cadres 
and ordinary people persecuted or hounded to death or 
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disability. Between 1967 and 1969, the case of a ''countet· 
revolutionary 'northeast gang' that betrayed the Party and 
capitulated to the enemy" was trumped up under the 
agitation of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolu-
tionary cliques. In October of 1966, Jiang Qing colla-
borated with Ye Qun in ordering Jiang Tengjiao to carry 
out an unlawful search in Shanghai of the homes of Zheng 
Junli, Zhao Dan, Gu Eryi, Tong Zhiling and Chen Liting, 
who were later persecuted physically. False cases con-
cocted under the instruction and instigation of the Lin 
Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques led to 
the framing and persecution of large numbers of cadres 
and ordinary members of Communist Party, government 
and army organs at various levels and various democratic 
parties and people's organizations, cadres and other peo-
ple in various circles and returned overseas Chinese. 
Among those well-known figures in various circles who 
were persecuted to death were: noted writers and artists 
including Lao She, Zhao Shull, Zhou Xinfang, Gai Jiao-
tian, Pan Tianshou, Ying Yunwei, Zheng Junli and Sun 
Weishi; noted professors including Xiong Qinglai, Jian 
Bozan, He Sijing, Wang Shourong, Gu Yuzhen, Li G~ang­
tian, Rao Yutai, Liu Pansui and Ma Te; noted scientists 
including Zhao Jiuzhang, Ye Zhupei, Zhang Zongsui, Liu 
Chongle, Chen Huanyong and Zhou Ren; famous medical 
specialists including Hu Zhengxiang, Zhang Changshao, 
Ji Suhua, Lu Shouyan, Ye Xichun and Li Zhongren; out-
standing sports coaches including Fu Qifang, Rong Guo-
tuan and Jiang Yongning; well-known model workers 
inch.;d!ng Meng Tai and Shi Chuanxiang; and well-known 
figures in overseas Chinese affairs including Fang Fang, 
Xu Li, Huang Jie, Chen Xujing, Huang Qinshu and Chen 
Manyun. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolu-
tionary cliques seriously disrupted national unity and had 























minority nationalities cruelly persecuted. As a result, 
Jiyatai and others were pe•;;.:cuteci to death. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques instigated large-scale incidents of violence among 
mass organizations throughout the country, attempting 
thus to seize power and cruelly suppress the people. At 
the instigation of Zhang Chunqiao, an armed clash, known 
as the Kangping Road Incident, was triggered in Shang-
hai on December 28, 1966, resulting in 91 injured and 
setting a vile precedent for seizing power by instigating 
violent incidents throughout the country. With the sup-
port of Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, Wang Xiao-
yu, then chairman of the Shandong Provincial Revolu-
tionary Committee, engineered in May of 1967 a violent 
incident in the compound of the provincial revolutionary 
committee in Ji'nan, resulting in 388 persons arrested and 
imprisoned. On Auuust 4 of the sam!! year, Wang Hong-
wen organized and dit·ectcd people to sutTound and attack 
the Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant,- resulting in 650 people 
imprisoned, injured or maimed. 
The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques each plotted to seize supreme Party and state 
power for itself. While they formed an alliance, their 
sharp contradictions remained. In 1969, Lir. Biao was 
designated successor to Chairman Mao Zedong. In 1970, 
Lin Biao realized that the forces of Jiang Qing, Zhang 
Chunqiao and company were growing in such a manner 
as to surpass his own, so he plotted to "take over" the 
leadership ahead of schedule. While well aware that 
Jiang Qing could never succeed in her ambitions, Lin Biao 
knew that it was impossible for Chairman Mao ZP.dong 
to support his "takeover" in advance. Therefore, in 
September of 1971, the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary 
clique decided to cast off its mask and stage an armed 
coup and assassinate Chairman Mao Zedong. As early as 
October of 1969, Wu Faxian, commander of the Air Force, 
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turned over to Lin Liguo all power to place the Air Force 
under his command and at his disposal. In October of 
1970, Lin Liguo organized a secret backbone force for the 
armed coup,. which he named the "joint fleet." In March 
of 1971, Lin Liguo, Zhou Yuchi and others mapped out in 
Shanghai a plan for the armed coup, which they named 
Outline of "Project 571." In line with the plan for 
establishing a "command team" as described in the Out-
line, Lin Liguo summoned Jiang Tengjiao and Wang 
Weiguo, political commissar of the P.L.A. Unit 7341, Chen 
Liyun, political commissar of the P.L.A. Unit 7350, and 
Zhou Jianping, deputy commander of the Air Force of the 
P.L.A. Nanjing Units, to a secret meeting in Shanghai on 
March 31, at which Jiang Tengjiao was put in charge of 
liaison between the three places of Nanjing, Shanghai 
and Hangzhou with a view to co-ordination and concerted 
operation. On September 5 and 6 of the same year, after 
receiving secret reports first from Zhou Yuchi and then 
from Huang Yongsheng about Chairman Mao Zedong's 
talks which showed that he was aware of Lin Biao's 
scheme to seize power, Lin Biao and Ye Qun decided to 
take action to assassinate Chairman Mao Zedong on his 
inspection tour and stage an armed coup. On September 
8, Lin Biao issued the following hand-written order for 
the armed coup: "Expect you to act according to the order 
transmitted by Comrades Liguo and Yuchi." Lin Liguo 
and Zhou Yuchi then gave detailed assignments to Jiang 
Tengjiao and Wang Fei, deputy chief-of-staff of the Air 
Force Headquarters, and other key members of the "joint 
fleet." While the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique 
was plotting intensively for the armed coup, Chairman 
Mao Zedong, having been alerted by their plot, suddenly 
changed his itinerary and safely returned to Beijing on 
September 12. 
Aiter the failure of their plan for the assassination, Lin 























Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng and Qiu Huizuo to 
Guangzhou, the base where he was prepared to stage the 
armed coup, in an attempt to set up a separate central 
government there and split the state. At Lin Biao's order, 
Hu Ping, deputy chief-of-staff of the Air Force Head-
quarters, had eight planes ready for the flight south to 
Guangzhou. On September 12, he secretly dispatched the 
special plane, No. 256, to Shanhaiguan for the use of Lin 
Biao, Ye Qun and Lin Liguo, who were then in Beidaihe. 
At a few minutes past 10 o'clock that evening, Premier 
Zhou Enlai inquired about the unexpected dispatch of the 
special plane, No. 256, to Shanhaiguan and ordered that 
it be brought back to Beijing at once. Hu Ping lied, say-
ing that the special plane, No. 256, had gone to Shan-
haiguan on a training flight and had developed engine 
trouble, refusing to carry out the order for brin~;.~g it 
back to Beijing. Meanwhile, he reported to Zhou Yuchi 
that the Premier had inquired about the movement of the 
plane. Zhou Yuchi in turn reported this to Lin Liguo. 
While issuing directives to those in charge of the Navy 
Aviation Corps' Shanhaiguan Airport, first at 23:35 hours 
on September 12 and then at 00:06 hours on September 
13, Li Zuopeng distorted Premier Zhou Enlai's directive 
that the special plane, No. 256, "Cannot take off without 
a joint order from four persons," namely, Zhou Enlai, 
Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian and Li Zuopeng, saying, 
"The plane must not be allowed to take off unless one of 
the four leading officials gives the order." At 00:20 hours 
on September 13, when Pan Hao, director of the Navy 
Aviation Corps' Shanhaiguan Airport, who had discover-
ed the abnormal silu;,.l~vu .,t t!1t! timt!, phoned Li Zuopeng, 
asking what they should do if the plane were to· take off 
forcibly, Li Zuopeng still did not take any measure to 
prevent the plane from taking off, thus enabling Lin Biao, 
Ye Qun and Lin Liguo to defect by the special plane, No. 
256. Learning that Premier Zhou Enlai had inquired about 
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the special plane's flight to Shanhaiguan, Lin Biao decid-
ed it was impossible to carry out the plan of fleeing south 
to Guangzhou and setting up a separate government there. 
So they boarded the plane and took off forcibly at 00:32 
hours on September 13 to flee abroad in defection. The 
plane crashed on the way, killing all those aboard. 
After learning about Lin Biao's defection, Zhou Yuchi 
and others seized the helicopter, No. 3685, in Beijing and 
took off at 03:15 hours on September 13 to flee the 
country, but the helicopter was forced to land. Large 
amounts of confidential state documents stolen by the Lin 
Biao counter-revolutionary clique and its plans for an 
armed coup were captured from the helicopter. 
After Lin Biao and others died on their flight abroad, 
the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique, in an at-
tempt to seize Party and state leadership, carried on crim-
inal activities to frame and persecute leading members 
at various levels. From 1974 to 1976, the Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary clique instructed writing groups 
such as "Liang Xiao," "Chi Heng" and "Luo Siding" to 
carry out counter-revolutionary agitation for vilifying 
leading cadres at various levels who had just returned to 
their posts as "having turned from bourgeois democrats 
to capitalist-readers," thus becoming targets of their so-
called continued revolution. In 1976, Jiang Qing, Zhang 
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen created 
new disturbances throughout the country and framed and 
persecuted large numbers of leading cadres with the 
ultimate objective of subverting the government. In March 
Jian[! C2ing, in a talk with leading members from 12 prov-
inces and autonomous regions, named a number of lead-
ing cadres at central and local levels and hurled false 
charges at them. In the same year, Zhang Chunqiao 
instigated Ma Tianshui and Xu Jingxian, vice-chairmen 
of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, to 






















in Shanghai and vilify leading cadres who had resumed 
work as "turning from bourgeois democrats to capitalist-
roaders." In the same year, Wang Hongwen and Yao 
Wenyuan ordered Lu Ying, editor-in-chief of Renmin 
Ribao (People's Daily), to dispatch people to some depart-
ments of the State Council and some provinces to cook 
up materials according to their intentions for framing 
veteran cadres who had resumed work as "having organiz-
ed landlords' restitution corps" and "trying to. reverse 
correct verdicts and stage a comeback." They used the 
materials to justify their seizure of power from those 
departments and regions which were not yet under their 
control. From March to May of 1976, the Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary clique made up stories, slandering 
ordinary people in Nanjing, Beijing and other places who 
honoured the memory of Premier Zb,.,u 'Eril.ai a~ "c~·.::-lter­
revolutionaries." The clique also vilified Vice-Premier 
Deng Xiaoping as "the chief boss behind the counter-
revolutionary political incident" at Tian An Men Square 
and agitated for large-scale suppression and persecution of 
cadres and ordinary people. 
Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen, principal culprits 
in the case of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique, 
made Shanghai their base for building and expanding a 
"militia force" under their direct control. As early as 
August of 1967, a report cleared by Zhang Chunqiao, en-
titled "plans of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee for setting up the 'verbal attack and armed 
defence' headquarters," called for "using the gun to pro-
tect revolution made with the pen" and for vigorously 
building up armeci. ro,·ce!. .;.nce.r their controL From 1973 
to 1976, Wang Hongwen said on many occasions to Ma 
Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen, key members 
of the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique in Shang-
hai, that "the army must not be allowed to lead the 
militia," that "il.'s Chunqiao and me who organized the 
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people's militia in Shanghai," that "you must run it well 
for me," that "what worries me most is that the army is 
not in our hands," and that "we must be prepared for 
guerrilla warfare," urging them to step up the expansion 
of the "militia force." The Jiang Qing counter-revolu-
tionary clique planned to use this armed force which they 
regarded as their own to engineer an armed rebellion in 
Shanghai. In August of 1976, Ding Sheng, a remaining 
confederate of the Lin Biao clique who had thrown his 
lot with the Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary clique and 
commander of the P.L.A. Nanjing Units· at the time, 
arrived in Shanghai. He told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian 
and Wang Xiuzhen, "My biggest wgrry is Unit 6453" 
stationed near Shanghai, that "I have no control over it" 
and that "you must be prepared for any eventuality." 
Ma Tianshui then made a decision and 74,220 rifles, 300 
artillery pieces and more than 10 million rounds of 
ammunition were issued from a munitions depot under 
their control to the "militia." On September 21, after 
being briefed in Beijing by Xu Jingxian about Ding 
Sheng's talk and about the hand-out of weapons to the 
"militia," Zhang Chunqiao said to Xu Jingxian: "Keep 
your eyes open for new trends in the class struggle." On 
September 23, Wang Hongwen made a telephone call to· 
Wang Xiuzhen, saying: "Be on your guard, for the 
struggle isn't over yet. The bourgeoisie· inside the Party 
will not be reconciled to defeat." On October 8, after 
learning that Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan 
and Wang Hangwen had been taken into custody, Xu 
Jingxian, Wang Xiuzhen and others decided to stage an 
armec! ,.~bellion. The command teams they had organb:ed 
for the armed rebellion then moved into their command 
posts, and 15 transmitter-receivers were installed to link 
them up by telecommunicctions. They also assembled 
and deployed 33,500 "militiamen." On October 9, Shi 























headquarters, ordered that the "militia" be concentrated 
with over 27,000 guns and artillery pieces of various types. 
On October 12, Zhong Dingdong, another member in 
charge of the Shanghai militia headquarters, drew up two 
specific operation plans, code named "Han No. 1" and 
"Fang No. 2." On the evening of the same day, Wang 
Shaoyong, vice-chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Rev-
olutionary Committee, Zhu Yongjia, leading member of 
the Shanghai writing group, Chen Ada, leadi,-.g member 
of the industrial and communication group of the Shang-
hai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and others met 
to plan production stoppages, strikes, parades and demon-
strations. They put forward the counter-revolutionary 
slogans "Return Jiang Qing to us," "Return Chunqiao to 
us," "Return Wenyuan to us~' and "Return Hongwen to 
us,'' readying themselves for "a life-and-death stru~r~?;le." 
Thanks to the powerful measures adopted by the Party 
Central Committee and the struggle waged by the people 
of Shanghai, their scheme for an armed coup failed to 
materialize. 
This court has held a total of 42 sessions for investiga-
tion and debate, during which 49 witnesses and victims 
appeared in court to testify, and 873 pieces of evidence 
were examined. The above-mentioned offences committed 
by the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary 
cliques have been verified by great amounts of material 
and documentary evidence, conclusions of expert corrob-
oration, testimonies of witnesses and statements of 
victims. The facts are clear and the evidence conclusive. 
Criminal Liability of the Ten 
Principal Culprits 
Since Lin Biao, Kang Sheng, Xic Fuzhi, Ye Qun, Lin 
Liguo and Zhou Yuchi, who were among the 16 principal 
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culprits in the case of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing 
counter-revolutionary cliques, are dead, the Special Proc-
uratorate Under the Supreme People's Procuratorate has 
decided not to pursue their criminal liability, in accord-
ance with Article 11 of the Law of Criminal Procedure 
of the People's Republic of China. The Special Proc-
uratorate also decides that except Jiang Qing and the 
other nine principal culprits, the other defendants in the 
case will be dealt with separately according to law. 
Following are the offences committed by Jiang Qing, 
Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen, Chen 
Boda, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu 
Huizuo and Jiang Tengjiao, for which they should be held 
criminally liable as confirmed by this court: 
(1) The defendant, Jiang Qing, who acted as a ring-
leader in organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary 
clique for the purpose of overthrowing the people's 
democratic dictatorship, was a principal culprit in the case 
of the counter-revolutionary clique. Jiang Qing framed 
and persecuted Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the People's 
Republic of China. Working in collaboration with Kang 
Sheng and Chen Boda, she decided in July of 1967 to 
have Liu Shaoqi persecuted physically and hence deprived 
of the freedom of action. From May of 1967, Jiang Qing 
assumed direct control of the "group for inquiring into 
the special case of Liu Shaoqi and Wang Guangmei" and, 
in collusion with Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, ordered the 
group to extort confessions from those arrested and put 
in custody, concoct false evidence and frame Liu Shaoqi 
as a "renegade," "enemy agent" and "counter-revolu-
tionary:' In order to rig up false evidence and persecute 
Liu Shaoqi, Jiang Qing made the decision in 1967 to arrest 
and imprison Yang Yichen, Yang Chengzuo, Wang Guang-
en, Hao Miao and seven others. When Yang Chengzuo 
was critically ill, Jiang Qing decided to "step up the 



















persecuted to death. The special case group under Jiang 
Qing's direction also had Wang Guangen persecuted to 
death. In collusion with Xie Fuzhi, Jiang Qing ordered 
that repeated actions be taken to extort confessions from 
Zhang Zhongyi who was critically ill. As a result, he 
died just two hours after an interrogation. In collabora-
tion with Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi and others, Jiang Qing 
instructed the special case group to extract confessions 
from Ding Juequn and Meng Yongqian and rig up false 
evidence for framing Liu Shaoqi as a "renegade." As 
a result of the false charges made by Jiang Qing and 
others, Liu Shaoqi was imprisoned and persecuted to 
death. 
On July 21, 1968, Jiang Qing worked hand in glove 
with Kang Sheng in cooking up such false charges as 
"renegade," "enemy agent" or "element having illicit 
relations with foreign countries" against 88 Members and 
Alternate Members of the Eighth Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China. 
From 1966 to 1970, Jiang Qing named 24 Members and 
Alternate Members of the Eighth C.P.C. Central Com-
mittee and hurled false charges at them at various 
meetings. As a result, they were persecuted one after 
another. 
On December 14, 1966, Jiang Qing attacked. Zhang 
Linzhi (Minister of the Coal Industry- Ed.) by name 
on false charges. As a result, Zhang Linzhi was illegally 
incarcerated and beaten up, and he later died from serious 
wounds. On December 27 of the same year, Jiang Qing 
smeared Shi Chuanxiang, a national model worker and 
a night-soil collecto1 lu Ddjin;s, :::; a "scci'b." Shi Chuan-
xiang thus suffered serious maltreatment and later died 
from torment. 
In October of 1966, Jiang Qing collaborated with Ye 
Qun in ordering Jiang Tengjiao to search and ransack the 
homes or Zhcng Junli and four other persons in Shanghai, 
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which was against the law. As a result, they were per-
secuted physically. 
In 1976, Jiang Qing worked hand in glove with Zhang 
Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen to create 
new disturbances across the country. In a talk to leading 
members of 12 provinces and autonomous regions in 
March of the same year, Jiang Qing attacked a number 
of central and local leading cadres by name on false 
charges. 
Jiang Qing was a ringleader of the Lin Biao and Jiang 
Qing counter-revolutionary cliques. She bore direct or 
indirect responsibilities for all the offences, committed 
during the decade of turmoil by the counter-revolutionary 
clique she organized and led, of endangering the People's 
Republic of China, working to overthrow the government 
and tyrannizing the people. 
The defendant, Jiang Qing, has been found guilty of 
organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique 
as provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of China, of plotting to overthrow the 
government as provided in Article 92, of conducting prop-
aganda and agitation for counter-revolutionary purposes 
as provided in Article 102, and of framing and persecuting 
people as provided in Article 138. She caused particularly 
grave harm to the state and the people in a particularly 
flagrant way. 
(2) The defendant, Zhang Chunqiao, who collaoorated 
with Jiang Qing in organizing and leading a counter-
revolutionary clique for the purpose or overthrowing the 
pcOii!"'s democratic dictatorship, was a principal culprit 
in the case of the counter-revolutionary clique. As the 
initiator and an all-time instigator and plotter in seizing 
power from the people's democratic political power during 
the decade of turmoil, he caused extremely grave harm to 























In January of 1967, Zhang Chunqiao said: "We must 
seize power everywhere." t"rom 1967 to 11i75, he said 
on many occasions that "the great cultural revolution" 
meant "a change of dynasty." He worked hand in glove 
with Jiang Qing in leading their counter-revolutionary 
clique in a great deal of activities aimed at usurping Party 
and state leadership. 
In order to seize leadership of Shanghai municipality, 
Zhang Chunqiao triggered off an armed clash in Shanghai 
on December 28, 1966, known as the Kangping Road In-
cident, which resulted in 91 injured. In May of 1967, he 
supported Wang Xiaoyu to engineer a violent incident in 
Jinan, which resulted in 388 persons arrested and 
imprisoned. 
In December of 1966, Zhang Chunqiao summoned Kuai 
Dafu alone and instructed him to organize a demonstra-
tion and agitate for "overthrowing Liu Shaoqi" ior the 
first time in society at large. 
Leadership of Shanghai municipality was seized under 
Zhang Chunqiao's instruction and instigation. Twelve 
leading cadres of the municipality were labelled "ren-
egades," "enemy agents" or "counter-revolutionaries." 
Cao Diqiu and Jin Zhonghua were persecuted to death. 
Controlled and directed by Zhang Chunqiao, the "You 
Xuetao group" carried out special tasks of espionage, 
trumped up cases to persecute cadres and other people, 
and falsely charged leading cadres in east China with 
"organizing an underground armed detachment south of 
the Changjiang (Yangtze) River" and "plotting a mutiny." 
In 1976, Zhang Chunqiao collaborated with Jiang Qing, 
Yao Wenyuan a;:;.::! W::.:::g H"nt;wc:: ::: crca~ing ne,·: 
disturbances across the country. In March of the same 
year, Zhang Chunqiao instructed Ma Tianshui and Xu 
Jingxian to smear, at a mass meeting of 10,000 people 
in Shanghai, those leading cadres who had resumed work 
as having turned "from bourgeois democrats into cap-
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italist-roaders" and become targets of what they called 
continued revolution. 
Zhang Chunqiao, in collusion with Wang Hongwen and 
others, made Shanghai their base for building up a 
"militia force" under their direct control, and plotted an 
armed rebellion there. 
The defendant, Zhang Chunqiao, has been found guilty 
of organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique 
as provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the 
People's Republic of China, of scheming to overthrow 
the government as provided in Article 92, of plotting an 
armed rebellion as provided in Article 93, of conducting 
propaganda and agitation for counter-revolutionary pur-
poses as provided in Article 102, and of framing and 
persecuting people as provided in Article 138. He caused 
particularly grave harm to the state and the people in a 
particularly flagrant way. 
(3) The defendant, Yao Wenyuan, who organized aJ!d 
led a counter-revolutionary clique for the purpose of 
overthrowing the people's democratic dictatorship, was a 
principal culprit in the case of the counter-revolutionary 
·clique. He took an active part in Jiang Qing's activities 
to seize supreme power. 
Yao Wenyuan directly controlled the mass media and 
conducted propaganda and agitation for counter-revolu-
tionary ends over a long period. From 1974 to 1976, he 
instructed writing groups including "Liang Xiao," "Chi 
Heng" and "Luo Siding" to vilify leading cadres at various 
levels who had resumed work, accusing them of having 
turned "from bourgeois democrats into capitalist-readers" 
and bcome targets of the so-called continued revolution, 
thus agitating for framing and persecuting them. 
In 1967, Yao Wenyuan took an active part in seizing 
leadership of Shanghai municipality. He joined in framing 
leading cadres of the municipality including Cao Diqiu. 






















Xiaoyu's plan to engineer a violent incident in Jinan in 
May of 1967. 
In 1976, Yao Wenyuan collaborated with Jiang Qing, 
Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen in creating new 
disturbances across the country. From January to 
September of the same year, he instructed Lu Ying to 
dispatch people to some departments of the State Council 
and some provinces to. fabricate materials according to 
their intentions so as to frame those leading r.adres who 
had resumed work. From March to May of the same 
year, Yao Wenyuan, by trumping up charges, smeared 
people in Nanjing, Beijing and other places who mourned 
the death of Premier Zhou Enlai as ·~counter-revolutiona­
ries," falsely charged Deng Xiaoping with being the 
"chief boss behind the counter-revolutionary political 
incident" at Tian An Men Square, and agitated for sup-
pressing and persecuting large numbers of cadres and 
ordinary people. 
The defendant, Yao Wenyuan, has been found guilty 
of organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique 
as provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, of plotting to overthrow the 
government as provided in Article 92, of conducting prop-
l,lganda and agitation for counter-revolutivi1arJi t:nds as 
provided in Article 102, and of framing and persecuting 
people as provided in Article 138. 
(4) The defendant, Wang Hongwen, who organized and 
led a counter-revolutionary clique for the purpose of 
overthrowing the people's democratic dictatorship, was 
a principal culprit in the case of the counter-revolutionary 
clique. He took an active> part in Jiane Qing's activitil'~ 
to seize supreme power. 
On December 28, 1966, Wang Hongwen participated in 
triggering off the Kangping Road Incident of violence, 
which resulted in 91 injured. On August 4, 1967, he 
organized and directed people to surround and attack the 
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Shanghai Diesel Engine Plant, and 650 people were 
imprisoned, wounded or maimed. 
In 1976, Wang Hongwen collaborated with Jiang Qing,, 
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan in creating new 
disturbances across the country. He instructed Lu Ying 
to dispatch people to a number of provinces to fabricate 
materials according to their intentions for framing leading 
cadres who had resumed work. 
Working in collusion with Zhang Chunqiao, Wang 
Hongwen made Shanghai their base for building up a 
"militia force" under their direct control. He instructed 
Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen time and 
again to step up the expansion of the "militia force," and 
plotted an armed rebellion in Shanghai. 
The defendant, Wang Hongwen, has been found guilty 
of organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique 
as provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, of conspiring to overthrow the 
government as provided in Article 92, of instigating an 
armed rebellion as provided in Article 93, of causing in-
jury to people for counter-revolutionary purposes as 
provided in Article 101, and of framing and persecuting 
people as provided in Article 138. 
(5) The defendant, Chen Boda, who played an active 
part in a counter-revolutionary clique for the purpose of 
overthrowing the people's democratic dictatorship, was a 
principal culprit in the case of the counter-revolutionary 
clique. He took an active part in the activities of Lin Biao 
and Jiang Qing to seize supreme power. 
Chen Boda controlled the mass media and cond,ucted 
propaganda and agitation for counter-revolutionary pur-
poses. In 1966, he raised such slogans as "sweep away 
all· monsters and demons" and whipped up extensive 
framing and persecution of cadres and ordinary people. 
In July of 1967, Chen Boda collaborated with Jiang 























persecuted physically and deprived of his freedom of 
action ever since. 
From late 1966 to 1968, Chen Boda on quite a few 
occasions smeared Lu Dingyi, Vice-Premier of the State 
Council, as an "active counter-revolutionary," "renegade" 
and "hidden traitor," and decided to have his health 
ruined. 
In December of 1967, Chen Boda said in Tangshan that 
the C.P.C. organization in eastern Hebei Provi:::.ce "was 
probably a party of Kuomintang-Communist co-operation, 
and in fact it might be the Kuomintang members, or 
renegades, who were playing a dominant role here." A 
case was thus trumped up at his instigation, which 
brought serious consequences, with many cadres and 
ordinary people in eastern Hebei persecuted. 
The defendant, Chen Boda, has been found guiltv of 
actively joining a counter-revolutionary clique as provid-
ed in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the People's Re-
public of China, of conspiring to overthrow the govern-
ment as provided in Article 92, of conducting propaganda 
and agitation ·for counter-revolutionary purposes as pro-
vided in Article 102, and of framing and persecuting peo-
ple as provided in Article 138. 
(6) The defendant, Huang Yongsheng, wno organized 
and led a counter-revolutionary clique for the purpose of 
overthrowing the people's democratic dictatorship, was a 
principal culprit in the case of the counter-revolutionary 
clique. He actively participated in Lin Bia·o's activities 
to seize supreme power. 
On November 3, 1970, Huang Yongsheng agreed to the 
proposal raised by t.hP e"'='11.::' in '::har;;e ~! t.h:: ~peci:ll case 
of Peng Dehuai that "Peng Dehuai be dismissed from all 
posts inside and outside the Party, expelled from the Party 
for good, sentenced to life imprisonment and deprived 
of civil rights for life." As a result, Peng Dehuai was 
subsequently persecuted. 
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In June of 1967, Huang Yongsheng approved the "report 
for instruction on investigation for the purpose of round-
ing up renegades," which was submitted by the head of 
the military control commission stationed in the Guang-
zhou Municipal Public Security Bureau, and its appendix, 
"plan for investigation, No. 1," scheming to frame Ye 
Jianying as a "renegade." In June of 1968, he turned over 
to Ye Qun materials falsely charging Ye Jianying with 
"plotting a counter-revolutionary coup." 
In 1968, Huang Yongsheng, in collaboration with Wu 
Faxian, fabricated charges against Luo Ruiqing, smearing 
him as a "counter-revolutionary who has committed 
heinous crimes." Huang Yongsheng also framed leading 
cadres in the Headquarters of the P.L.A. General Staff. 
In December of the same year, he slandered the P.L.A. 
General Political Department as "recruiting renegades" 
and took an active part in Lin Biao's criminal activities 
for the "thorough smashing of the P.L.A. General Political 
Department." 
From October of 1967 to March of 1968, Huang Yong-
sheng proposed to investigate the history of the under-
ground C.P.C. organization in Guahgdong Province before 
liberation and decided to examine the records of Wen 
Niansheng, Deputy Commander of the P.L.A. Guangzhou 
Units, and others. This gave rise to the false cases of the 
"Guangdong underground Party organization" and a 
"counter-revolutionary clique" in the P.L.A. Guangzhou 
Units. As a result, large numbers of cadres and ordinary 
people were framed and persecuted, and the Vice-
Governor of Guangdong, Lin Qiangyun, and Wen Nian-
sheng were persecuted to death. 
On September 6, 1971, Huang Yongsheng secretly 
informed Lin Biao of Chairman Mao Zedong's talks which 
showed he was aware that Lin Biao was conspiring to 



















action to assassinate Chairman Mao Zedong and engineer 
an armed coup d'etat. 
The defendant, Huang Yongsheng, has been found 
guilty of organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary 
clique as provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of 
the People's Republic of China, of conspiring to overthrow 
the government as provided in Article 92, and of framing 
and persecuting people as provided in Article 138. 
(7) The defendant, Wu Faxian, who organiz~d and led 
a counter-revolutionary clique for the purpose of over-
throwing the people's democratic dictatorship, was a prin-
cipal culprit in the case of the counter-revolutionary 
clique. He actively participated in Lin Biao's activities 
to seize supreme power. 
Receiving Lin Biao's instructions in August of 1966, 
Wu Faxian had materials prepared on September 3, 
accusing He Long of plotting to seize lcadersnip in the 
Air Force, and sent them to Lin Biao. In August of 1968, 
Wu Faxian, in collaboration with Huang Yongsheng, 
fabricated charges against Luo Ruiqing; smearing him as 
a "counter-revolutionary who has committed heinous 
crimes." 
Wu Faxian laid false charges against a w..tmber of 
leading cadres in the Air Force, ailegh1g that they 
.attempted to "seize power." He approved the detention 
and persecution of 174 cadres and rank-and-filers in the 
Air Force, among whom Gu Qian, Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force Command of the P.L.A. Nanjing Units, and Liu 
Shanben. deputy superintendant of the Air Force 
Academy, were persecuted to death. 
In October of 1969, W11 FAxian turned over to Lin Lig•Jo 
all power to place the .Air Force under his command and 
at his disposal, thus enabling him to form a "joint fleet," 
which constituted the backbone force in the plot of the 
Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique to assassinate 
Chairman Mao Zedong and stage an armed coup d'etat. 
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The defendant, Wu Faxian, has been found guilty of 
organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique as 
provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the People's 
Republic of China, of conspiring to overthrow the govern-
ment as provided in Article 92, and of persecuting people 
on false charges as provided in Article 138. 
(8) The defendant, Li Zuopeng, who o.rganized and led 
a counter-revolutionary clique for the purpose of over-
throwing. the people's . democratic dictatorship, was a 
principal culprit in the case of the counter-revolutionary 
clique. Li Zuopeng took an active part in Lin Biao's 
activities to seize supreme power. 
In April of 1968, he falsely accused He Long and others 
of trying to "usurp army leadership and oppose the 
Party." He attacked 120 cadres in the Navy by name on 
false charges. 
At 11:35 p.m. on September 12 and at 00:06 a.m. on 
September 13, 1971, Li Zuopeng twice distorted Premier 
Zhou Enlai's directive just before the defection of Lin 
Biao and Ye Qun. When Pan Hao, director of the Navy 
Aviation Corps' Shanhaiguan Airport, in an emergency 
phone call at 00:20 a.m. on September 13, asked for in-
struction on what he should do if the plane were to take 
off forcibly, Li Zuopeng did not take any measure to pre-
vent the takeoff, thus allowing Lin Biao to escape abroad 
by air. Afterwards, Li Zuopeng tried to cover up his crime 
by altering the logbook entry of the relevant phone calls. 
The defendant, Li Zuopeng, has been found guilty of 
organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique as 
provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the People's 
Repu~l!c of China, of conspiring to overthrow the govern-
ment as provided in Article 92, and of framing and per-
secuting people as provided in Article 138. 
(!l) The defendant, Qiu IIuizuo, who organized and 
led a counter-revolutionary dique £or the purpose o( over-



























principal culprit in the cas2 of the counter-revolutionary 
c:liquc. Qiu Huizuo took an active part in Lin Biao's 
activities to seize supreme power. 
In 1967, Qiu Huizuo instructed some persons to steal 
the archives of the P.L.A. General Political Department 
and framed cadres in the department. He played an 
important role in Lin Biao's criminal activities of 
"smashing the General Political Department." 
Between 1967 and 1971,. Qiu Huizuo set up a kangaroo 
court in the P.L.A. General Logistics Department to extort 
confessions through torture, and directly framed and per-
secuted 462 cadres and ordinary people, among whom 
Tang Ping, Zhou Changgeng, Gu Zizhuang, Zhang Shusen, 
Shen Maoxing, Wang Shuchen, Zhang Lingdou and Hua 
Diping were persecuted to death. 
The defendant, Qiu Huizuo, has be~n fot'..~d ~:!!!j' of 
organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique as 
provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the People's 
Republic of China, of conspiring to overthrow the govern-
ment as provided in Article 92, and of framing and per-
secuting people as provided in Article 138. 
(10) The defendant, Jiang Tengjiao, who played an 
active role in the counter-revolutionary clique for the 
purpose of overthrowing the people's democratic dictator-
ship, was a principal culprit in the case of the counter-
revolutionary clique. On March 31, 1971, Jiang Tengjiao 
attended a secret meeting called by Lin Liguo in Shanghai 
to establish a "command team" for an armed coup, at 
which he was made the person responsible for liaison 
between the three places of Nanjing, Shanghai and Hang-
zhou "with a view to cu-un:ii11.:.dor. and concerted opera-
tion." Having received, via Lin Liguo, a hand-written 
order from Lin Biao on September 8 for an armed coup, 
Jiang Tengjiao took part in working out the details for 
assassinating Chairman Mao Z~dong, and assumed the 
position of first-line commander for action in the Shanghai 
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area. Following the failure of the plot to murder Chairman 
Mao Zedong, Jiang Tengjiao took an active part in the 
counter-revolutionary action of Lin Biao and Ye Qun in 
preparing for fleeing south to Guangzhou. 
The defendant, Jiang Tengjiao, has been found guilty 
of playing an active role in a counter-revolutionary clique 
as provided in Article 98 of the Criminal Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, of instigating an armed rebellion 
as provided in Article 93, and of attempting to ldll people 
for counter-revolutionary purposes as provided in Article 
101. 
Among the above-mentioned defendants, Wang Hong-
wen, Chen Boda, Wu Faxian, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo and 
Jiang Tengjiao each gave an account of the offences he 
had committed. Jiang Tengjiao confessed his offences 
the day after Lin Biao's defection. Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo 
and Jiang Tengjiao exposed crimes committed by Lin 
Biao, Jiang Qing and other co-defendants in the case. 
Huang Yongsheng confessed some of his offences. Yao 
Wenyuan described his offences as mistakes and denied 
that they were crimes. Zhang Chunqiao refused to answer 
the questions put to him by the bench. Jiang Qing 
disrupted order in court. 
Judgement on the Defendants According 
to Criminal Law 
In view of the facts, nature and degree of the offences 
Jiang Qing and the other nine defendants committed and 
the damage they did to society, and in accordance with 
Articles 90, 92, 93, 98, 101, 102, 103 and 138, as well as 
Articles 20, 43, 52, 53 and 64, of the Criminal Law of the 























Jiang Qing is sentenced to death with a two-year 
reprieve and permanent deprivation of political rights; 
Zhang Chunqiao is sentenced to death with a two-year 
reprieve and permanent deprivation of political rights; 
Yao Wenyuan is sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment 
and deprivation of political rights for five years; 
Wang Hongwen· is sentenced to life imprisonment and 
permanent deprivation of political rights; 
Chen Boda is sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment and 
deprivation of political rights for five years; 
Huang Yongsheng is sentenced to 18 years' imprison-
ment and deprivation of political rights for five years; 
Wu Faxian is sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment and 
deprivation of political rights for five years; 
Li Zuopeng is sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment and 
deprivation of political rights for fiVP vears; 
Qiu Huizuo is sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment and 
deprivation of political rights for five years; 
Jiang Tengjiao is sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment 
and deprivation of political rights for five years. 
The fixed terms of imprisonment for those listed above 
who are sentenced to such a penalty shall run from the 
first day of enforcement of the sentences. Where an 
offender has been held in prior custody, the duration of 
such custody shall be deducted from the term of imprison-
ment at the rate of one day for each day spent in prior 
custody. 
This judgement is final. 
January 23, 1981 
The Special Court under the Supreme People's Court 
of the People's Republic u: China 
President of the Supreme People's Court and concur-
rently President of the Special Court: Jiang Hua 
Vice-Presidents: Wu Xiuquan, Zeng Hanzhou and 
Huang Yukun 
Judges: Wang Wenzheng, Wang Zhidao, Wang Zhan-
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ping, Gan Ying, Shi Xiaotan, Ning Huanxing, Situ Qing, 
Qu Yucai, Zhu Lizhi1 Ren Chenghong, Ren Lingyun, Liu 
Liying, Liu Jiguang, Xu Zongqi, Yan Xinmin, Su Ziheng, 
Wu Baosan, Li Minggui, Li Yi, Wu Maosun, Shen Jian, 
Zhang Shirong, Zhang Min, Fan Zhi, Fei Xiaotong, Luo 
Tongqi, Gao Chaoxun, Gao Bin, Huang Liangchen, Cao 
Lizhou and Zhai Xuexi 
This copy has been verified and found to be identical 
with the original. 
January 25, 1981 
Recording clerks: Guo Zhiwen and Huang Linyi 
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